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“A Global Struggle,” examines the role that diplomacy, particularly at the United 
Nations, played in Namibian nationalist and South African imperial policy in the decades 
following the Second World War. My work is based on extensive archival research in 
Namibia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the United States.  I argue 
that the creation of the United Nations out of the ashes of the League of Nations gave 
both Namibians and South Africans hope that they could shape Namibia into what they 
wanted it to be.  Namibians wanted to end the League of Nations Mandate that had 
allowed South Africa to rule their country since 1920, and the South African government 
hoped to annex Namibia as the fifth province of the Union of South Africa. Namibian 
nationalists worked with the United Nations and other nations to prevent South Africa 
from gaining legal control of Namibia.  Representatives of Namibian nationalists as early 
as 1947 began transforming the United Nations away from an institution concerned with 
maintaining empires into a burgeoning anti-colonial force that would hasten 
decolonization.  South Africa, facing decreasing support from the United States and Great 
 vii 
Britain, desperately tried to reverse the rising tide of anti-colonial sentiment that was 
building at the United Nations.   Both South Africans and Namibians viewed the United 
Nations as the center of the struggle over the future of Namibia.  My project examines the 
strategies and actions of both groups as they tried to manipulate world opinion in their 
favor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“A Global Struggle:  Namibian Nationalism and South African Imperialism at the 
United Nations, 1945-1960,” examines the role that the UN played in the strategies of 
Namibians and South Africans in their plans for the future of Namibia.  Namibians and 
South Africans viewed the United Nations as central to their strategies in gaining control 
over Namibia.  Namibian nationalism developed in the crucible of international politics, 
and until independence in 1990, Namibians viewed international diplomacy as their 
primary weapon against South African rule.  “A Global Struggle” is the first study to look 
in depth at Namibian and South African activities between 1945 and 1960.  The 
Namibian issue was pivotal in helping transform the UN into an anti-colonial body.  By 
the early 1950s, while the imperial powers tried to reconsolidate their empires, they had 
to confront the rising anti-colonial sentiment at the UN, which found its focus in 
Namibia.  The actions of Namibians kept the issue before the UN and gave nations such 
as India ammunition to attack imperialism. 
South African control of Namibia was formalized under a Mandate from the 
League of Nations. Upon the dissolution of the League in 1946, the role of the 
international community in Namibia, represented by the United Nations, was a 
contentious issue as South Africa and the UN both claimed sovereignty over Namibia.  
Between 1920, the year the mandate was conferred to South Africa, and 1990, South 
Africa ruled Namibia as an integral part of South Africa.  South Africans moved into 
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Namibia, and when apartheid was instituted in South Africa in 1948, it quickly spread to 
Namibia.     
As the United Nations began to take over the functions of the League of Nations, 
in particular the transferring of the mandates under the umbrella of the Trusteeship 
System overseen by the Fourth Committee of the UN, Namibia was the only mandated 
territory not to be turned over to UN supervision.1  Instead of submitting a trusteeship 
agreement Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, attempted to 
annex Namibia into the Union of South Africa.  For the next forty-five years, the United 
Nations and South Africa would wrestle over the future of Namibia.  It was at this stage 
that Namibians began their long liberation struggle against South Africa at the United 
Nations.  Between 1946 and 1990, the United Nations and its judicial branch, the 
International Court of Justice, played a prominent role in the plans of Namibian 
nationalists.  Namibians utilized the UN to gain support for their cause and to isolate the 
South African government through forty-four long years of increasing South African 
domination.  The South African government also viewed the UN as the place where it 
could win a decisive victory and incorporate the territory as a fifth province.   
When describing the South West African People’s Organization’s (SWAPO) 
strategies against South Africa, Sam Nujoma wrote that SWAPO had “designed a three-
pronged strategy: the political front, the diplomatic front and the armed liberation 
                                                
1 The Fourth Committee was also known as the Trusteeship Committee and was responsible for ushering 
the trusteeships towards independence.  After the last trustee territory gained independence the Fourth 
Committee became the Special Political and Decolonization Committee and encouraged all dependet 
territories towards independence. 
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struggle.”  He went on to describe the political front as “working with the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement, the UN, and of course with our 
people back home,” clearly demonstrating that international organizations and foreign 
policy played center stage in their struggle.2  SWAPO’s strategy continued the earlier 
periods of Namibian struggle examined in this dissertation.  Namibian nationalists, with 
help from sympathetic nations visited, petitioned, worked with, and influenced the United 
Nations until independence in 1990.  Namibian nationalists also worked directly with 
nations around the globe, setting up offices on virtually every continent. 
“A Global Struggle” is the first work to look in depth at how Namibians and 
South Africans planned and waged their campaigns at the United Nations.  Each side 
viewed UN support as central to the future of Namibia.  While “A Global Struggle” is 
primarily about the actions of South Africans and Namibians, it sheds light on how the 
debate over the future of Namibia influenced and was representative of the changes in the 
global order after the Second World War.  I explore how Namibians and South Africans 
negotiated the changes that consumed the globe as each group tried to manipulate world 
opinion in its favor.  Namibians and South Africans had to negotiate the global 
transformations that the end of the Second World War created.  South Africa was unable 
to adapt to the changing world and by 1960, world opinion was firmly on the side of the 
Namibian people.  Between 1945 and 1960, the world dominated by European empires 
                                                
2 Sam Nujoma, Where Others Wavered: My Life in SWAPO and my participation in the liberation struggle 
of Namibia, (London: Panaf Books, 2001), 123. 
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that Smuts grew up in was disintegrating.  The Cold War rivalry between the United 
States and Soviet Union overshadowed the older imperial rivalries of the previous 
centuries, and both nations were outwardly anti-imperialist.  The retreat from colonialism 
by the British in the late 1950s, along with increasing African nationalism and the anti-
colonial stance of both the US and USSR, encouraged Namibians in their struggle.  As 
European empires retreated, former colonial states began to express themselves globally 
through multiple international gatherings at Bandung, Cairo, Accra, and other places 
around the globe.  By the 1950s, the “Third World” began to flex its muscles.  Vijay 
Prashad in his history of the Third World, The Darker Nations, argues that the United 
Nations was the main institution from which the Third World expressed its power.3 
“A Global Struggle” examines the initial period of Namibian activism and South 
Africa’s struggle at the United Nations.  The immediate post war period provided the 
international atmosphere in which Namibian nationalism flourished.  Tony Emmett in his 
study of Namibian nationalism argued that the work of Namibians at the United Nations 
in the 1940s and 1950s “would help to prepare the ground for the emergence of new 
types of resistance.”4 In the face of these global transformations, Namibian nationalists 
out maneuvered the Union of South Africa.  Between 1946 and 1956, Namibians built a 
global network of support through the auspices of the Anglican cleric Michael Scott, and 
from 1956-1990 represented themselves at the United Nations.  The South Africans were 
                                                
3 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations:  A People’s History of the Third World, (New York:  The New Press, 
2007),  xvi. 
4 Tony Emmet, Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966, (Basel: P. 
Schlettwein Publishing, 1999)  255. 
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less able to adapt to a changing world.  The end of colonialism and the rise of the Third 
World put them on the defensive as they sought to extend their control over Namibia, 
while defending racial segregation and white rule.  The one avenue where the South 
Africans felt they could maintain support from the West was to rely on South Africa’s 
anti-communist credentials.  The Union of South Africa was staunchly anti-communist 
and its strategic position at the southern tip of Africa was a pivotal bargaining position.  
Perhaps more importantly, the Union controlled massive uranium reserves within 
Namibia that South Africa leveraged to gain limited support from the US and Great 
Britain.  Both the American and British public turned against the Union by the late 1950s 
and neither government was willing to openly support South Africa, but they were also 
afraid of completely alienating South Africa.  
In the struggle for Namibia, 1960 was a pivotal turning point as conditions in 
Southern Africa and in the international atmosphere changed.  By the end of 1960 
Namibian nationalists had created two rival nationalist organizations, the South West 
African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African People’s Organization 
(SWAPO).  These organizations were dominated by young men, inspired by the 
campaigns of Hosea Kutako at the UN, and were ready to push a more militant agenda in 
order to secure independence.  In the Union of South Africa, the long held desire of the 
Afrikaners came to fruition as the Union transformed into the Republic of South Africa 
and withdrew from the British Empire.  After 1960, the South Africans became more 
obstinate in their refusal to work with the international community over the future of 
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Namibia. South Africa was unable to adapt to the new global reality that the rise of the 
Third World and anti-colonialism created.  As the world moved away from empires and 
segregation, the South Africans increased their control of Namibia and built the system of 
apartheid in order to defend their white civilization from the African majority.   In 1960, 
the struggle for Namibia also temporarily left the UN as Ethiopia and Liberia argued 
before the ICJ that the South African occupation of Namibia was illegal.  This case 
coupled with the arrival of the “Year of Africa,” in which over a dozen African nations 
gained independence, transformed the United Nations fully into an anti-colonial body.  
The work of Michael Scott, Hosea Kutako, Tshekedi Khama, Sam Nujoma, Mburumba 
Kerina, Fanuel Kozonguizi, Hans Beukes, and many others’ efforts to transform the UN 
from an institution protecting empires into an anti-colonial force came to fruition.  The 
South West African case was a defining issue for the Fourth Committee and the United 
Nations. Namibians from Hosea Kutako with the aid of Michael Smith in the 1940s to 
Sam Nujoma in the ensuing decades were able to take advantage of the opportunities that 
the United Nations offered them.  “A Global Struggle” demonstrates that the United 
Nations was a powerful ally that Namibian nationalists were able to harness for their own 
ends.  The UN in its issuance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 also 
gave Namibians the ammunition to turn the world against the South Africans.  They were 
the first to speak up against the gross human rights violation that was apartheid, as the 
South African government would often try out its “native” policies in Namibia before 
they fully incorporated them at home. 
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 Kutako and other Namibians were initially unable to approach the UN directly 
and had to get Michael Scott to represent the Herero people at the UN during the 1940s 
because the South African government would not allow Namibians to leave their country.  
In response to the refusal of South Africa to allow Namibians to travel, the United 
Nations eventually began issuing passports to Namibians that were recognized by most 
nations around the world.  The UN was able to undermine the sovereignty of South 
Africa and its imperial possessions by creating a space for stateless people to travel and 
speak to the world. 
 The UN that Smuts helped design believed in the power of sovereign states 
working together to maintain world peace.  Smuts and others viewed the UN as a peace 
keeping force that did not meddle in the affairs of its member states.  For Namibians and 
other dispossessed peoples, the UN represented a forum in which they could seek 
restitution for their grievances.  The Namibian case was pivotal in helping transform the 
UN from an institution that protected the interests and sovereignty of its members into an 
anti-colonial organization.  In 1956, Namibians won the right to petition directly to the 
UN in order to shame South Africa into leaving the territory.  The Human Rights 
Committee and later the Fourth Committee would use this precedent to allow others to 
come before the UN to accuse member states of wrongdoing.  By the end of the 1950s the 
UN was well on it’s way to becoming a forum where stateless people and activists could 
attack states on issues from colonial rule to human rights violations.      
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Namibians were able to successfully exploit the opportunities that an international 
organization provided and through a combination of diplomacy, mass political 
mobilization, and an armed struggle, Namibia was able to win its independence.  The last 
remnants of formal colonialism in Africa were situated in the southern region of the 
continent and the region became a key battleground during the Cold War.  In Southern 
Africa Cold War rivalries often turned hot.  Traditionally, studies of the end of 
colonialism in Southern Africa look at the fall of white rule as a battle between the East 
and West and relegate the role of Africans to that of bit players in a larger story.  While 
nationalist historiography puts Africans into the limelight in the domestic sphere, it often 
ignores the way that international politics influenced events on the continent.  Africans 
were involved in international organizations and global politics decades before they 
broke free from the shackles of colonialism.  A new wave of historiography is putting 
Africans into the story, but they are often seen as reacting to rather than shaping imperial 
and global policy.  This new historiography does an excellent job of showing how 
independent African nations helped push for decolonization in the rest of Africa, but still 
down plays the international component of African nationalist activities.   
 “A Global Struggle” contributes to the historiography of African decolonization, 
Namibia, South Africa, the United Nations, and international history.  By examining the 
role that Namibians played in gaining international support and discrediting the South 
African government, I demonstrate that African liberation movements had a global 
outlook and were involved in diplomatic struggles around the world.  Scholars have 
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written dozens of books on African decolonization that examine the political, military 
and social aspects of independence, but studies of the international aspects of 
decolonization are rare.  One exception is Voices from Tanganyika:  Great Britain, the 
United Nations and the Decolonization of a Trust Territory, 1946-1961, by Ullrich 
Lohrman.  Voices from Tanganyika demonstrates how Tanganyikans exploited their 
status as a trustee territory in order to hasten the end of British rule.  They utilized the 
same strategies as Namibians of petitioning and working with the Fourth Committee, but 
their status as a trust territory gave them the legal rights to do so.  Namibians were not 
guaranteed the same access and had to fight for a seat at the international table. 
My work is inspired by Matthew Connelly’s book A Diplomatic Revolution:  
Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origin of the Post-Cold War Era, which claims 
that the Algerians were able to manipulate world opinion and the rivalries of the Cold 
War to gain their independence.  He claims that this manipulation set the stage for a 
“diplomatic revolution.”  This revolution supposedly created a new wave of diplomacy 
that demonstrated the power of the non-aligned movement and the way that the 
disenfranchised could access the halls of global power.  However, while Connelly’s work 
was groundbreaking, it does suffer from some key flaws.  Algeria was not the first 
African nation to try to manipulate world opinion in its favor and most of A Diplomatic 
Revolution focuses on De Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Dulles, not the Algerians who agitated 
for independence. 
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 Compared to the anti-colonial historiography of Zimbabwe, Kenya, and South 
Africa, Namibian historiography is just now coming into its own.  During the liberation 
struggle, political scientists, legal scholars, and international relations theorists were 
fascinated by the struggle and wrote scores of books and articles on the subject.  
However, since independence the literature has tapered off.  Those scholars who do study 
the liberation struggle have focused on either the military aspect or the social impact of 
the struggle and have only briefly alluded to the role that Namibians played 
internationally.  Marion Wallace in her History of Namibia recognizes the importance 
that international politics played in Namibian liberation, but focuses on events within the 
country.  Tony Emmet provides an almost encyclopedic account of the development of 
Namibian nationalism, but once again focuses on events at home rather than abroad.  
Political scientist Lauren Dobell whose book SWAPO’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-
1991: War by Other Means investigates the role that the focus on diplomacy had on the 
formation of SWAPO, but does not discuss in detail the earlier period of international 
activism. 
 One scholar who does focus on the international aspect of the struggle is S.C. 
Saxena in his 1991 book, Namibia and the World:  The Story of the Birth of a Nation.  
Saxena was attached to an NGO that supported Namibian independence in India, and his 
book, while giving a detailed overview of the international community’s role in 
independence, is not an objective historical account. He focuses on the role that 
organizations like the UN and Commonwealth played in the granting of independence to 
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Namibia, while Namibians are presented as almost passive actors.  During the 1960s and 
1970s, dozens of works by political scientists, journalists, lawyers, historians, and 
activists were published in order to explain the Namibian situation to the international 
community and often were designed to influence political action. 
 One scholar who has begun to examine Namibia’s liberation struggle in the 
international arena is Christopher Saunders.  Saunders, a professor of history at the 
University of Cape Town, looks at the Namibian independence struggle through a South 
African lens.  His two most important articles are, “The Role of the United Nations in the 
Independence of Namibia,” in History Compass, and “The Transitions from Apartheid to 
Democracy in Namibia and South Africa in the Context of Decolonization,” in the 
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History.  Both of these articles were written in the 
last ten years, look at South Africa as an imperial power, and argue that we need to 
reevaluate the way we look at the struggle for majority rule in South Africa and Namibia.  
The problem is that like Saxena, Saunders still looks at Namibians as playing a secondary 
role to the UN and Cold War rivalries.   
 Piero Gleijeses has also written about the role that international actors played in 
Namibia’s liberation struggle.  His article in Cold War History, “Cuba and The 
Independence of Namibia,” and his book Visions of Freedom:  Havana, Washington, 
Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991, argue that the most important 
force in Namibia’s quest for independence was the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.  
Without Cuban troops in Angola and the threat of them invading Namibia to aid SWAPO 
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the US would not have forced South Africa to the negotiating table in the 1980s.  This 
argument is too simplistic and downplays the role of Namibians in the struggle.  Cuban 
troops clearly played a role in US and South African decision-making, but their presence 
was not the most important factor in Namibia’s drive for independence. 
 “A Global Struggle” builds on the work done by others and fills a necessary gap 
in the literature on Namibian independence.  Namibians took control of their own 
struggle and South Africa’s inability to deal with either Namibian activists or the 
changing global dynamics is an important story that needs to be told and has important 
ramifications.  Literature on the UN also points to the 1960s as the moment in which the 
Afro-Asian bloc takes over the United Nations, but without issues such as South African 
control of Namibia to unify the “Third World” in the 1940s and 1950s the transition in 
the 1960s would have been harder.  Africans, Latin Americans, and Asians had been 
working with Namibians for over a decade before they were thrust into the spotlight and 
had to work together on other issues.  Namibia was discussed by the UN more than any 
other issue in its early history and hastened the transformation of the UN. 
 “A Global Struggle” is broken down into four chapters.  The first chapter, “The 
Opening Salvo:  The Fight Over Incorporation,” examines the attempt by the Smuts 
administration to incorporate Namibia as a fifth province of the Union of South Africa.  
Smuts, one of the key architects of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, at 
the opening of the United Nations requested the UN’s blessing for incorporation.  He was 
stunned when newly independent nations like India rejected his plan and asked what the 
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opinion of the African population was towards incorporation.  By 1947, Hosea Kutako, 
the head of the Herero in Namibia, was able to raise funds and send a representative to 
the UN to fight against incorporation.  Kutako’s campaign, along with support from India 
and other non-western nations, prevented Smuts from annexing Namibia.  Smuts believed 
that the role of India in the debate over Namibia set a dangerous precedent for the future 
of the United Nations.  Even with the support of the United States, Great Britain and 
France he was unable to legally annex Namibia and the UN began its transformation into 
an anti-colonial organization.  Chapter One is an in depth look at the strategies used by 
both Kutako and the Smuts Administration in the opening sessions of the United Nations. 
Chapter 2, “A New Atmosphere:  The Nationalists Take Over,” focuses on the 
changing strategies of the Malan government beginning in 1948.  The Malan government 
criticized the Smuts administration for working with the UN, rather than just 
incorporating Namibia.  The Malan administration was antagonistic towards the UN and 
fought the UN instead of trying to work with it.  South Africa declared that the mandate 
had lapsed with the League of Nations and moved into a closer relationship with 
Namibia.  Between apartheid and the refusal to negotiate, the UN effectively turned 
against the Union in 1948 and in 1949 invited the Reverend Michael Scott to speak for 
the Herero.  Many observers of Scott’s speech to the UN commented that the Namibian 
issue was not a legal issue, but a moral one.  The Union up to 1990 would argue the legal 
issues over Namibia, but for many in the UN morality became the key concern over 
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Namibia.  Scott continued to pressure the UN and the Malan administration succeeded in 
isolating itself from much of the world. 
Chapter 3, “Opening the Floodgates:  The International Court of Justice, 
Apartheid and the Right to Petition,” examines the role that the ICJ played in the 
Namibian issue and the struggle for Namibians to make themselves heard at the UN.  The 
ICJ issued several important decisions on the Namibian issue in the 1950s.  The first was 
to refute Malan’s claim that the mandate had lapsed and to assert that the Union had an 
obligation towards the UN over Namibia.  One of the key obligations was to submit 
reports on their administration of the territory and to allow petitioners to send information 
to the UN.  The Union refused to do either and throughout the 1950s became increasingly 
belligerent towards the UN.  After a second hearing of Michael Scott, the Union briefly 
boycotted the UN.  The US, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and France all discretely fought 
alongside South Africa to prevent petitioners from coming to the UN because they feared 
the precedent that would set.  However, the General Assembly was able to overrule the 
Great Powers and an ICJ decision confirmed the legality of allowing petitioners to 
comment on the Namibian issue.  The Human Rights Committee used the ICJ decision to 
allow petitioners to come before it in the 1960s.  Throughout the 1950s, the Union 
became more entrenched in their refusal to acknowledge the rights of the UN to have a 
say in Namibia.  The Union temporarily withdrew from the UN in 1956 because of the 
nature of the discussion over Namibia and the addition of apartheid on the General 
Assembly’s agenda.  The ICJ decision opened the floodgates of petitioners.  By the late 
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1950s Namibians were writing dozens of letters to the UN every year criticizing South 
African rule, in particular the implementation of apartheid, and began sending 
representatives directly to the UN. 
The last chapter, “A New Approach, Massacre, Mobility, and Nationalism,” 
examines the attempt by the UN and South Africa to come to an agreement and two 
critical events in Namibian history that helped lead to the rise of broad based nationalist 
organizations such as SWAPO and SWANU, and destroyed any attempt at a 
reconciliation between the Union and the United Nations.  The UN, realizing that a 
solution to the impasse over Namibia could not be reached if the Union did not 
participate in discussions decided to create The Good Offices Committee and use a new 
approach to the situation.  The Good Offices Committee was made up of Great Britain, 
the United States, and Brazil and was permitted to entertain any solution to the problem.  
Union officials believed that the Good Offices Committee could create a chance to make 
progress until late 1959 when the discussions were wrecked by two South African 
actions.  The arrival of Hans Beukes at the United Nations and the massacre of 
Namibians in Windhoek ended all hope of negotiations.  Beukes was a Namibian student 
who had received a scholarship to study in Europe; however, the South African 
government revoked his passport.  After losing his passport, Beukes became political and 
illegally traveled through Africa to Europe and eventually reached the United Nations.   
While in Europe, he gave speeches to packed audiences and his story would capture the 
attention of the United Nations.  It also demonstrated the ability of the UN to ignore the 
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power of nations to control their borders.  The Union was furious that both the UK and 
the US allowed Beukes to travel through their territories without proper documentation.  
Both nations replied that as members of the United Nations they could not prevent people 
from traveling to the UN.  On December 10, 1959, South African police fired into a 
crowd in Windhoek killing eleven and wounding dozens in what became known as the 
Old Location Massacre.  The massacre began because of the Union’s plan to forcibly 
move the black population of Windhoek to Katatura, the new township outside of 
Windhoek. The Massacre also horrified the international community and demonstrated 
the brutality of the South African regime. Both the Old Location Massacre and Beukes 
greatly impacted the ability of Namibians to lobby the UN and demonstrated to Union 
officials that they were losing what little ability they had to influence world opinion. 
 “A Global Struggle” is based on research on three continents, in five countries, 
and a dozen cities.  Piecing together the stories of stateless and dispossessed people from 
the archives can often be a challenge.  The South African, American, and British 
governments keep thorough and detailed records, but the papers of individuals like Hosea 
Kutako, Hans Beukes, and Mburumba Kerina are harder to track down.  By the 1960s 
SWANU and SWAPO had produced many reports, newsletters, and official 
communications to keep track of their global struggles, but in the earlier years we often 
have to rely on the official sources of the colonial government.  The vast majority of my 
sources are from the South African National Archives in Pretoria, supplemented by the 
personal papers of Eric Louw at the Archive for Contemporary Affairs at the University 
17 
 
of the Free State, miscellaneous papers at the University of Witwatersrand and the 
National Archives of Namibia.  The National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew 
Gardens also contained a substantial amount of documents.  From these sources, I was 
able to piece together the strategies of the various South African administrations and their 
relationships with the British government.  The South Africans also kept detailed notes 
and files on Namibian activists and from their files along with the Michael Scott 
Collection at the University of Oxford, Kozonguizi’s papers at the Basler Afrika 
Bibliographien in Basel, and smaller archives in both the United States and Southern 
Africa, the motivations and strategies of Namibians and their allies can be determined.  
Namibians and their supporters also published significant works to help explain the 
history of their struggle, which helped piece together areas where the archives were 
silent. 
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  CHAPTER 1 
THE OPENING SALVO:  THE STRUGGLE OVER INCORPORATION 
 
 
 
 In April of 1945, representatives from fifty nations, spearheaded by the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, met in San Francisco, to create a new 
international organization to replace the defunct League of Nations.  The soon to be 
victorious allies sought to create an organization that would prevent violent conflicts 
from consuming the globe.  The end result of the meetings in San Francisco was the 
creation of the United Nations (UN).  The diplomats who signed the UN Charter on June 
26, 1945, believed they had created an organization that would replace the ineffectual 
League of Nations and ensure international cooperation.    Four months later, on October 
24, 1945, the United Nations was formally created when the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, France, and most of the other signatories ratified the 
organization’s charter. 
 The ratification of the Charter was a momentous step in setting up the United 
Nations for success.  One of the key architects of the League of Nations, Woodrow 
Wilson, was unable to convince the United States Congress to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles, which prevented the United States from joining the League.  The League of 
Nations began with great hope, but its weakness and lack of universal international 
support, neither the United States nor Germany were founding members, helped lead to 
its downfall, a mistake the delegates at the San Francisco Conference did not want to 
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repeat.  The architects of the United Nations wanted it to appear as if there was a clear 
break from the League.  In distancing the UN from the League, the delegates hoped that 
people would forget the failures of the past and look towards the future with the UN 
maintaining the peace.  Some did not believe that the UN was fundamentally different 
from the League.  Leland Goodrich argued in 1947, that the UN was merely “a revised 
League, no doubt improved in some respects, possibly weaker in others, but nonetheless a 
League, a voluntary association of nations, carrying on largely in the League tradition 
and by the League methods.”5  Goodrich believed the UN could learn from the League’s 
successes and failures, and emerge as a stronger institution.  He hoped that since the UN 
was so similar to the League that it could succeed where the League had ultimately failed. 
In South West Africa, later renamed Namibia,6 the replacement of the League by 
the UN was closely watched.  Following the First World War, the great powers granted 
the Union of South Africa, in large part for her help during the war, had received a 
mandate for German South West Africa.  The granting of the mandate to South Africa 
fulfilled the expansionist aims of the South Africans who had wanted to expand 
northward for decades.7  The mandate also reinforced South Africa’s desire to move out 
                                                
5 Leland Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations,” International Organization, vol. 1, no.1, 
(Feb., 1947), 3-12, 21. 
6 I will refer Namibia as South West Africa up until the official name change in 1968.  I will refer to the 
African population in the country by the term Namibian and refer to the white population as South West 
Africans. 
7 For a detailed analysis of South Africa’s expansionist designs see Ronald Hyam’s Failure of South Africa 
Expansion, 1908-1948 
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of the British shadow and gain greater autonomy.8 The Mandate System, created by the 
Treaty of Versailles was conceived in the ideas of self-determination and anti-
imperialism embodied in Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points.  One of Wilson’s lasting legacies 
at Versailles was the creation of the League of Nations and the Mandate System.  Wilson 
believed that the First World War was not fought for territorial gain, but to spread the 
benefits of self-determination and democracy and the addition of further colonies was 
discouraged.  In Europe, this meant the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires, the creation of an independent Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and a number of Balkan countries.  However, the overseas 
colonies of Germany and the non-European territories of the Ottoman Empire were 
granted to the victorious allies to rule as “sacred trusts” of the international community. 
When the League of Nations created the mandate system, it divided the territories 
of the German and Ottoman Empire into three classes of mandates.  A, B, and C 
Mandates were created based on the how the Allies viewed the development of the 
populations within each territory.  Territories, such as Iraq, were classified as Class A 
mandates and were deemed almost ready for independence.  The League operated under 
the assumption that Class A mandates would be quickly shepherded to independence.  
The territories judged least able to govern themselves were labeled Class C Mandates.  
German South West Africa was considered a Class C territory.  Denys Meyers, the 
Assistant Director of League of Nations News Bureau, described the Class C mandates in 
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1921 as “the lowest class of mandates, by which a territory is practically left within the 
national jurisdiction of a state.”9  Class C mandates were ruled by the mandatory power 
virtually as formal colonies, while the A and B Class mandates were given various levels 
of autonomy based on their supposed development. 
Under the mandate, South Africa “ha[d] full power of administration and 
legislation over the territory” and a responsibility to “promote to the utmost the material 
and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants.”10  From the very 
beginning of the mandate period, South Africa administered the territory as if it was part 
of South Africa.  South African laws were instituted in South West Africa and South 
African settlers flowed into the sparsely populated territory, bringing both British and 
Afrikaner culture and values in to the country.  They would also bring with them their 
prejudices and an insatiable desire for land.   By 1925, 880 farms had been given to poor 
whites from the Union.  The Smuts administration also created pass laws and African 
reserves much like those that existed in South Africa.11  The territory’s close proximity to 
South Africa, as well as the port of Walvis Bay, which had always been ruled by South 
Africa, meant that the connections between the two entities were extremely close.  In 
1920, Smuts held a meeting in Windhoek and reassured the white population that the 
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mandate was virtually the same as annexation.  He promised that South Africa would 
administer the territory as if it was part of the Union.12 
During the interwar years the Mandate Commission routinely criticized the 
Union’s administration in South West Africa.  Susan Pederson argues in “The Meaning 
of the Mandate System: An Argument” that the treatment of Namibians by the Union 
government during the interwar years had already convinced those who were paying 
attention that South Africa should not be allowed to incorporate the territory.  The 
adoption of pass laws, the creation of native reserves, and the breakup of Namibian 
groups led many within the Mandate Commission to question whether South Africa was 
ruling in the best interest of the territory’s population.  She places the beginning of South 
African ostracism to the 1930s.13  However, while South Africa was criticized by the 
Mandates Commission the criticism was never severe enough to change South African 
policy in South West Africa.   
From the mid 1880s until the South African conquest, South West Africa had 
been ruled by a series of brutal German colonial administrations.  The German 
occupation of Namibia was one of the most horrific in Africa.  The African population 
was pushed to the side and those who resisted were annihilated.  The Herero in particular 
were almost completely destroyed as the German Army went on a genocidal campaign to 
punish them for rebelling.  The Herero were eventually defeated, and thousands died in 
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the Kalahari as they fled to Botswana, separating their people into two groups.  The 
German colonial administration also encouraged rebellion and strife in South Africa and 
actively supported the Boers during the South African War.  By the time of the First 
World War, the people of Namibia were suffering under the lash as the German 
population tried to make the colony profitable.  When war broke out, a South African 
column swept into the territory and, with the help of the Namibian population quickly 
defeated German forces in the region.  The Namibians initially welcomed Union forces as 
liberators.   
The Union government had always sought to expand its influence in southern 
Africa and after defeating the German forces in South West Africa, began to administer 
the territory with the hope of annexing it into the Union.  Their hopes were dashed at the 
Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as the victorious Allies decided to create the mandate 
system.  Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, South Africa would administer the territory as 
a “trust of civilization.”  The mandate system required the South African government to 
provide yearly reports on the progress made in the territory.  It also created a procedure 
for the inhabitants of the mandates to petition the League if the spirit of the mandate were 
violated, but the right to petition was a little used practice, as the right to petition had to 
be carried out through the mandatory power.  The territory of South West Africa was 
granted to South Africa to administer as a sacred trust for the League, and was not 
officially a part of the Union.  When the League of Nations began to crumble during the 
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Second World War, the South African government immediately tried to end the 
international community’s control of Namibia. 
By early 1945, South Africa, under the leadership of Field Marshall Jan Smuts’ 
United Party, began calling for an end to the mandate under which South Africa ruled 
Namibia. In a speech to the South African parliament in March 1945, Smuts expressed 
doubts that the mandate system would last.  He advised parliament that South Africa 
should move with a unified voice to see that Union interests were protected when the 
League and the Mandate system fell apart.  The push for incorporation was celebrated in 
The Windhoek Advertiser, the only English language newspaper in South West Africa.  
The editors of the Advertiser believed “that the best solution would be to abolish the 
Mandate system, and to include South West14 in the Union of South Africa.”15 As the 
world gathered in San Francisco in April 1945, South Africa came with a plan to end the 
Mandate System and incorporate South West Africa into the Union of South Africa. 
When Smuts and his delegation arrived at the San Francisco conference, they 
immediately began to work on getting international approval for the incorporation of 
South West Africa into the Union.  Jan Smuts, one of the few statesmen to be 
instrumental in the founding of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, had 
immense political capital at his disposal.  He believed that his position as an international 
statesman and prime minister of South Africa would allow him to bring Namibia firmly 
into South Africa.   However, as the international climate shifted during the Second 
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World War, his belief in the British imperial system became outdated.  The failure of the 
League of Nations to prevent another catastrophic war coupled with the rise of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant forces in the world spelled the end of 
the British Empire’s influence over world politics.  The USSR and the US were both 
ideologically anti-imperialist nations and were unwilling to overtly support a white-
dominated South Africa’s desire to incorporate Namibia.  Jan Smuts’ belief in a world 
best governed by the ties of empire would not help him in the new world order that was 
emerging in San Francisco. 
Smuts’ plan in San Francisco was quickly dashed, as the delegates at the 
conference were more concerned with creating the United Nations than on deciding the 
future of independent mandates or nations.  The South African delegation was told that 
issues of particular territories were not going to be discussed in San Francisco and that he 
should wait until the next conference to push for incorporation.  In order to set the stage 
for the next conference, the Union representatives issued a statement declaring that  
The delegation of the Union of South Africa has raised the issue of the 
inapplicability of the mandate system to South West Africa and has given the San 
Francisco Conference  notice of its intention to claim at a later peace conference, 
when territorial questions are discussed, that its mandate over the territory be 
terminated and that it be incorporated as part of the Union of South Africa.16 
 
In a document circulated at the San Francisco Conference, Smuts laid out his reasons for 
Union incorporation of South West Africa.  His argument focused on the following 
issues: that “the Union of South Africa has governed and administered the territory as an 
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integral part of its own territory and has promoted to the utmost the material and moral 
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants,” that “it is geographically and 
strategically a part of the Union of South Africa, and in World War No. 1 a rebellion in 
the Union was fomented from it, and an attack launched against the Union,” and that 
“there is no prospect of the territory ever existing as a separate state, and the ultimate 
objective of the mandatory principle is therefore impossible of achievement.”17   
After realizing that they had a lot of work to do to convince the world at the first 
session of the UN, the delegation moved to influencing the development of the UN.  
Smuts was more than capable of steering the direction of the UN because he had been 
appointed Secretary General of the General Assembly.  According to historian Mark 
Mazower, Smuts’ desire to maintain the status of the British Empire in the world was 
paramount in his view of the United Nations.  He believed that he was creating a UN that 
“could safeguard the peace and create the conditions for European values to be 
globalized.”18  Smuts, who ruled a segregated settler outpost in South Africa, wrote the 
inspiring preamble to the UN Charter.   He could speak of equality and human dignity 
and not see the hypocrisy of his own rule in South Africa.  Smuts believed that the only 
way that non-whites could “progress” was the white stewardship.  His UN was one that 
protected empire and continued the civilizing mission.  The UN that emerged from San 
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Francisco was quite different from the one Smuts imagined.  Rather than being a place to 
preserve empire, it quickly became a forum to discuss the end of colonialism.   
 The Windhoek Advertiser saw Smuts’ inability to convince the allies at San 
Francisco as a major blow to his plans for incorporation.  While it supported 
incorporation, the paper wrote in August 1945 that incorporation would probably take a 
long time and that people needed to be patient as South Africa tried to convince the world 
that annexation was the best option for South West Africa.  The writer accurately pointed 
out that annexation would be a hard sell as South Arica had asked for “an existing 
mandated territory to be turned into a colonial possession,” which went against the anti-
colonial sentiment sweeping the world.19 
In both South Africa and South West Africa, the white population 
overwhelmingly supported formal incorporation of the territory into South Africa.  In 
June 1945, J. Orman, a white South West African, wrote to The Windhoek Advertiser that 
all South West Africans believed that the territory should be incorporated into the Union 
sooner rather than later.  Orman feared that “South West Africa may be a football in the 
game for Iwo Jima or some far off island” and that “it is essential for us therefore to face 
this issue and show the world that we as a community are undivided in our support” of 
incorporation.20   He was afraid that the issue of the territory would be overshadowed by 
the growing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.  In South West 
Africa, The Windhoek Advertiser was so sure of incorporation that it wrote, “we can take 
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for granted that the mandate will be abolished and that this territory will be formally 
annexed to the Union.”  The paper suggested that the territory work closely with the 
Union to guarantee that the incorporation of the territory would go smoothly and benefit 
both the Union and South West Africa.21 
In this spirit of cooperation, Smuts met with Petrus Hoogenhout, the Administer 
of South West Africa, to discuss the future the territory.  At that meeting Smuts told 
Hoogenhout that “the Union [was] entitled to administer the territory as an integral 
portion of the Union and this [was] virtually incorporation.  If we retain the present 
position we are safe.  We cannot cancel the Mandate without cancelling the rights with 
regard to the Territory that we now enjoy.”22  Smuts was reassuring Hoogenhout that 
even if South Africa was not able to incorporate the territory, nothing would change as 
long as the Union was not forced to place South West Africa under the UN’s trusteeship 
system.   
During the summer and fall after the San Francisco conference, the South African 
government began to plan for the incorporation of South West Africa.  Smuts’ 
administration decided that  
whatever the exact legal position is, . . . it seems to us that we cannot escape a 
moral obligation to submit the question of S.W.A’s incorporation to the approval 
of a United Nations body.  We would urge, therefore that in meantime you go 
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ahead with the preparation of the Union’s Government’s case for 
incorporation.”23 
 
The Union government realized that it could not move forward on the issue of 
incorporation without convincing the United Nations that incorporation would be best for 
everyone involved.   
 The Smuts administration came up with two options to convince the world that 
incorporation should move forward.  The first strategy would be to bypass the newly 
formed United Nations and convince the League of Nations at its final meeting to 
terminate the mandate and allow for incorporation before the League transferred their 
authority to the UN. Smuts and his staff foresaw a few problems with this strategy.  One 
of the biggest would be that bypassing the UN would lower their standing at the UN by 
evading it so soon after its inception.  Smuts was concerned that they would not be able 
to gain unanimity, which was necessary in order to change the mandate, because the 
Soviet Union would ask Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia to block the motion.  Their other 
option would be to approach both the League and the UN.  By informing the League of 
their intention to incorporate South West Africa, and obtaining permission from the UN, 
they would avoid both the unanimity clause in the League and avoid alienating the UN.  
If the Union could convince the United States to support the move then it could get the 
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two-thirds majority in the UN necessary to end the mandate and incorporate the 
territory.24 
By December 1945, the South African strategy was based on the assumption that 
a Yugoslavian proposal that all mandatory powers promise to submit their mandates to 
the trusteeship system would pass in the UN.  The Yugoslavian proposal requested that 
all mandates be transferred to the Trusteeship Council at the opening stages of the United 
Nations.  Most delegations believed that forcing mandates into a trustee agreement would 
be the best course of action, even though both Britain and France were hesitant about 
promising to turn the mandates over to the UN before the final meeting of the League.  
The Union government, however, was unwilling to enter into any agreement with the UN 
that did not lead to incorporation.  South Africa refused to consider turning over South 
West Africa to the United Nations.25 
The Smuts government believed that it could avoid entering into a trusteeship 
only if it was able to demonstrate that Namibians clearly desired incorporation.  Even 
before the first meeting of the General Assembly, the South Africans knew incorporation 
would be a hard sell. Smuts knew that Union officials would have to overcome the 
increasingly hostile world opinion regarding South African racial policies as well as the 
general anti-colonial sentiment around the world.  The South African High Commissioner 
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in London laid out the root of the problem in a letter to the Secretary of External Affairs.  
He claimed that  
there is really widespread ignorance as to the nature of colonial administration.  
Out of 51 countries represented here, not more than a dozen have any conception 
of the practical difficulties of the problems involved and anti-colonial prejudice 
based on distortion of  the facts and an academic and superficial study of the 
subject is very deep seated indeed.  In the course of our discussions, time and 
again we run up against all sorts of innuendoes based on the conviction that the 
primary objective of the administering authority is to exploit the local population 
as far as this is possible without shocking world opinion.  We have to cope with 
the anti-colonial empire prejudices of the Americans, the desire of countries like 
India or the Philippines to aid what they regard as the legitimate aspirations of all 
subject peoples to self government, the anxiety of the Arab States similarly to 
give this thesis every support, the indifference of the South Americans, who only 
want to side with the majority, and the ambitions of the Russians to secure a 
finger in every trusteeship pie (All this constitutes a formidable combination of 
ignorance, prejudice, apathy and opposing interests.26   
 
The South Africans had to move fast, because the UN planned on having all mandated 
territories submitted to the Trustee System by 1947.27 
 If the plan for incorporation failed, the South Africans decided that they could 
utilize a loophole in the trusteeship system that allowed mandates to be retained as 
territories by the mandatory power if they were classified by the Security Council as a 
strategic area.  Union officials would accept the territory as a strategic area if the bid for 
incorporation failed.28  The South African Chief of the General Staff argued that “the 
defence of South West Africa and it’s (sic) incorporation into the Union are as vital to the 
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defence of Southern Africa as is the control of say the Eastern or Western sea boards of 
North America to the United States” and that the Mandate’s prohibition against arming 
the territory was a major strategic weakness for the Union.29   
 In the spring and summer of 1946, the South African government approached the 
British in an effort to convince them that incorporating South West Africa was the best 
possible option for the territory.  In meetings held with the Commonwealth Ministers in 
February of 1946, the ministers of India and New Zealand informed the Union that they 
believed that the UN Charter obligated the mandatory powers to convert their mandated 
territories into Trusteeships.30  The South Africans also began consulting the Namibians 
within the territory so that they could demonstrate that the entire population, both black 
and white, supported incorporation.  According to a poll in September of 1945, almost 75 
percent of South Africans supported incorporating South West Africa into the Union, 
demonstrating to Smuts that incorporation was popular in both nations.31  Many of the 
South Africans who opposed incorporation did so because they were afraid of the number 
of “Nazis” in the territory.32  Even though roughly 90 percent of whites in SWA agreed 
with incorporation, some feared that incorporation into the Union would be detrimental 
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for the Namibian population and that it should not be done without consulting them.33  
They also feared that they would lose some of their economic advantages with the South 
African government particularly in the trading of Karakul wool, which was allowed only 
in South West Africa.  The opposition to incorporation was muted and the Smuts 
administration was able to arrive at the first meeting of the UN with the firm backing 
from the white populations of the Union and South West Africa regarding incorporation. 
 The opening session of the United Nations in the spring of 1946 were designed to 
implement the Charter and to figure out how the organization would operate.  However, 
the meeting soon turned into a general discussion of world events.  At the first meeting of 
the Trusteeship Council, the question of South West Africa came up.  H.T. Andrews, a 
Union delegate, reported that while the committee was “not unfriendly” it was not 
“sympathetic to our South West African intentions,” and that the “prevailing wave 
against ‘Imperial-colonialism’” at the San Francisco Conference had transferred to the 
UN.  Andrews noted that the Union would have to work very hard to ensure international 
support for incorporation before the UN met again in September.34 
Over the next few months, Smuts took Andrews’ advice and worked behind the 
scenes to ensure international support.  When the UN met again in September 1946, 
Smuts arrived believing that the formal annexation of South West Africa in the Union 
was a foregone conclusion.  He had been assured that the British would support his 
annexation bid and that it was only a matter of time before the issue was resolved in his 
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favor.  The British, unlike many around world, believed that South Africa had ruled in the 
spirit of the mandate in a “truly commendable character.”35  The British cabinet thought 
that the sweep of the United Party in South West Africa against the Nationalist was “an 
endorsement of General Smuts’ war policy, and of his intention, announced at San 
Francisco, to apply for the termination of the mandate and the incorporation of the 
territory of the Union.”36  At a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May of 
1946, the British assured Smuts that as long as the Union could demonstrate that 
incorporation was the will of the inhabitants, then the British would support 
incorporation.  The British minister also told Smuts that the Union had already convinced 
him that the majority of people supported incorporation.37  British documents support this 
as the a British Cabinet document before the ministers meeting recommended that  
(1) We should press Field-Marshall Smuts to accept our draft Trusteeship 
Agreements for Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons. 
(2) We should be prepared to intimate our readiness in principle to support the 
South African Government in their proposed application to the United 
Nations in regard to South-West Africa. 
(3) We should do what we can to secure the support of the Canadian, Australian 
and New Zealand Governments in the South African Government’s policy in 
regard to South-West Africa, or, at least, their agreement not to oppose that 
policy at the United Nations General Assembly.38 
 
The British Cabinet was worried that if they did not support the incorporation of the 
territory into the Union then it would strengthen the Nationalist Party in South Africa, 
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which was calling for South Africa to weaken its relationship with the Crown.39  The 
Secretary for Dominion Affairs also reinforced this message at the end of July, stating 
categorically that if the inhabitants of South West Africa supported incorporation then so 
would Great Britain.40 
 On September 9, the South Africans received good news from the Australians as 
they were also willing to support the Union in the UN, after they were non-committal at 
the Prime Ministers conference in July.41  The meetings of the heads of the Dominions 
convinced Smuts that he would be able to push through his plan for incorporation with 
little worry.  The only hold-out came from the New Zealand delegation, which argued 
that all the mandates must be turned over to the trusteeship council.  The only stipulation 
was that South Africa must obtain the approval of the population of the territory in order 
for incorporation to be pulled off.  The South Africans were convinced that they had 
accomplished this task by the end of the summer of 1946.   
 Smuts believed that the vast majority of the African and European populations of 
Namibia had expressed their desire to be incorporated into the Union and his government 
was busy preparing a detailed report to demonstrate support for incorporation to the 
United Nations.  In this report the South Africans were not only trying to demonstrate 
that the African population supported incorporation, but that they were also better off in 
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1946 than they were when South Africa acquired the mandate.  The consultation with the 
Africa population over incorporation would be the lynch pin over whether or not the 
territory could legitimately be incorporated.  In their consultation, the South Africans 
were overwhelmingly told by the headmen representing the African populations that they 
supported South African rule.   The one major exception was a small isolated African 
group called the Hereros.  The Herero once dominated the central region of Namibia until 
they were virtually wiped out in a genocidal war by the Germans.  During the period of 
South African rule, they were kept in the small isolated settlements that the Germans had 
driven them into.  Throughout the mandatory period, the Herero continuously asked for 
their land to be returned to them, and after decades of South African intransigence, they 
were unwilling to support continued South African occupation. 
 At the end of 1945, a meeting between the South West African administrators and 
the Herero took place and the South West African administrators expressed the 
possibility that the Herero could receive more land.42  However, nothing came of these 
talks as the Smuts’ administration was unwilling to even discuss returning land to the 
Herero.  Once Smuts heard of the meeting he quickly had a message sent to Hoogenhout 
telling him that while he  
clearly indicated to the headmen in question that you could make no promises that 
they would be allotted land requested by them either in the Doakoveld, or the 
Waterberg (or both), or elsewhere, the discussions indicate fairly clearly that the 
Administration would go a long way to meet their wishes.  Difficulties might, 
therefore, well arise should it later not be found possible to concede any request 
that these natives may make and failure to grant any such requests might well 
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have an important influence upon the attitude of the natives, particularly the Ova-
Herero, towards the incorporation question. In these circumstance, and generally, 
the Prime Minister thinks that it might have been wiser to consult the Union 
Government with regard to the scheme outlined in the Minutes as a whole, before 
the discussions took place.43   
 
Smuts was correct in assuming that the promise of land and then the lack of action on the 
issue would prevent the Herero from supporting incorporation.  Throughout their 
discussions in 1946, the Herero, led by Hosea Kutako, continually refused to support any 
South African action that did not lead to return of their land. 
 In planning the consultation, Hoogenhout, the Secretary for South West Africa, 
recommended that the South African Administrations approach the Ovambos first 
because Hoogenhout believed that the Ovambos would support incorporation “provided 
that the present system of tribal control, which has been in force for many years in the 
Northern Native Territories, remains unaltered.”44  Only after the Administration had 
received Ovambo support would it approach the Herero.  Hoogenhout believed that if the 
administration gave the Herero a system of self-rule similar to the Ovambos then the 
Hereros would support incorporation.  He believed that if the Hereros agreed then so 
would the Damaras and other smaller groups.45  In January of 1946, the territorial 
administrators approached the Ovambos and were able to gain the support of their 
appointed headmen. 
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The South Africans wanted to finish their consultations with the Nama and Herero 
by early February, so they could spend the next few months planning their strategy and 
report to the UN.46  During their meetings with the Herero, the Native Administrator and 
Major Hahn, the native commissioner in Ovamboland, told the Herero that the Ovambos 
had already been consulted and that they overwhelmingly “expressed their desire to 
become part of the Union of South Africa, and to remain under its Flag,” and that the 
Herero should do the same.47  Union officials explained all of the supposed benefits that 
the Herero have received under the control of the Union.  Hahn also emphasized that the 
Union unlike the Germans had not sought to destroy the Herero and instead had helped 
them over the past couple of decades.  The Herero rejected the South African proposal 
and refused to accept the plan for incorporation.  The wording of the referendum on 
incorporation was ambiguous and the Ovambos to later claimed that they were misled by 
the Union government, and that they did not support incorporation.  In the presentation to 
the Namibian people, the Chief Native Commissioner told them that “if South West 
Africa becomes part of the Union, it will, as I have just made clear, become and remain 
part of the territories of the King and be included in the family of British nations under 
the King.” 48  This wording led many Namibians to believe that they were voting to 
become part of the United Kingdom, not join the Union of South Africa.  He also told 
them “that there [was] no question of the Union Government leaving this territory” and 
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that they were only being consulted as a matter of courtesy.49  Hosea Kutako and the 
Herero refused to accept this explanation.  Kutako told the Administrator and Hahn that 
since they were asking that the mandate be removed then the nations of the world who 
had an interest in the mandate should be present.  He said these nations should be neutral 
witnesses to their reply and that without them present they did not believe that their views 
would be accurately represented.  The Union officials refused this request arguing that 
“South West Africa [was] still administered by the Union and it cannot deal with foreign 
powers” and that “the Territory ha[d] no international status.  The Union must speak for 
it.”50  This statement of course was a blatant lie as the territory definitely had a 
international status and the UN wanted the Namibian population to clearly state whether 
they supported incorporation. 
 After consultations among themselves on March 6th, the Herero once again met 
with Union officials and told them that “We reckon that if the Territory is incorporated 
into the Union, our land will never be returned to us.  We fear that we would then receive 
no consideration.  We do not want the Territory to be incorporated and it is our wish that 
our land should be returned to us.”51   The Herero throughout the late 1940s would 
oppose incorporation on the grounds that the Union Government continually refused to 
allow the ten thousand Herero in Botswana to join them in Namibia or to return their land 
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to them.  Hosea Kutako, the Herero leader in Namibia, would emerge in the following 
years as one of the key antagonists to the South African government.  Kutako’s struggle 
would be described in SWAPO’s official history as the key link between earlier anti-
imperial struggles in Namibia and the advent of the modern nationalistic struggle.52  
When he realized that the Herero protest in March of 1946 would not prevent the South 
Africans from pushing forward with incorporation, Kutako requested that he be allowed 
to accompany the Union delegation.  His request was denied by the Union and he was 
told that only “heads of countries had been invited.”53  In a letter to Frederick Maherero, 
the Herero Paramount Chief exiled in Botswana, one Herero Chief wrote that “the white 
people here say that the country must be joined to the Union, but we said that it could not 
be joined to the Union but should be given to us as it is ours,” and that they needed him 
to return to help the Herero in their struggle.54  As a result of the refusal of the South 
African Government to honor the wishes of the Herero, Frederick Maherero turned to 
Tshekedi Khama, a leading African in Botswana.  The Herero did not trust that the South 
African government would accurately portray their views to the UN and so on March 
19th, Festus Kandjou, a young chief and advisor to Kutako, sent a telegram directly to the 
United Nations.  In this telegram he said that the Herero did not want to be incorporated 
into the Union and instead wished to be transferred to Great Britain as a trustee 
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territory.55   Kandjou was described by the Secretary of South West Africa as “one of the 
cleverest of the Hereros and one of their best speakers,” and a man that could cause 
problems for the Administration as he was believed to have taken part in a rebellion in 
Rehoboth.56  Kutako and Kandjou would meet with Hahn and other administrators once 
again in July to discuss the problems affecting the Herero, namely the lack of food and 
land.  They also told the Union officials to stop asking them to change their minds about 
incorporation.  Kandjou and Kutako reiterated that they were against incorporation and 
that Kutako should be allowed to travel to the UN to express their desires to become 
independent.  Hahn tried to reassure them that their views were being transmitted to the 
UN and that it would be impossible for Kutako to join the delegation.57  While, the South 
African government did follow through on their promise to tell the UN that the Herero 
were opposed to incorporation, they also painted the Herero as a minor tribe that was out 
of touch with the rest of the African population. 
 Fearing that their telegram to the UN had not been received, a number of South 
West Africans including Kutako and Kandjou signed a letter written by F. Kazombizae 
from Windhoek to the Communist Party of South Africa asking for help.  They asked the 
Party if it would help them send someone to the UN because “the Africans of South West 
Africa as a whole are not in favour of being incorporated and subjected to the Boer rule 
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of prejudice and colour bar,” (underlining in original).58  Kutako and the other Herero 
appealed to one of the few organizations within South Africa that they believed would 
help.  However, the seizure of this letter in a police raid of Communist Party offices in 
October of 1946, allowed the South Africans to begin to portray Namibian nationalists as 
Communist agents at worst and sympathizers at best.  The South Africans tried to portray 
Kutako in this way, even though the courts ordered that the letter be returned since it was 
seized in an illegal raid and could not be made public.  When this letter came to light, the 
Union government warned its Washington legation about the Herero telegram and said 
that they “represent [an] unimportant group and [any] status they claim for themselves is 
therefore gross exaggeration.”59 
The Herero made up about 10% of the African population of South West Africa, 
but they were the best known Namibian group in South West Africa.  The British had 
published a report, widely reading in the 1920s, on the German atrocities during the 
Herero Revolt.  So when their protest of ill treatment by the South African administration 
reached the UN, it found a sympathetic hearing, particularly considering that the South 
Africans used the German genocide of the Herero to make their rule seem more humane.  
John Neser, the Secretary for South West Africa, complained to Smuts that the Herero 
acted “haughty” and that “no gratitude whatsoever was expressed for the many benefits 
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bestowed on them” by the Union.60  In the official report to the UN outlining the South 
African claim for incorporation, the Union argued that 208,850 Africans supported 
incorporation while only 33,520 were opposed.  Almost everyone that opposed 
incorporation were Herero “due to the traditional grievance of the Hereros that their 
country was not returned to them after the defeat of Germany,” and that they opposed 
anything which did not give them their land back.61 
During the consultation with the African population, the South African 
government received word that Tshekedi Khama was trying to come to London to 
convince the British to oppose the incorporation of South West Africa.62  The 
intervention of Khama into the issue caused much consternation for Union officials.  
They had just begun their campaign to convince the world that incorporation was the best 
thing for everyone in the Territory and Khama could ruin their plans.  Khama and the 
other Chiefs of Bechuanaland eventually published a twenty-two page memorandum on 
the dangers of allowing South West Africa to be subsumed by the Union. The memo 
demanded that Great Britain take over the mandate for South West Africa in order to 
prevent the territory from forever falling into the racist hands of the South African 
government.  Khama believed that if South West Africa was incorporated then it was 
only a matter of time before the High Commission Territories of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland were also taken over by the Union.  The memo also argued that the Chiefs of 
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the territory had a vested interest in the issue of incorporation because of the ten thousand 
Herero exiles in the territory who wanted to be reunited with their countrymen, but were 
prohibited to move back to South West Africa by the Union.63 
Khama was also concerned with the plight of the Herero living in Botswana.  
Since the German-Herero War thousands of Herero under Paramount Chief Frederick 
Maherero had lived as exiles in Botswana.   Besides the unwillingness of the Union 
government to return Herero land, they also refused to allow Maherero and the rest of the 
Hereros back into Namibia.  In February of 1946, J.G.U. Katjerungu sent a letter to 
Maherero stating that he needs to return home to help fight against incorporation or "the 
heritage of your father's orphans is about to be taken from them and because we cannot 
speak with one voice as we are scattered all over the country our heritage may therefore 
fall to that side for which we have no liking."64  Maherero shared this letter with Khama 
and asked him to intervene on his behalf.  The plight of the Hereros coupled with his fear 
of South African expansion led to Khama’s campaign against incorporation.  Historian 
Michael Crowder would later argue that the UN's refusal to accept incorporation in 
"December 1946 owes much to the year-long campaign against the incorporation of 
South West Africa led by Tshekedi Khama."65  Khama spent most of 1946 lobbying the 
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British government to oppose incorporation and in the summer of 1946 attempted to go 
directly to London to appeal directly to the Crown. 
 The British government thought Khama's visit "should be discouraged.  The 
object of the visit could not be kept secret and it would seem to be very embarrassing to 
have it disclosed to the world that Tshekedi, who has no clear locus standi in the matter, 
had been allowed to come here to discuss the future of South West Africa with the 
Secretary of State."66  The memo also stated that they did not need to worry about Khama 
just arriving in London because he would be unable to "get a passage . . . without the 
support of the High Commissioner or the United Kingdom Government and I do not see 
that we are obliged to grant such facilities."67  Khama had already booked passage to 
London for late June, just in case the British agreed to allow him to travel.   The British 
government refused to grant him permission to leave southern Africa, so he had to turn to 
others to help in his fight.68 
 The British also wanted to keep Khama's proposed trip and the British banning of 
it a secret because it "would no doubt lead to pressure on the United Kingdom 
Government by personas and societies in this country (e.g. the Anti-Slavery Society) not 
to support the incorporation of South West Africa in the Union, and agitation of this kind 
might become embarrassing."  In order to placate Khama they told him that they would 
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pass on his memo and letters to the UN, but that is all they would do. 69  Even though 
they had prevented him from arriving in June of 1946, the British government wanted to 
make sure that if he found another way to come to London that they should stay out of it 
since the backlash could weaken their position at home and abroad if they once again 
refused him.70 
Tshekedi Khama refused to allow the British to silence him and began a fierce 
letter writing campaign to the British cabinet, opposition in the British and South African 
parliaments, sympathetic organizations throughout the world, and the press.  In a letter to 
the South African Institute for Race Relations, Maherero wrote that all the Hereros 
opposed incorporation and that “if the U.N.O. agrees to the Union’s proposals the fate of 
Bechuanaland to remain outside of the Union would be sealed,” so they must help 
prevent the fall of Namibia into South African hands.71  Khama’s campaign gained 
notoriety throughout Southern Africa.  A supporter sent him words of encouragement 
saying that the African population of South Africa wished for his success in preventing 
Namibia’s annexation.  The writer believed that “such a step would not only be the means 
of serving the best interest of the native population of that country but would also 
indirectly help us in the Union because with the protecting hand of Britain over the 
Protectorates on the one hand and that of the Trustee-ship Council on the other, we feel 
that the Union of S.A. may hesitate to pursue further its present policy which can only 
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end in permanent injury to good relations between the Black and White races in 
Africa.”72  The letter also stated that the only practical solution was that South West 
Africa be turned over to the Trusteeship Council. 
In an interview with the South African Press Association in July of 1946, Khama 
stated that “the Union of South Africa is showing oppressive Imperialist tendencies 
which vitally concerned the United Nations, as they had grave implications for the future 
of the African continent,” and that he would do everything in his power to prevent 
Southern Africa from falling under Union control.73  The Windhoek Advertiser took 
Khama’s attacks in the press and in lobbying the UN and British governments as 
evidence “of the weapons now made available to the native peoples in their struggle to 
secure better conditions.”74  These new weapons allowed the “native” to “appeal” to a 
wider circle in their struggle.  “The world [was] now the forum for the consideration of 
policies affecting all races.  The day has passed when the native had to be content with 
such hearing as he could obtain for his case in the land in which he lived.  It is possible 
that the outside world may decide that it is not proper for it to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of individual States, but the mere fact that views can now be publicised so that all 
the world may hear them, is in itself a powerful weapon in the struggle to secure 
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rights.”75  Khama’s campaign clearly demonstrated that organizations such as the UN as 
well as the increasingly globalized world opened up opportunities for oppressed and 
stateless people to appeal to world opinion to better their lives. 
 Even though Khama was unable to travel to London or New York to state his case 
in person, he was able to wage his campaign from Botswana.  In September, he wrote a 
long and detailed letter to Walter Huggard, the British High Commissioner, demanding 
the return of Herero land and for Maherro to be allowed to return to his people.  The 
letter described in detail the inhumane pass systems, which prevented the Herero leaders 
from visiting one another by barring them from leaving their reserves without permission.  
In his letter Kutako  
challenge[d] any statement either now or hereafter made by the Union 
government to the General Assembly at UNO this October to the effect that the 
Native peoples of South West Africa concur in the transfer of that territory to the 
Union free of any Mandate.  In view of the points raised by the Hereros at their 
meeting with Your Excellency and as amplified in this letter we cannot believe 
that either the British Government or the members of the General Assembly at 
UNO are aware of the determined policy of oppression and the denial of all 
human rights to the native peoples of South Africa by the Government of the 
Union."76   
 
The letter also states that the Union’s claim that their rule was better than that of  the 
Germans was only true because "the Germans had one penalty-the death penalty-for even 
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minor offences," and it is not hard for the South Africans to improve on genocidal 
policies.77    
Khama, realizing that he was going to be unable to present his information 
himself, requested that the British forward his letter to the appropriate authorities at the 
United Nations.  The British government, however, refused to forward the letter.  It had 
already come out in support of the South Africans and did not want to do anything to 
weaken their position.  The British response to Khama’s letter was "to send the 
correspondence to Mr. Bottomley at New York for his information," and to the Union 
government, but not to the UN.78  Since one of the key components of South Africa’s 
argument for incorporation was that it had the support of the Africans within South West 
Africa the British did not want to embarrass their ally by forwarding Khama’s 
agreements.  Both the British and South Africans argued that it was only outside agitators 
such as Tshekedi Khama who were arguing against incorporation, and by preventing 
Maherero’s statements from appearing before the UN, they could keep this farce going.    
 After the British government supported South Africa’s position at the United 
Nations, Khama fired off an angry letter to Huggard stating that that the support of the 
UK for incorporation was based on lies.  Khama argued that the way the Namibians were 
consulted was fraudulent and the British government was at fault for not allowing Khama 
to travel to the UK to present the facts.  He wrote: 
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we should be failing in our duty to the British Empire and our people if at this 
stage we omitted to record that the handicaps placed in our way by the British 
Government to have the views of those we represent made known to the British 
Public and to the Nations assembled at U.N.O. and the manner in which the so-
called consultation with the Native Peoples of South West Africa was conducted, 
only to convince the Native Peoples of South Africa that the principle of the 
United Charter – ‘to affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of all 
nations large and small’ – does not apply to the backward races of the African 
continent.”79 
 
In the spring and summer of 1946, the South African government was trying to 
convince the Namibians that they were better off as part of the Union, and Smuts wanted 
to make sure that Union would not have a legal obligation to turn over the mandate to the 
United Nations.  At the final League of Nations meeting in April, the South African 
delegation lobbied other League members over the future status of the mandates; 
particularly what the obligation of the mandatory powers would be towards the territories 
after the League was dissolved.  The South African position was that the mandatory 
powers should retain control of the territories and could do with them as it wished.  The 
South Africans had the support of the British but had to deal with major opposition from 
India and New Zealand, both of whom wanted a declaration requiring that the mandates 
be transferred to the UN, but both were unwilling to directly oppose the British.80    
Before the League’s meeting, the New Zealand delegation argued that it would 
not support any action that would prevent South West Africa from being turned over to 
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the United Nations, even if the British pushed through a resolution that allowed the 
Union to incorporate South West Africa.81  Liberal South Africans had been lobbying the 
Prime Minister of New Zealand throughout 1946 in order to prevent them from backing 
the Union’s move for incorporation.  New Zealand as early as 1945 argued that all 
mandates had to be transferred to the Trusteeship Council and so became a potential ally 
of those who opposed annexation.  One South African from Mafeking wrote that “the 
Union of South Africa has forfeited all right whatsoever of any claim upon further 
Territory, or to the control of any more native peoples, by reason of its consistently 
appalling neglect, and callous indifference to their needs, as well as by its repression and 
injustice to its whole non-European population.”82  This position was supported by 
Margaret Ballinger, the MP representing the Africans of Mafeking.  However, even with 
extensive lobbying by South Africans, the New Zealand government was unwilling to 
oppose the British when it came down to a final vote. 
The Chinese delegation to the League gave the Union some unexpected trouble as 
it pushed for a transfer of the mandatory powers to the UN’s Trusteeship Council.  Unlike 
New Zealand and India, the Chinese did not have to worry about upsetting the UK and 
the balance of the power in the Commonwealth.  The Chinese were concerned with the 
Japanese mandates in the Pacific and wanted a blanket proposal that would force all 
mandates to be converted into trusteeships.  However, the Union was able to convince the 
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British to pressure the Chinese into modifying their proposal in a way that did not force 
the mandatory powers to transfer the mandates to the UN.83  The final decision by the 
League was a major victory for the South Africans since they were now able to argue that 
they did not have a legal obligation to transfer South West Africa to the United Nations. 
The South Africans then turned their attention to the upcoming meeting of the 
United Nations in September.  They felt confident that they had the legal right to 
incorporate South West Africa, based on the final decision of the League and the moral 
right based on their consultation with the population of the territory.   However, they still 
wanted to be careful.  Their strategy relied on the fundamental belief that the UN was not 
the successor to the League, but a new organization and that they could not limit South 
Africa’s control of Namibia.  Smuts’ position was that “a direct claim for incorporation 
or annexation runs grave risk of defeat and should be avoided, if possible.  Incorporation 
is not really necessary, as our rights of administration and legislation of the territory as an 
integral part of the Union cover all practical purposes and our main object is to avoid 
coming under a trusteeship agreement.”84  The official position of the Smuts government 
throughout the 1940s was that while incorporation was desirable, the mandate allowed 
for direct rule of the territory, so they must avoid UN control at all costs.  Smuts also 
believed that the referendum over incorporation demonstrated that the Namibians 
supported incorporation and that they were better off under South African rule than they 
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otherwise be.  When warned that the UN might want to visit the territory to verify the 
report they submitted, Smuts told Hofmeyr that the Union had nothing to fear and that a 
UN visit would merely reinforce what the Union had told them.85 
Smuts’ optimism heading into the UN was tempered by news from the United 
States and Great Britain.  Both the Americans and the British advised Smuts that he 
should wait until 1947 to ask for incorporation.  They believed that the delay would give 
the UN enough time to fully investigate South Africa’s claims about both the desires and 
living conditions of the African population.  An American State Department official told 
Hofmeyr that if everything was as the Union claimed it was then the UN commission to 
South West Africa would most likely allow incorporation and at worst the South Africans 
could design a trusteeship agreement that kept the same terms as the mandate.86  The 
South Africans believed that incorporation was a done deal, even if their allies 
recommended a different path.  Smuts believed that if South Africa waited until 1947 
then African resistance to incorporation would increase and he believed that “Tshekedi . . 
. ha[d] been steered off and the Hereros prevented,” from coming to the United Nations.87  
Hofmeyr thought “that postponement will put [the Union] in worse position next year and 
would expose Government and [Smuts] in particular to criticism here.  We trust therefore 
that postponement will not be necessary” and that Smuts should “emphasise that our 
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action is designed to give effect to principle of self-determination.”88  The only thing 
Smuts and Hofmeyr were sure of was that the British would support their bid for 
incorporation and hopefully bring the Commonwealth countries behind them, even if they 
believed 1947 would be more opportune.89 
On November 4, 1946, Smuts finally got his chance to push for the incorporation 
of South West Africa into the Union.  He began his case by first discussing the nature of 
the trustee system, arguing that it was not the successor of the mandate system but an 
“improvement on it” because the mandate system was limited in what it could do, while 
the trusteeship agreements allowed for greater variation.90  This variation allowed for 
states to incorporate territories into security and other systems that were banned by the 
mandates, all while still protecting and civilizing the inhabitants of the territories.  Smuts 
believed that the only link between the mandate and trustee systems was that both were 
designed to advance the population of the territories in question, but they were not 
interchangeable.  Under the new system, these societies would be able to choose their 
own futures.  Smuts argued that the people of South West Africa had chosen to join the 
Union, and the UN should allow the merger to proceed.91 
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Following his opening statement he presented his reasons for why South West 
Africa should be allowed to enter the Union.  He said that  
South-West Africa, by reason of its physical contiguity to the Union and its 
ethnological kinship with the rest of Southern Africa, was uniquely different form 
the other C mandates of Western Samoa, New Guinea and the Japanese Pacific 
Islands.  Moreover South Africa had at that time the experience, which was to be 
repeated 25 years later, of its national existence being threatened from the 
contiguous territory of South-West Africa.  It was, therefore, anxious and 
legitimately anxious to secure the annexation of the territory and it was only in 
deference to the views of other statesmen that General Botha, the Prime Minister 
of the Union, agreed as an experiment to accept South-West Africa as a C 
mandate.  Such an architect of the mandate system as President Wilson could 
foresee only one future for the territory, namely that of incorporation.92 
 
By arguing that the mandate of South West Africa was only an experiment, Smuts 
claimed that the territory was intrinsically linked with the Union, and doubt about the 
future was the only thing hindering the further development of the mandate.  Once South 
West Africa was incorporated, it would flourish as part of South Africa. 
 Smuts foresaw that hostile nations would criticize the way in which the 
consultation with the African population was done so he made sure to clarify how the 
referendum was conducted in his opening speech by stating that “it would be a mistake to 
regard the consultation which was carried out as a referendum of individuals.  Such a 
notion is entirely alien to the mind of the tribal Native.  Rather it was a consultation of 
the wishes of tribal units, the views of the individuals being ascertained by the tribal 
authority in the recognised traditional and customary fashion.”93  While the referendum 
was not a direct vote, the Union government believed that the Namibians were consulted 
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and the UN should accept their decision.  Smuts believed that the South African 
treatment of the mandate was beyond reproach and besides the wishes of the inhabitants, 
this was his strongest reason for incorporation.  In a speech before the UN Smuts argued 
that 
South Africa’s record as a mandatory Power under the supervision of the League 
mandates Comission, a record which is open to all to see and judge in the annual 
reports submitted to the Commission, is indisputable evidence that the Union 
Government has discharged its trust with the highest regard for its responsibilities 
for the advancement of the moral and material well being of the inhabitants.  
When the Union Forces first occupied the territory, they found the proud and 
aristocratic Hereros decimated and humiliated by the Germans, a broken and 
dying race; the Berg Damaras, deep rooted in servitude, the Ovambos and other 
tribes of the North riddled with witchcraft and engaged in tribal forays in which 
there was no security for man of beast.  The roving Bushman, still regarded as 
little better than animals, human vermin of the veld, the whole country just 
emerging from the stupefaction and horror of the German massacres and killings 
of the early years of the century.  
Today the tribes are contented and prosperous.  The Hereros have more than 
doubled in number, development is going on a pace within limits of the territory’s 
revenues.  Every where throughout South-West Africa, as is the case throughout 
the Union, there is full and unreserved recognition of the four fundamental human 
freedoms.  There is complete freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom 
from fear.  Freedom from want is a the great objective of the whole area of 
Southern Africa which is being gradually attained by the full development of its 
natural resources.94 
 
The Union’s argument that life was fundamentally better for the African under the Union 
government than under the Germans clearly demonstrated that they had ruled in the spirit 
of the mandate and should proceed with closer unification.  This argument was flawed 
and caused problems when the Herero and others demonstrated repeatedly that life under 
South African rule was filled with discrimination and repression. 
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 The UN’s response was not what Smuts had anticipated.  The Indian delegation 
led the campaign against the Union, arguing that the consultation with the African 
population was fraudulent because the Chiefs consulted were appointed by the Union and 
it was never explained to them what the Trustee System entailed.  The Indian charge was 
expected as India had been feuding with the Union government over the treatment of 
Indians in the Union, but the reaction of the South American and other European 
delegations was not.  They not only agreed with the Indians, but they also started to 
demand that the Union submit a trusteeship agreement for South West Africa.  The South 
Africans could only count on British support. 95  Over the next week, things did not get 
better for the South Africans. In a telegram to the Secretary of External Affairs, the 
delegation described their reception at the UN as “very hard and feeling against South 
African policy on both the Indian and South West African question is wide and strong.  
Both colour policies are most unpopular in the United States of America and in a World 
Assembly like U.N.O., and the atmosphere is chilly all round.  The only bright spot is the 
discreet support that the United Kingdom is giving us, especially on South West 
Africa.”96  For South Africa, the situation would not improve.  Once the ball got rolling 
everybody except the British joined in on attacking South Africa. 
 On November 14, Dulles joined the chorus against the Union, arguing that the 
“data before this assembly does not justify an act by this session of the assembly 
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approving incorporation by South Africa of the mandated territory of South West 
Africa.”97  Once the Americans rejected the idea of incorporation, its fate was all but 
sealed.  The UN would not give South Africa its blessing to incorporate the territory, and 
by the end of November the Indian delegation began pushing for a resolution that they 
hoped would force the Union to turn South West Africa over to the Fourth Committee.98  
Forsyth desperately fought against the Indian draft resolution arguing that incorporation 
was what the people of South West Africa wanted and that the way that they were 
consulted was along traditional power lines.  He argued that any other way of consulting 
them would have led to confusion.99 
 Major Hahn, the administrator of Ovamboland and the leading “expert” on the 
Africans of Namibia, had travelled with Smuts and desperately tried to convince the UN 
that the report consultation with Namibians was a valid representation of their wishes.  
Hahn had been in charge of the consultation with the chiefs and argued that the Indian 
accusation that the African population was not presented with all of their options was 
incorrect.  He stated that   
I put the various alternative before them.  I asked them whether they and their 
lands were to be incorporated in the Union or whether they would continue under 
a mandatory form of administration excercised by the Union Government under 
the supervision of the Trusteeship Council or whether they were to be controlled 
by one or more of the other members of U.N.O. 
The marked feature of their replies was the emphatic and enthusiastic manner in 
which these replies were given.  The general sense was that the ‘Government of 
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the Cape” which had sent the soldiers to beat the Germans must take over full 
ownership of their territory.”100 
 
Hahn’s argument failed to convince the hostile delegations that the consultations were 
valid and his recollection on what was said in the consultations was a half-truth at best.  
The African population was led to believe that the Germans might take over the territory 
again if the South Africans left. 
 Smuts, Forsyth, and Hahn were unable to overcome the negative pressure that was 
applied by the Indians and other delegations within the United Nations.  They also had to 
deal with criticism from home.  Charese Frisk of South Africa wrote a letter that was sent 
to all UN delegations in late October that was designed  
not only to protest the proposed annexation, but to direct to your attention the fact 
that the Government of the Union of South Africa denies ordinary human rights 
and elementary freedoms to millions of native Africans over whom it already 
exercises arbitrary and relentless power.  The natives of South-West Africa will 
be condemned permanently to the same treatment-without hope of remedy- if the 
annexation is permitted.101 
 
Frisk and others from both South West Africa and South Africa were able to make their 
voices heard and coupled with the already negative views of Union racial policies around 
the world; the damning letters from the Union were hard to overcome. 
 On November 29, a fierce debate raged in the UN over South Africa’s request to 
incorporate South West Africa.  The Soviet Union took the position that the territory 
must immediately be placed under trusteeship and that the results of Smuts’ referendum 
could not be taken at face value because it did not represent the true will of the people of 
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the territory.  Dulles, even though he believed that South West Africa should not be 
incorporated, argued that it was not required that all mandates be placed under the 
Trusteeship System.  Mandates could be legally granted independence, join with another 
country, or be placed under the Trusteeship System.  He took this position because the 
United States wanted to avoid placing the Japanese mandates under the trusteeship 
council’s authority.  The only thing that all sides could agree on was that the territory 
should not be incorporated and that the way in which the referendum was conducted was 
inherently flawed and inadequate.   The Chinese delegate, Liu Chieh, went one step 
further and argued that the population of South West Africa was “not sufficiently 
advanced to understand the scope of its decision, nor sufficiently free to express itself,” 
and therefore could not have an official position one way or the other.102 
  After the debate four draft resolutions were submitted concerning South West 
Africa.  The Soviets, Cubans and Indians all authored resolutions and the Danish and 
American delegations submitted a joint draft resolution.  The Soviet, Cuban, and Indian 
draft resolutions called for South West Africa to be placed under a trusteeship agreement.  
The joint Danish and American draft invited the Union to place the territory under the 
Trusteeship Council but did not require a trustee agreement.  Smuts and the UK 
grudgingly accepted the US and Danish resolution but argued fiercely that the 
consultations with the African population was an accurate reflection of their wishes for 
incorporation.  The UK delegation said they would have conducted a referendum in 
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precisely the same way.  Smuts also took offense at Liu’s shot at South Africa, claiming 
that saying that the people of the territory were not advanced enough to understand what 
they were doing was insulting both to the Union and the population of the territory. 103  In 
the end, the US-Danish resolution passed and the Union was prevented from 
incorporating South West Africa, but was spared from having to turn the mandate over to 
the UN.104   
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65 was not the victory Smuts had 
hoped for, but it was not a complete failure.  While it recommended that the territory be 
placed under trusteeship, it allowed South Africa to continue to rule South West Africa 
under the principles of the mandate.105  Smuts supported the US measure only in order to 
prevent the harsher resolutions presented by the other delegations and was willing to take 
a partial victory.  After the severe criticisms leveled at the Union during the general 
debate, the end result could have been much worse.  Forsyth wrote that the only bright 
spot was that the British, “stood by us throughout this controversy with the utmost 
steadfastness and loyalty,” even with “a considerable measure of criticism, both here and 
at home.”106  Over all the experience was painful for the South African delegation.  In a 
letter to a friend in early 1947, Major Hahn described the previous year’s meetings as 
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not all Beer and Skittles.  It was all intensely interesting but we got it in the neck 
good and proper.  This is all due to those blasted Indians and Russians having 
formed a solid block and having got the majority of the lesser Dago and half-
breed peoples to vote against us.  All the Nordic races with one or two exceptions 
voted for us.  In my opinion U.N.O. cannot last at this rate for it will simply mean 
that civilisation will go back in that the advanced and civilised peoples will have 
to dance to the tune of Latin America led by India and Russia.  India, by the way, 
I might tell you, is going all-out against the White man.  This may be a good thing 
because she will thereby create a Western Block which Russia must join as to 
preserve herself. This sounds high politics but all the indications point that way.  
Actually it will be a damn good thing if the white races could withdraw altogether 
from those yellow areas and leave them to develop without European guidance 
and brains.107 
 
The South African delegation left the United Nations in December of 1946 a lot less 
optimistic than when they arrived.  For Smuts, it was the beginning of the end of his 
career, both internationally and domestically.  As the only head of state to be at the 
creation of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, he entered 1946 with a 
large amount of political capitol.  However, his reception at the UN in 1946 demonstrated 
that he had used it all.  On Smuts’ return home, the Nationalist Party headed by Dr. 
Daniel Malan, would use his failure in 1946 to help propel them to power in 1948.   
Almost immediately on his arrival back in South Africa, Smuts would have to begin 
defending his actions at the UN. 
 Throughout the UN sessions, the Nationalist Party maintained that the UN did not 
have the right to interfere in the mandate and routinely criticized Smuts for even asking 
the UN for permission to incorporate South West Africa.  Smuts defended himself on 
January 18, 1947, in the Union Parliament.  He explained that  
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The past four months have been some of the most difficult of my life.  It is not 
only the work but it is the scope and the seriousness of the subjects that we have 
dealt with.  I have felt right throughout that whatever may have happened in Paris 
or New York is going to affect the future of South Africa.  We are the spearhead, 
as it were, of the human problem.  Nowhere else in the world do you find 
conditions such as here.  Here you have all colours, all races, all views, all 
cultural levels, and the problems engaging human attention, the problems dealt 
with both in Paris and New York, are problems of the deepest and most far-
reaching interest to South Africa.  I took up everything seriously, and I continue 
to do so, and I shall be glad if there could exist with us a certain measure of 
unanimity on at least a portion of that work.  In view of what has been said by the 
Leader of the Opposition, (Dr. D.F. Malan) namely, that I have acted back to 
front; that I bungled the matter; that mistakes have been made which might harm 
our interests, and the criticism which has been exercised over my actions in other 
respects, I do think it right that the House should express itself on my actions.108 
 
Smuts believed that his actions at the United Nations were in the spirit of progress and 
was flabbergasted by the reaction abroad and at home.  He felt that South African actions 
throughout 1946 were honorable and that they acted in the right way by asking for the 
UN’s approval in incorporating South West Africa.  Even though Smuts could most 
likely have annexed the territory anytime throughout World War II and probably could 
have gotten away with it in 1946, he wanted the blessings of the international 
community.109  The opening session of the UN, disillusioned Smuts.  As the architect of 
the Mandate System as well as the President of the General Assembly at the San 
Francisco Conference, he believed that his views had been in line with those of the UN.  
Unfortunately, for him, he was a relic of a previous age and had trouble adapting to the 
world that emerged following the Second World War.  
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 Smuts believed that the decision to take the matter before the UN was still the 
right one even though it did not work out in his favor.  He believed that the wishes 
expressed by the African population in their referendum were genuine and should have 
convinced the UN that incorporation was the desire of the inhabitants, but in his words 
“the storm was too strong.  The desire to have the trusteeship system applied generally 
was irrepressible.”110  So Namibia was not allowed to be incorporated, but neither was it 
transferred to the trustee system.  According to Resolution 65, its status had not changed; 
South Africa still administered it as a mandate.  Eric Louw, a well-respected diplomat in 
South Africa and a staunch Nationalist, believed that the mandate had lapsed with the 
dissolution of the League and that the UN had no right to interfere in the Union’s 
administration of Namibia.  Smuts disagreed; he argued that while the mandate had 
lapsed the Union still had the same rights both to the people of the territory as well as to 
the international community.  In 1947, the Smuts government prepared a report, similar 
to the ones given to the League, on South Africa’s administration of the mandate to give 
to the UN.   Louw vehemently opposed this plan arguing that it would recognize the 
UN’s authority in the territory.  For Smuts it was a matter of principle; the Union had an 
obligation to continue to respect the mandate and the United Nations even though the 
exact legal status of the territory was complicated.  Smuts described Namibia as “not a 
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colony, but it practically amounts to that, it is more in the nature of a colony,” but that did 
not exclude the Union from its international obligations.111 
 Immediately following Smuts’ defense of his actions at the United Nations, a 
fierce debate raged in the South African Parliament over whether or not Smuts’ approach 
was the correct one and what the Union should do in the future.  The Nationalists 
condemned Smuts for approaching the United Nations and some even demanded that the 
Union withdraw from the UN.  Margaret Ballinger, a liberal MP from Mafeking, 
condemned this course of discussion stating that she “failed to understand what 
contribution we could make to civilised living if we were prepared to repudiate authority 
whenever it happened to cross our own path and be exercised against us.  In the 
circumstances I feel that we have a very great obligation upon us to accept what U.N.O. 
has decided,” even if it did not turn out like they wanted.112  Ballinger would argue that 
they should work with the UN and convince them that the Union was worthy of ruling 
Namibia, and not to try to go their own way.  Her voice was lost in the shouting of the 
Nationalist.  Smuts and the United Party were barely able to stand their ground in the 
legislature against the attacks of the Nationalists.113 
 The Smuts administration did not just try to defend itself from the Nationalists 
within South Africa; it also began to strengthen its case for the next UN session.  It 
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recognized that the only ones who truly stood with it in 1946 were the British, even 
though a large section of the British population believed that South Africa should give in 
to the UN’s wishes.114  D.B. Sole, a diplomat in the South African Embassy in London, 
recommended that the South Africa government mount a propaganda campaign in the 
UK.  This campaign would be designed to convince the British public that annexing 
Namibia was the best thing for the inhabitants and that the treatment of non-whites in 
South Africa was not as bad as the Indians had portrayed it in the United Nations.  Sole 
believed that Lord Hailey’s positive report on the referendum and treatment of Africans 
in Namibia could go a long way towards helping their image, even if it would not help 
them convince the opposition in the Labour Government to support them.115 
 The most important aspect of the Smuts administration’s quest to bring South 
West Africa closer to the Union was to try and convince the population of the territory 
that its wishes were betrayed by the United Nations and to try to convince the Hereros 
that incorporation was the best option for them.  The South African strategy for gaining 
African support was to try to delegitimize the United Nations.  In a memo outlining the 
way in which to approach the African population, the administrators in South West 
Africa were told to emphasize that the UN did not allow incorporation because “they 
considered that the Natives of South West Africa had not had enough experience of 
ruling themselves and were not sufficiently developed, to express an opinion as to how 
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they are go be governed,” even though that was what they themselves had chosen.116  
This strategy would ultimately fail, particularly in the case of the Hereros.  Hosea Kutako 
and the Herero leadership had completely lost faith in the South African government and 
refused to rely on them.  Throughout the spring and summer of 1947, Kutako demanded 
that a Herero representative be allowed to travel to the United Nations and that a UN 
panel visit the territory.  The South African administrators continued to underestimate the 
reach and determination of Kutako.  W.J.B. Slater, the Chief Native Commissioner, 
continually argued that since the Herero were better off under South African rule than 
they were under German rule then they had no reason to complain about the Union.117 
Major Hahn believed that he could convince the Herero to support incorporation 
if he could convince them that they really were better off under South African rule.  
Forsyth and Smuts told him to try, but they did believe that Kutako would end his 
campaign against South Africa.  After failing once again to convince the Hereros to 
support incorporation, Hahn finally decided to tell Kutako that the Herero were not 
representative of the Namibian population.  Hahn argued that since they made up less 
than ten percent of the Africans in the territory their opinions were not important.  He 
told Kutako that no matter what he thought and regardless of whether South West Africa 
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was incorporated, South Africa would continue to rule South West Africa, and most 
people in the territory supported incorporation.118 
 Throughout the summer, Kutako continued to pressure the South Africans to 
return their land and allow the UN to visit Namibia.  In a letter to John Neser, the 
Secretary for South West African, he wrote:  
We are still of the opinion that South West Africa should not be incorporated into 
the Union and that if a referendum were to be conducted this should be conducted 
by an impartial body.  We should like to have permission to send our 
representatives overseas to express our attitude in this connection even though 
they may not be able to attend the session of the United Nations Assembly. 
Finally since the Union Government has not accepted the recommendations of the 
United Nations Organisation regarding the Mandated Territory; and now that the 
League of Nations has ceased to exist we are at a loss to know whose wards we 
are and to whom final appeals can be addressed now that our right to petition the 
League has also ceased.119 
 
Kutako rested his case on the fact that South Africa was operating outside of the will of 
the international community and that the African population of South West Africa was 
left without a protector.  Neser would reply to Kutako that the only person he has the 
right to petition to was the King because the UN did not have any say in the 
administration of the mandate now that the League ceased to exist.  Neser also told 
Kutako that he “should not impugn the Union Government’s good faith and that the fact 
that they are against incorporation was duly brought to the notice of U.N.O. last year,” 
and cease his campaign against the Union.120 
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 Kutako also sent a similar letter to James Bottomely, the British High 
Commissioner, and the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations.  Bottomely decided to 
ignore the letter, claiming that Kutako had no right to speak for the Herero and that the 
condition of the Herero was of no concern to him.121  An intriguing claim considering 
that a significant portion of the Herero lived in Botswana, a territory he was 
administering on behalf of the British.  Even though both Bottomley and Neser refused to 
help, Kutako held out hope that the British would step in.  In his letter to the Secretary for 
Commonwealth Relations, he argued that ““the Union Government by reason of its 
treatment of the African people, both in the Union and in South West Africa, has now 
forfeited all moral right and claim to continue exercising the Mandate over South West 
Africa and we would ask for your support of our application to send representatives 
overseas to state our case.”122  He believed that the British would step in and do the right 
thing.  However, it was clear after their treatment of Kutako and Khama as well as their 
actions at the UN, that they stood firmly behind the Union government, so Kutako had 
find another champion for their cause. 
 Kutako would find his champion in the form of an Anglican minister named 
Michael Scott.  Scott came from a family of ministers who worked with the impoverished 
of England and at a very young age, Scott became aware of the injustices in the world 
and tried to help those who were less fortunate.  With the rise of fascism in Europe during 
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the 1930s, Scott flirted with communism believing that it was the only force that could 
withstand the growing racism in Europe.123  However, his flirtation with communism 
would eventually fade as he could not reconcile his Christian beliefs with the atheism of 
the communist world.  He found his way back to South Africa following the Second 
World War; he had spent most of the 1920s there.  Almost immediately upon his arrival, 
he began working with the marginalized African and Indian populations.  He was an 
active supporter of the Indians during the Durban Riots and was eventually arrested for 
ministering and living in the African township of Tobruk, on the fringes of Johannesburg.  
After being released from jail, he was invited by Tshekedi Khama to come to Botswana 
and meet Maherero.  Maherero explained that his people in Namibia were suffering and 
that the Union was preventing them from coming to him and he asked Scott to travel 
there on his behalf.124   
 Scott’s arrival in Namibia would begin a long relationship with the Herero and he 
would become their representative at the world until the 1980s.  Chris Saunders wrote 
that Scott was the Herero because  
the issues there seemed particularly stark-the first genocide of the twentieth 
century, people stripped of their land and scattered, the sheer scale of the 
continuing oppression-but Scott was also enormously impressed with the quiet 
dignity of the Namibians he met and their Christian commitment.  He saw a way 
to rescue them from South African Racial tyranny by appealing to the conscience 
of the world, and his primary motive was always to right their wrongs.125   
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Scott was impressed with the dignity and religiosity of the Herero in general and Kutako 
in particular.  He believed that it was a righteous and worthy thing to represent them at 
the UN.  The Herero believed in the 1940s that the UN was “God’s instrument of justice 
and freedom for their people.”126 
 During Scott’s only visit to Namibia he was stunned by “the fine spirit and 
bearing” of the Herero that he desperately sought to learn the history so he could 
adequately convey their suffering to the United Nations.127  As Kutako took him from 
reservation to reservation to examine the living conditions of the Herero, they stopped to 
pray at a spot where the Germans had carried out a massacre.  Kutako’s words were 
forever etched on Scott’s memory, and he repeated them many times in his push to first 
prevent incorporation and then later to argue for independence for Namibia.  Kutako’s 
prayer called on God to save the Herero from their fate.  He said: 
You are the Great God of all the Earth and the Heavens.  We are so insignificant.  
In us there are many defects.  But the Power is yours to make and to do what we 
cannot do.  You know all about us.  For coming down to earth you were despised, 
and mocked, and brutally treated because of those same defects in the men of 
those days.  And for those men you prayed because they did not understand what 
they were doing, and that you came only for what was right.  Give us the courage 
to struggle in that way for what is right. 
O Lord, help us who roam about.  Help us who have been placed in Africa and 
have no dwelling place of our own.  Give us back a dwelling place.  O God, all 
power is yours in Heaven and Earth. 
Amen.128 
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Scott dedicated the rest of his life to fulfilling Kutako’s hope that he would have a 
dwelling place of his own, and the UN was the forum in which he would do it. 
 In August, Scott began to plan for his trip to the United Nations to present his 
findings and the wishes of the Herero to the United Nations.   The South Africans tried to 
prevent his arrival at the UN.  For them Scott represented all that was wrong with the 
world, a white who worked with and believed in the African population.  The British 
backed South Africa’s attempt to prevent him from securing a visa.  It was only on the 
intervention of the Indian delegation that declared Scott as a personal advisor that he was 
eventually issued a visa.129  His visa severely limited his movements and activities to the 
United Nations; he was prevented from leaving Manhattan or working while in the US.  
The United States had initially refused to grant him a visa because they had branded him 
a troublemaker and did not believe that he had any business at the United Nations.130 
 As Scott waited, first in Johannesburg and then in London, for his American visa, 
he forwarded a stream of letters and petitions to the United Nations on behalf of the 
Hereros.  The first letter arrived in late September and simply expressed the Herero desire 
for the return of their lands.131  This letter would be the first of hundreds of 
communications between Scott and the UN.  His next letter informed the UN that Kutako 
had asked Scott to represent him at the UN, because he do not feel that the Union 
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represented the Herero.132  Scott also sent a petition to the UN from the Herero’s 
demanding that the UN send a team to investigate the situation in South West Africa.  He 
claimed that “the Union’s Administration of the Mandate has proved disastrous” and that 
the way in which the referendum was conducted was misleading and that the Ovambos 
and Namas stood with the Herero in their opposition to incorporation.133   
Scott’s activities at the UN worried the South African administration, but it 
believed that it had already prevented Scott from directly approaching the UN.  In 
Namibia, the administration began to pressure Kutako to back down from his campaign.  
Slater, a South African Official, sent a message to Kutako ordering him to stop his work 
at the UN claiming that   
In putting forward the request for the appointment of an independent 
Commission, the Hereros are concerning themselves with matters which properly 
belong to the Government of the country.  You (the Hereros) have been told that 
you represent only one-tenth of the Native population of the Territory and that 
you should recognise your position that you speak on behalf of only a section of 
the Native population. 
You have also already been told that you should not impugn the Union 
Government’s good faith and that the fact that you are against incorporation was 
duly brought to the notice of the United Nations Organization last year. 
As to your request to be placed under a Mandatory body appointed by the United 
Nations or under the protection of the British or American Governments, I am to 
say that the Union Government does not recognise any authority in the United 
Nations over South West Africa except to the extent that the Union Government 
has assumed responsibility by reason of its signature of the Charter.  The United 
Nations has, therefore, no authority or power to grant a mandate in respect of this 
Territory to any State.  From this it follows that the United Nations cannot 
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transfer South West Africa to the United Kingdom or the Untied States under 
mandate, even if it wished to do so. 
In view of the foregoing the Union Government can see no purpose that would be 
served by the Hereros either petitioning the United Nations or sending a 
delegation to present their ‘case.’  The proper course for you to pursue if you wish 
to represent your case is to do so to this Administration or to the Union 
Government, through this Administration, as you may see fit, because you are the 
wards of the Union Government.134 
 
Slater’s attempt to pressure Kutako into backing down would have the opposite effect.  It 
demonstrated to him that the South Africans were only interested in protecting 
themselves and that if he wanted to improve the lives of his people he would have to do it 
through the UN. 
 The South West Africa issue at the UN in 1947 became a test of the newly formed 
organization.  The Union once again declined to place the territory under trusteeship and 
the majority of the delegations saw this as a clear violation of UN authority.  One 
observer commented in early September that if the UN issued a hostile resolution towards 
South Africa, it could have disastrous consequences for both the UN and the Union.  In 
the Union, it would strengthen the Nationalist opposition who were increasingly calling 
for the creation of a Republic and withdrawal from the United Nations.  For the UN, if 
the British supported the Union in defying the UN then it “would be a heavy and perhaps 
fatal blow to the United Nations.”135   
 Heading into the 2nd Session of the United Nations, the South Africans had been 
quietly warned by the Americans and British that criticism of them would be worse than 
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it was in 1946.  Ben Cockram, of the US State Department, met with Bottomley and the 
South African government in early July of 1947 and told them that if the Union continued 
to defy the United Nations, which he was sure they were going to do, then this could spell 
disaster for the UN.  He told them “if South Africa decides to ignore UNO 
recommendations, there is nothing that the UN as an organization can do about it other 
than pass a condemnatory resolution.  But the spectacle of a member of the 
Commonwealth following a policy of ignoring the United Nations, combined with the 
likelihood of further Soviet intransigence and non-co-operation, will make it very 
difficult for the United Nations as an organisation to get on its feet.”136 Both the South 
West African as well as the Indian issue could spell doom for the UN as it struggled to 
gain legitimacy.  Cockram also warned the South Africans that they could not rely on 
American support in 1947.  Official State Department policy was to build a stronger 
relationship with India and they were not willing to jeopardize that over South Africa.  
The South Africans then planned to try to go to Foster Dulles to get support, but they 
recognized that even he would only be willing to go so far.137 
When the General Assembly began discussing South West Africa on September 
26, the Indian delegation demanded that the Union place South West Africa under a 
Trustee agreement as the General Assembly requested in 1946.  The Indian delegate, 
Mahraj Singh, said that the consultation with the inhabitants of the territory was a farce as 
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they were not advanced enough to understand what they were agreeing to, especially 
considering the racial barriers place on them in both South West Africa and the Union.138   
In order to help with his argument over the poor treatment of Africans within the 
territory, Singh requested that a letter from Michael Scott be circulated among the 
delegates.  This was the first time information from Scott appeared at the UN, and it 
marks one of the only times the South African delegation did not oppose the distribution 
of material from Scott.139  He also said that the Union had a moral as well as a legal 
responsibility to enter into a Trusteeship agreement. Singh implied that if the Union 
continued to defy the UN by refusing to place the territory under Trusteeship then they 
would have to consider what steps the UN could take to force South Africa into line.  The 
US representative, Dulles, differed greatly from the Indian point of view, arguing that 
there was no legal obligation for the Union and that there was nothing that the UN could 
do to force the Union into a Trusteeship agreement.  Dulles believed that it was a positive 
step that the territory was not incorporated in early 1947 and that if the world continued 
to apply moral pressure on South Africa then they would eventually place South West 
Africa under a Trusteeship Agreement.   The Danish and Dutch delegates agreed with 
Dulles that there was not a legal obligation to submit a Trusteeship Agreement, but did 
argue that the Union had a moral obligation.  The Yugoslavian, Chinese, Guatemalan, 
Polish, and Philippine delegations all agreed with India that the Union was in violation of 
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the Charter, and should be brought into line.140  Over the next couple of days the attitude 
and actions of the South African government would be interrogated by the General 
Assembly.    
 The debate over the territory in the General Assembly ended on September 27th, 
and the delegates were told that they had to turn in resolutions for consideration by 
October 1.  With few exceptions, the majority of the General Assembly wanted a repeat 
of the previous year’s resolution calling for South West Africa to be placed under the 
Trusteeship.  The only strong opposition came from Bottomley, of Great Britain, who 
argued that the Union did not have an obligation to place the territory under UN 
supervision.  The British position was that the Union showed great progress towards 
cooperation by asking the UN’s blessing before incorporating the territory and that after 
they were rejected, did not proceed with incorporation, even though that was clearly the 
wishes of the inhabitants.141 
Outside of the General Assembly, Dulles approached the Union.  Dulles told the 
South Africans that the US would support the South Africans.  This support was limited 
and would only consist of the US saying that the Union did not have legal obligation to 
submit a trusteeship agreement.  Dulles agreed with the Netherlands that the best course 
of action would probably be to ask for a judgment form the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), which the Union would probably win.  The South African delegates wished to 
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avoid this, but did not think that they would be able to.  Dulles also warned them that the 
Report on South West Africa prepared by the Union government would most likely be 
referred to the Fourth Committee.  This is a move the South Africans wanted to avoid.142  
The South African government also moved behind the scenes to make sure that any 
resolution condemning their actions would be muted.  They directly approached the 
Canadian and Americans who they believed promised to help, while the British 
delegation worked on the Latin Americans.  Union officials believed that the worst case 
scenario was that the UN would issue another non-binding resolution as it had in 1946.143 
While awaiting news on what the various delegations would propose, Smuts sent 
direction to the South African delegations.  He believed it best to try to avoid the ICJ 
because the Charter was clear in stating that mandates were not required to be transferred 
into trustees, but that if that was the will of the committee they would not fight it.  On the 
threat that the Report on South West Africa would be shared with the Fourth Committee, 
Smuts said that it was created for public consumption, but does not imply that the Union 
is accountable to the UN.  The South African position rested on the belief that even if the 
General Assembly condemned the Union for not placing South West Africa under 
Trusteeship despite its previous resolution that the UN should be reminded that 
resolutions were only recommendations and were not legally binding.144 
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Both the Indian and Danish delegations submitted draft resolutions dealing with 
the South West Africa issue.  Both draft resolutions called for the Union to honor the 
previous resolution and to submit a trusteeship agreement for South West Africa.  The 
resolutions differed, however, on whether or not the Union was obligated to do so.   The 
Danish resolution requested that the Union push forward a Trusteeship Agreement, while 
the Indian resolution demanded that they do so.145146   In the end, the Indian Draft calling 
for the Union to immediately place South West Africa under a trusteeship agreement was 
passed. 
Michael Scott arrived in New York after the debates over South West Africa were 
concluded, but that did not stop him from trying to lobby the UN in its decision making 
process.  While his papers were circulated among the UN, his presence was not as 
impactful as he might have wished.  The press virtually ignored him and the South 
Africans described his impact as negligible, claiming “in spite of three Press Conferences 
and intensive lobbying by the Indian Delegates all efforts to present Michael Scott to the 
American Public through the publicity media of the press have failed dismally.  He has 
not aroused any interest.  The petitions and his own statements to U.N. have gone 
unnoticed.  No reference was made to them in the Fourth Committee, which also, 
undoubtedly, diminished their value as documents worthy of attention by the press.”147  
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The only positive press he got was from Ebony, which “featured Michael Scott as the 
saviour and martyr for all oppressed non-European peoples in the Union of South 
Africa.”148  In Scott’s press release of October 1947, he informed the UN that he was sent 
by the Herero, because the South African government refused to allow the Herero to 
travel to New York.  They wanted to make sure that the world knew they opposed 
incorporation and they did not believe South Africa would operate in good faith.  Scott 
ended his press release by arguing that the racial policies of the Union in both South West 
Africa and South Africa prevented the non-white inhabitants of acting on their own so 
they were “looking in desperation to U.N. to help them.”149   Michael Scott, according to 
the South Africans to be a “self-styled representative” of the Hereros, continued 
throughout the end of 1947 to be a burr in the South African side as he continued to work 
with their critics.150 
The South Africans were more concerned with the direction the United Nations 
was taking.  The UN, led by India, began to see themselves as “the guardians and 
protectors of colonial peoples and that the Union should expect criticism from them in the 
future.  However, the Union must avoid arguing with them over points in the South West 
Africa report and that over time the issue will become routine and die down.”151  Another 
option the Union considered was “exposing the jaundiced and distorted motives of those 
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like Scott, or of delegates like Sir Maraj Singh.”152  The Union government would then 
walk the unpopular path of trying to expand its control of Namibia in an age when world 
opinion was becoming increasingly hostile to the old imperial system.  The Union belief 
that  
The future of South West Africa can in my opinion only lie with the Union.  The 
White population being mostly Union citizens wants incorporation with the 
Union. . . The natives are unable to speak with one voice.  People who dream of 
the natives eventually developing into one coherent unit, who can set up an 
independent Administration, should visit the Territory to be disillusioned.  The 
groups are always at loggerheads with one another, are racially antagonistic and 
ethnologically very dissimilar.  I do not think that within the next hundred years 
they will be able to govern themselves or to take a very intelligent part in any 
government.  The Hottentots and Herero have been deadly enemies for longer 
than the French and the Germans have been.  The Bushmen have been the object 
of hatred, contempt and persecution by the other races for a longer period than has 
been the case with any other nation in the world.  All the groups have their 
conferes of corresponding groups in the Union, and it must be assumed, therefore 
that if they must choose between closer association with the Union or a 
Government which is headed by foreign people overseas, who they don’t know, 
and who do not know them, their choice will be the Union.  If they are left to 
themselves, they are likely to start again where they left off, when the White man 
took control and complete the work of mutual extermination with which they 
were then busy,153 
  
was increasingly out of step with the will of the Namibian people and world opinion. 
 The opening sessions of the United Nations clearly demonstrated that world 
opinion had begun its shift against colonialism.  The debates over South West Africa case 
showed that the great powers’ control over the UN was not as firm as they believed.  For 
the British, their support of the Union hurt their standing in the world, and the Americans 
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made a tactical decision to support the rising power of India rather than stand with their 
traditional allies.  The founding of the United Nations created a forum in which the old 
ways of doing things fell to the side and new nations and private individuals influenced 
the course of world history. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
A NEW ATMOSPHERE:  THE NATIONALISTS TAKE OVER, 1948-1950 
 
 The election of the Nationalist Party in 1948, under the leadership of D.F. Malan, 
transformed the debate over the future of Namibia, as well as the fate of everyone in 
South West Africa and South Africa.  Immediately upon his election, Malan created an 
antagonistic relationship with the UN by claiming that South West Africa was an integral 
part of the Union and the UN did not have jurisdiction in the territory.  The South West 
African issue at the UN became extremely contentious and in 1949 reached a boiling 
point when the Fourth Committee requested Michael Scott to provide oral testimony 
against the Union.  The good will that Smuts had tried to build did not last as South 
Africa under the Nationalist party became increasingly isolated at the UN.   
At the Second Session of the United Nations, the Fourth Committee ended its 
deliberations over South West Africa with a whimper.  Both Scott and Smuts left feeling 
as if they had won partial victories, but neither was completely satisfied with the 
outcome.  Even though the Fourth Committee passed resolutions recommending that the 
Union of South Africa place South West Africa under a trusteeship agreement that would 
eventually lead to independence, it was merely a recommendation.  Smuts viewed the UN 
rejection of incorporation as only a temporary setback in his quest to bring South West 
Africa into the Union, while Scott looked to build on his momentum and push for 
stronger action at the next session.  In early 1948, both Scott and Smuts began to plan for 
the next phase of negotiations by reaching out to their allies around the world.   
84 
 
After failing to gain the United Nations’ blessing in his bid to incorporate South 
West Africa into the Union of South Africa, Smuts returned to South Africa.  Smuts was 
optimistic about the future of South West Africa.  He had agreed not to incorporate the 
territory into the Union, but he still believed that the territory would be integrated into 
South Africa.  The weakness of the UN resolutions emboldened him to plan a stronger 
campaign during the Third Session of the UN.  The Smuts administration was confident 
that the Union was in a better negotiating position than it was in 1947.  Forsyth, Smuts’ 
private secretary, thought the Union’s submission of a report on South West Africa, as 
well as its decision not to incorporate the territory would please their opponents in the 
Fourth Committee.  Union officials believed that the only group “that desire[d] 
trusteeship [was] the Herero tribe and they [were] only taking that attitude in the hope of 
attaining their selfish wish to the detriment of the majority of Native peoples,” and the 
Union would be able to clearly demonstrate this to the UN.154  Union officials saw the 
Hereros’ opposition to incorporation as a temporary setback and underestimated their 
ability to sustain a long international campaign against South Africa. 
The administration also realized that the calls for placing South West Africa under 
trusteeship would not cease, but that Smuts’ willingness to compromise at the previous 
session would help South Africa avoid strong condemnation.  Forsyth wrote in mid-
January that  
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The best we can ‘hope’ fore (sic) therefore is a continued attack on moral 
grounds, with  some added expression of regret that an otherwise loyal member of 
the United Nations has seen fit to ignore the force of world moral opinion as 
expressed in the Assembly’s recommendation.     
      
What we should aim at, therefore, is maintaining the small support already 
accorded us by our present friends, and if possible, to increase their number.  As 
you will be aware, whilst the attack on legal grounds has diminished – although 
some members will certainly continue to take an opposing view – the attack will 
be maintained and accentuated on moral grounds.155 
 
South African strategy would focus on reemphasizing that the European population of 
South West Africa, as well as the majority of the African population, opposed submitting 
a trusteeship agreement.  Forsyth hoped this strategy would counteract the moral 
obligation that many delegations argued required the Union to place the territory under a 
trusteeship agreement.  He also suggested to the South West African legislature that it 
should pass legislation formally requesting incorporation into the Union to strengthen the 
case for incorporation, as the Legislature had in the 1920s.156 
 The Union delegation to the UN was confident that it could count on US support 
during future UN sessions.  Francis Sayre, the President of the Trusteeship Council and 
lead US delegate, had a long conversation with Andrews, a Union delegate, about South 
West Africa in January of 1948.  Andrews described Sayre as “a good and understanding 
friend” to the Union during the 1947 sessions, even though he recommended the Union 
place South West Africa under a trusteeship agreement.  Sayre believed a trusteeship 
agreement was the best option because  
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his approach to international problems in the United Nations . . . had always been 
guided by the principle that under present conditions, with the world divided 
between totalitarian and democratic forces, it was essential that any divergences 
between the United States, the Commonwealth and other like minded nations 
should be eliminated, or at least reduced to a minimum, in the interest of as united 
a front as possible.157   
 
Sayre wanted to avoid a similar debate in 1948 over South West Africa that could 
potentially harm the relationship between the United States and South Africa.  He 
believed that if the Union submitted a trusteeship agreement then its friends would be 
able to get hostile nations, such as India, to give compromise a chance.  He thought 
Smuts’ agreement to submit reports to the United Nations had been a positive step in this 
direction.158    
Andrews did not buy this point.  He thought that while the “cooperation in the 
United Nations among like-minded democracies” was important he did not believe that, 
“our friends and others had yet given sufficient weight or consideration to our case in 
answer to the ‘moral obligation,’ upon which in fact the Assembly resolution had largely 
been grounded.” 159  The passing of the UN resolution on moral grounds, not on legal 
grounds, was detrimental to South Africa’s case, particularly after the Union reported that 
most people in the territory were opposed to a trusteeship agreement.  Sayre told 
Andrews “he feared very much the absence of any constructive approach to the Assembly 
resolutions might only serve to isolate South Africa from her friends, who might be 
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compelled to reconsider their attitude on the whole issue.” 160  The Union administration 
had been warned by the US that while the decision not to incorporate the territory and to 
submit reports on its administration were a positive step it did not go far enough.  
Andrews left the meeting with the impression that the Union could count on US support 
as long as it made an effort at compromising.161 
Sayre and the others who pressured Smuts to compromise with the UN 
underestimated the hostility towards the UN within South Africa and South West Africa.  
Friendly delegations at the UN recognized that Smuts’ options were limited because of 
the pressure of the Nationalist Party, which believed he had already compromised too 
much.  Michael Scott disagreed with this interpretation of Smuts’ actions.  He told 
Khama that almost the entire white population, including the United Party, was opposed 
to any UN interference in South West Africa.  Smuts was facing opposition within his 
own party, not just from the Nationalists.  Since 1948 was an election year in South 
Africa, Smuts’ negotiations with the United Nations were not his primary concern.162    
While the South African delegation was evaluating the 1947 session and planning 
for the Third Session of the UN, Michael Scott was reaching out to his allies.  Scott spent 
most of 1947 trying to convince the UN that it should invite Namibians to the next 
session so they could report directly to the UN.  By early 1948, Scott realized that the UN 
would not invite Kutako to speak before them.  He told Tshekedi Khama, that legally 
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“the African inhabitants have no right to be heard by the Trusteeship Council since the 
Assembly only gave it authority to examine the Union government report.”163  Khama 
and Scott had hoped that since the Fourth Committee was investigating the report sent by 
the Union then they would also want to hear from the African population; however, the 
Fourth Committee chose not to invite the Herero to Paris in 1948.  Scott argued that this 
decision took away the Namibian the right to petition, which was guaranteed under the 
mandate.  With the continual refusal of the Union to recognize the Herero’s position and 
the UN’s refusal to invite the Herero, Scott wanted to refer the South West Africa case to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).164 
 In January of 1948, Scott worked with the NAACP and other organizations to 
secure support for Kutako at the next UN session.  This was in violation of his visa from 
the United States, which allowed him only to attend meetings at the United Nations.  
Through the lobbying of Walter White, the State Department permitted Scott to stay in 
New York, which enabled him to increase his contacts within the United States and at the 
UN.165  The Union criticized Scott’s activities in New York and exerted pressure on the 
State Department to revoke his visa.  Union officials hoped they could prevent Scott from 
addressing the UN by ensuring that the US would refuse to grant him future visas.166  On 
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January 25, Scott wrote a letter to all UN and Fourth Committee delegations regarding 
South West Africa.  He wanted to send one last appeal for the reunification of the Herero 
and the return of their land.  In the letter, he wrote that he could not  
conscientiously return to South West Africa until I am sure that at least members 
of the United Nations and of the Fourth Committee have had an opportunity of 
considering the appeal of these South West Africans and have therefore caused 
their statements to be reproduced in full and circulated herewith. 
In my humble opinion of one who has lived and worked for many years as a 
missionary, the question of South West Africa which confronts the United 
Nations is one of vital consequence to all Africans and others whose lands are a 
sacred trust to our civilisation.167 
 
Scott wanted to be able to return to Kutako saying he had done all that he could to bring 
their case to the United Nations, even if the Union was able to block much of his work. 
 After the 1947 session many believed Scott’s inability to speak before the Fourth 
Committee showed that the Council was not concerned with the people in the non-self 
governing territories.  Scott adamantly disagreed, arguing that the Fourth Committee was 
more than “a band of well meaning talkers,” but their hands were tied by legal 
concerns.168  Scott believed the Fourth Committee wanted to become a transformative 
power but that the British, French, and Americans were concerned with larger global 
issues and South West Africa and the trustee territories were not high on their agenda.  
However, he believed that the best way to change the views of the Fourth Committee was 
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to continue to pressure them into acting on their moral responsibility towards colonial 
subjects around the world.  
 Scott arrived in Windhoek on February 12 to report on his progress to Kutako.  
Immediately upon his arrival, he visited the “native” location in Windhoek and began 
passing out his reports from the 2nd Session of the United Nations.169  Scott told J.A. 
Mentz, the Deputy Commissioner for the South African police in South West Africa, that 
the “object of his visit to [South West Africa] was to enlighten the natives of what had 
passed at the recent U.N.O. meeting at Lake Success,” and that “he was not disappointed 
with the outcome of the U.N.O. meeting referred to and that he had brought back a 
message of hope to the natives.  By peaceful and recognized representations to those in 
authority the natives would in his opinion ultimately attain what they were entitled to.”170  
Mentz did not believe Scott was in South West Africa to report on the meetings at the 
United Nations and had him monitored twenty four hours a day.  Mentz reported that 
while Scott was acting within the law his “conduct would seem to indicate premeditated 
incivility if not open defiance.  Moreover the natives with whom he has been in 
conference are strongly suspected of communistic tendencies which gave rise to the 
suspicion that he may be engaged in spreading subversive propaganda.”171  Mentz was 
concerned with Scott’s willingness to stay in the African sections of Windhoek and that 
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Scott was speaking to people other than Kutako.  Scott’s activities violated racial norms 
within South West Africa, and he was seen as a danger to the status quo in the territory. 
 In Windhoek, Scott requested permission to visit the native reserves so that he 
could speak directly with Kutako.  The South West African Administration denied him 
such permission and prevented Kutako from traveling to Windhoek to meet with Scott.  
Union and South West African officials tried to limit Scott’s interactions with Namibian 
leaders.  By March, the Smuts Administration was considering deporting Scott, but it 
eventually allowed him to stay as long as the police continued to monitor his activities.  
The Smuts’ administration was concerned that if it deported Scott it would create an 
international scandal, which would damage its efforts at incorporation.172 
 Hoogenhout tried to convince Scott to go through “proper” channels in his 
discussions with Kutako and the Herero.  Hoogenhout insisted that the South West 
African administration acted in the best interest of the Hereros and Scott should give all 
the material from the UN to him and he would pass it on to Kutako.  He believed Scott 
was confusing the African population and forbade him from visiting them.  Scott was told 
that if continued to work in subversive ways then he would be banned from South West 
Africa.  Hoogenhout and the South West African administration tried to keep Scott from 
interfering in their plans for the territory, but they were unsuccessful in driving Scott 
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away.173  Scott responded to Hoogenhout’s threats by trying to appeal to his sense of 
decency and Christian upbringing.  In a letter to Hoogenhout, Scott wrote that the United 
Nations was pivotal to world peace, asserting,  
For my own part, I hope that these controversies, especially in their larger aspect 
of the Native problem as a whole, can and will be settled within the framework of 
the British Commonwealth.  But I do not think one can deny the right of these 
Africans to have petitioned the United Nations and I do not feel guilty about 
having assisted them to do so. On the contrary. We have the task, have we not, of 
trying to build a civilisation in Africa which will make possible a harmonious 
development of both the white and black races?  But there are things happening in 
our country which are tending to destroy that harmony and it is not usually the or 
mainly the Africans who are destroying it in my opinion. 
The white race has all the power, political, economic and administrative and all 
the military force too.  Hence the fears, too loudly expressed sometimes, may be 
grounded in a bad conscience in the matter of dealings with the Native peoples.174 
 
He argued that the South African administration had presented the Herero with little 
choice but to appeal to the United Nations.  The Union government continually denied 
the African population of both South West Africa and the Union any type of 
representation or power, so their only option was to take their concerns to the world. 
 By April, Scott’s frustration with both the Smuts’ and the South West African 
administrations had reached a boiling point.  They continued to deny him access to the 
Native Reserves and refused to recognize that he could speak for the Herero.  In a report 
to his supporters abroad he wrote that “there [was] something sinister as well as ludicrous 
about all the attempts which have been made to stop these Africans’ voices as well as my 
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own.  The authorities went so far as to stop and interrogate any African who had been 
seen speaking to me.”175  Scott was able to occasionally lose his police tail, but not long 
enough to have significant meetings with Kutako and the other Herero leaders.  By the 
end of May, Scott had acquired new documentation from Kutako and the other Herero 
chiefs, as well as from the Nama leadership, reaffirming him as their chosen 
representative and demanding that the administration allow him to visit them.  Scott 
forwarded these letters to the United Nations and Smuts, as well as a complaint that he 
was being prevented from meeting with those who had clearly and repeatedly asked for 
his help.176  Scott spent the summer of 1948 trying to secure permission from the South 
African government to visit Kutako in the Arminus Reserve, but neither Smuts nor his 
successor Malan granted him permission.  He eventually had to leave South West Africa, 
without personally delivering his report on the meetings of the United Nations to Kutako. 
 While Scott was in South West Africa, Smuts was battling for his political life.  
Smuts’ consultation with the UN over the future of South West Africa was one of the 
primary criticisms Malan leveled at him.  The Nationalists accused Smuts of kowtowing 
to the United Nations and argued that by submitting a report on South West Africa to the 
UN, he had given them a say in a South African issue.  Even before the criticism from 
Malan, Smuts had already begun to regret submitting a report to the United Nations.  The 
                                                
175 Report by the Reverend Michael Scott, April 17, 1948, John H. Bracey Jr. and August Meier, eds., 
Papers of the NAACP:  Part 14: Race Relations in the International Arena, 1940-1955, (microfilm, 21 
reels), reel 5 
176 Letter to Secretary of the Trusteeship Council from Michael Scott, 31 May 1948, BTS 1/18/59, volume 
11, NASA. 
94 
 
Fourth Committee did not believe the report adequately described the conditions on 
South West Africa and had sent the Union a series of follow-up questions.   
 Smuts did not want to send a reply to the Fourth Committee, particularly after the 
attacks by the Nationalists over the initial report.  He believed while the UN itself was 
not inherently hostile, the Fourth Committee was, and that responding would only cause 
problems.  Smuts was concerned that sending an answer to the questionnaire could set a 
dangerous precedent because “questions on policy were dangerous and attempts to 
appease might lead us further into deep water.  Appeasement was allright (sic) amongst 
friends but it never worked with those who were fundamentally hostile.”177  Smuts, after 
his initial optimism following the 1947 UN meetings, was becoming worried the UN was 
toxic and “those of us who were at that madhouse – U.N.O. – should beware of becoming 
infected by the same mania,” which could turn friends against each other.178  In the end, 
Smuts responded to the UN’s questions in the hopes that this would help the Union in 
future UN sessions. 
 Smuts spent the majority of early 1948 focused on the parliamentary elections in 
South Africa.  An election he would ultimately lose to Dr. Daniel F. Malan and the 
Nationalist Party.  The election of the Nationalists in 1948 transformed South West 
Africa as well as South Africa.  The Nationalists swept to power by appealing to rural 
Afrikaners who felt the United Party represented urban and British interests and was too 
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concerned with remaining attached to Great Britain.  The triumph of the Nationalists 
cemented Afrikaner control over South Africa until majority rule was achieved in 1994.  
Within the Union, the Nationalists implemented their policy of apartheid, which set up 
extreme forms of segregation and discrimination.  These laws quickly spread to Namibia 
and by the 1950s isolated South Africa internationally.    
 Malan’s government also tried to distance itself from Smuts’ foreign policy, 
particularly at the United Nations.  The Nationalist government became increasingly 
belligerent towards the United Nations and in 1948 seriously discussed withdrawing from 
the UN.  Eric Louw, an experienced diplomat and Malan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
spent the early part of the summer of 1948 preparing for the UN’s meetings.  He planned 
to stand strong against the UN and not try to appease it as he though Smuts had.  Louw 
and Malan believed the Smuts administration should not have submitted the report on 
South West Africa to the UN and that the UN did not have jurisdiction over South West 
Africa.  The Nationalist had not only swept into power in the Union, but also won the 
general election in South West Africa on the promise of closer cooperation between the 
two, and they took this as a mandate for incorporation.  Louw arrived at the UN, with a 
plan to fight and secure South West Africa for the Union permanently.   
 Sir Alan Burns, a UK delegate, reassured the Malan administration that neither 
they nor the Americans or French would do anything to embarrass the Union at the 
upcoming session.179 The Union was cautiously optimistic that with British, American, 
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and French support they would emerge relatively unscathed from the 1948 session of the 
UN.  On July 23, the Fourth Committee began its discussions over the future of South 
West Africa.  The Soviet delegate argued that since the mandate system and League of 
Nations was defunct the Union had two options:  the Union had to either submit a 
trusteeship agreement or grant South West Africa immediate independence.  The 
Mexican delegation agreed with the Soviets that South West Africa should be placed 
under trusteeship, but they did not believe the territory was ready for immediate 
independence.  Sayre quickly jumped into the debate and said the Union should be 
praised for submitting a thorough response to the UN’s questionnaire and agreeing to 
work with the UN regarding South West Africa.  He argued that the UN should focus on 
improving the conditions for Africans within South West Africa and then push for 
Namibian independence.  The Chinese and Belgian delegates agreed with Sayre adding 
that the Union should also make more land available for the Herero so Maherero and his 
followers in Botswana could return.  By the end of the session, the Fourth Committee had 
created a drafting committee consisting of Belgium, the United States, China, and Costa 
Rica in order to draft a resolution on South West Africa.180  
 One of Bernardus Fouire’s, the lead Union delegate, biggest concerns was that the 
Fourth Committee would invite Michael Scott to speak on behalf of the Herero.  Over the 
first few meetings, Scott’s presence was fiercely debated in the Fourth Committee.  On 
the 23rd, the committee decided, “it would be inappropriate to hear him because he was 
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not an elected or selected representative of the inhabitants of South-West Africa, and 
because it was felt that all the evidence he might communicate to the Council could be 
communicated in writing,” but this could change at any time.181  Fourie believed Scott’s 
letters would be damaging to the Union and the Union should minimize their impact.  He 
suggested two possible defenses against Scott’s attacks.  Since the letters Scott was 
submitting were mostly anonymous, to protect the authors in South West Africa from 
intimidation, the Union could argue that they did not hold any weight.  If the UN 
accepted them then the Union should argue they were inadmissible.  If anybody could 
write letters to the UN without proof of their legitimacy and without the proper 
notification of the countries in which they originated, this would lead to all manners of 
complications.  He also presented a much more active second option.  Malan should also 
consider “having it out with the Secretary-General.”  Fouire believed this was the best 
long term solution because he believed “that at least a sizeable proportion of the 
personnel of the Trusteeship Department are somewhat unfavourably inclined towards 
the Administering Powers in general, and South Africa in particular, and unless we are 
continuously on the alert they may act to our detriment.”182  Fouire believed Malan must 
move first and prevent the committee from becoming even more hostile towards the 
Union.   
 Fortunately for Malan, the South Africans were not working alone.  The 
American delegate, Sayre, was working behind the scenes going “to individual members 
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advising moderation.”183  This appeared to have paid off, as the Fourth Committee was 
more lenient than the Union delegation expected.  Sayre was told by the State 
Department that he should “should speak as early as possible” and he should use a “very 
conciliatory speech” which “might prevent other members of the Council from indulging 
in considerably more censorious language.”184  Both Union and State Department 
officials believed Sayre was able to temper the allegations and accusations they had 
expected.   
The US also tried to temper the Drafting Committee’s Draft Resolution on South 
West Africa, but Sayre was less successful in the committee then he had been behind the 
scenes during the Fourth Committees opening meetings.  The draft resolution called for 
the Union to provide more resources for Africans within South West Africa in the 
economic and political realms.  Union representatives were promised that Great Britain, 
along with Australia and New Zealand would oppose the draft, but they could not count 
on French support.  The French delegates told Union officials that they were hostile to 
any form of racial discrimination and refused to support South Africa in any 
discriminatory practices.  The South Africans were also worried about the growing 
resentment of the colonial powers within the Fourth Committee.  They believed  
it [was] impossible for the representatives of the administering powers to offer 
successful resistance to the non-administering group unless they vote solidly as a 
bloc.  Some of the administering members are, however, very sensitive about 
accusations of “bloc voting”.  Furthermore certain of the administering powers 
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often press their ‘liberal views’.  The United States, for example, is not an 
administering power in our sense of the word.  She is comparatively new to this 
role and continues to be a strong critic of anything that in American eyes 
represents Colonial Imperialism.185 
 
The American, British, and French delegations did not want to act as if they were only 
concerned with maintaining colonialism and therefore were afraid of working together.    
 As the debate progressed over South West Africa the Latin American, Asian, and 
African delegations became increasingly hostile towards South African rule in particular 
and colonialism in general.  The Fourth Committee in particular was becoming hostile 
towards colonialism in all its forms.  The colonial powers were afraid that if they made a 
stand in supporting South Africa, then the Fourth Committee might start enquiring about 
their colonies.  In the late 1940s, Britain and France in particular were still in the process 
of regaining control of the colonies in Asia and North Africa that had fallen to the Axis 
powers during the Second World War.  As the UN began its turn towards anti-
colonialism the imperial powers were reinforcing imperial power around the globe.  The 
British fought a brutal campaign in Malaysia beginning in 1948 and the French were 
trying to hold on in Vietnam.  The Cold War also complicated the situation for the United 
States, which was not a colonial power in the same vein as the French or British.  The 
Soviet Union supported the actions of the anti-colonial bloc in order to gain support at the 
expense of the United States.  American officials were concerned that if the US supported 
South Africa’s imperial ambitions then the Indians and others would migrate into the 
Soviet camp. 
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 The debate over the drafting committee’s draft lasted into the middle of August 
before a milder version was eventually passed.  The US delegation was able remove 
much of the criticism, but not all of it.  The South Africans refused to consider the draft 
report, because they believed the Fourth Committee only had the ability to give 
observations on the condition of Africans in South West Africa, not to offer suggestions 
on how the Union could better manage the territory.  Cockram, a Union delegate, was 
concerned that US and friendly support was beginning to break down as the Soviets and 
Panamanians, in particular, continued to push for increasingly stronger criticisms of the 
Union.186 
 In response to the growing fear among the Malan administration that US support 
was tapering off H.T. Andrews, a South African diplomat, approached the State 
Department to remind them of the importance of South Africa to the United States.  
Andrews informed the Secretary for External Affairs that  
the United States delegation were adequately apprised at the topmost level of any 
special relationship that existed, or could come into being as between the United 
States and South Africa in, say, the atomic field, the United states delegation 
would be in a more favorable position to take all facets of United nations 
problems into account into Committees and ultimately the Assembly, when it 
came to formulating, or supporting, or even opposing resolutions affecting the 
interests of one or other country.187 
 
Andrews wanted to make sure the State Department adequately explained to the US 
delegates at the UN the importance of South Africa uranium to the American nuclear 
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program.  While not coming out and offering to trade uranium for support, he wanted the 
Americans to understand they needed the Union almost as much as the Union needed 
them.188 
 The Malan administration believed the Union was being unfairly criticized in the 
UN and decided to up the ante.  Eric Louw arrived in Paris to further the Union’s cause.  
Louw was a lifetime diplomat and one of Smuts’ chief critics in the diplomatic corps, 
particularly in his handling of the South West African and Indian issues before the United 
Nations.  He believed that Smuts did not fight hard enough to keep the UN out of the 
internal affairs of the Union.  Throughout the remainder of his career, Louw was South 
Africa’s fiercest diplomat and he consistently took every opportunity to try to discredit 
and weaken the UN’s voice in South African affairs.  He was primarily concerned with 
what he saw as a violation of the UN Charter in the constant interference in what he 
considered domestic issues within South Africa. 
 In a radio interview with Reuters and the Christian Science Monitor in September 
of 1948, Louw acknowledged the growing sentiment within the Union that the country 
should withdraw from the UN.  He made the argument that the Union was a founding and 
supportive member of the United Nations, but the Malan administration and many South 
Africans were questioning why they should continue supporting an institution that 
continuously censured and attacked them.  He also argued that United Nations 
interference in the treatment of Indians in the Union as well as the UNs questioning of 
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South African racial policies in both the Union and South West Africa was leading to 
heightening racial tensions.  If this criticism continued then he did not understand why 
the Union should remain in the UN.189 
 South Africa flirted with leaving the UN for the next couple of decades.  Louw, in 
his later years, was one of the strongest voices in espousing the Union’s abandonment of 
the UN.  Successive Union administrations wrote massive reports on the consequences of 
leaving the UN, and each time they recognized that leaving would cause more problems 
than it solved.  It was better to remain and defend themselves or work behind the scenes 
to weaken the UN’s continuous attacks against South Africa.  Even after the Union was 
effectively kicked out of the United Nations in 1973, the South Africans still maintained 
a permanent delegation in New York to work with other delegations to limit the attacks 
on South Africa. 
 While in Paris, Louw wanted to build support for the Union and monitor the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  Louw was adamantly 
opposed to the UDHR.  In a speech before the Third Committee, the Committee on 
Human Rights, he argued that the UDHR was a violation of the UN Charter as it 
interfered with the internal politics of sovereign nations.  He “suggest[ed] to our fellow 
delegates, therefore, to confine themselves to those rights which are practicable in the 
world of our day.  Let us by all means hitch our world to a star, but do not let us leave 
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terra firma altogether.”190  The UDHR to Louw was an impossible document and should 
never have been considered in the first place.  He was also annoyed that Michael Scott 
was an observer for the International League for the Rights of Man at the drafting 
session, which he saw as a personal affront. 
 Louw also tried to find new allies while he was in Paris.  American and British 
support was not enough to stop the growing hostility in the UN towards the Union.  He 
saw the Israel-Palestine crisis as an opportunity for the Union to win over Arab support.  
During the discussion of the Union’s report on South West Africa in July, the Iraqi 
delegate, Khalidy, was noticeably silent on the South West African issue.  However, he 
had criticized the Australians over the administrations of their trustee territories as well as 
spoke out against the UK’s administration of its trust territories.  Fourie believed that 
Khalidy’s silence on Union matters was because he was not sure of the Union’s position 
on Israel.  Since the British and Australians had allied with Israel, they could not count on 
Arab support, but there was a chance the Union could win Arab support by not 
supporting Israel.191  If flipping the Arab vote succeeded, Union officials believed it 
could turn the tide in the Fourth Committee.192 
 Before Louw arrived, Fourie and Water began to lay the groundwork for a strong 
Arab/South African relationship.  They wanted to convince the Arabs not vote against the 
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Union in exchange for Union support on Palestine.  Winning the Arab vote in the UN 
would not only secure the Union a greater base in the UN, but also show they did not 
have to rely solely on the imperial powers for support.  Louw hoped this would create a 
domino effect of support.193  This strategy ultimately backfired.  When Louw and Water 
tried to convince the Arabs of their support, the Lebanese Prime Minister pointedly 
reminded them that Smuts had followed the British lead and had already recognized 
Israel.  Union officials argued that the Malan administration did not have to honor Smuts’ 
position and they would prefer to have a relationship with the Arab League.  In an 
internal memo one Union official argued the Arab League would make a better ally 
because “History shows that the good will of the Jews is not (is not) dependable factor in 
either domestic or international spheres.”194  Union officials argued that Smuts only gave 
de facto recognition to Israel not de jure, and the Malan administration had never 
officially recognized Israel.  Representatives of the Arabs did not buy this argument.  
They did not trust the Union and could not be reassured that the Union would not later 
turn against them.195     
 The carefully cultivated relationship with the Americans also began to slowly fall 
apart.  Louw was upset that Eleanor Roosevelt had publically criticized the Union in an 
interview with the French press.  He wrote to Sayre that the US “particularly needs South 
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Africa”, not only for a route around the Cape in case the Mediterranean became 
inaccessible, but also because South Africa would be the largest producer of would 
uranium in the world, a significant portion from South West Africa.  He told Sayre that  
it is in the interests of America and other countries, that this strategic position 
should be in control of a European people, whose way of life and outlook, accord 
with those of Americans.  We are faced with a stiff fight against extensive 
Communist propaganda among the huge non-European majority in our country 
and it is essential that political power should not pass out of the hands of the 
Europeans.196 
 
 Sayre responded frankly to Louw by telling him that while the United States valued 
South Africa and shared many common concerns with the Union, their policy of 
discrimination would not be condoned.  Louw’s accusations that the US should 
understand South African policies because of racial discrimination in the American South 
did not shake Sayre’s conviction that the US should oppose apartheid.  Sayre argued that 
the US was fighting discrimination to the best of its ability and while it may be 
unsuccessful, it was at least trying.  He implied that if the Union wanted to continue to 
receive American support then it should move away from racial discrimination and 
resume the submission of reports to the United Nations.197  Sayre and Louw continued to 
have a friendly relationship even as the Union moved further and further away from 
Sayre’s suggestions to work with the United Nations. 
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 The only delegation the Union officials felt they could fully trust was the British.  
Since the first session of the United Nations, the UK had supported the Union position 
that they did not have an obligation to place South West Africa under a trusteeship 
agreement.  In 1947, Sir Alan Burns had also tried to prevent the Fourth Committee from 
discussing the reports the Smuts administration had submitted.  If he had been successful, 
many of the problems the Union faced in 1948 may have been avoided.  The British 
government supported the Union’s position that they did not have to submit reports on 
their rule in South West Africa.  The Colonial office believed it would be advantageous  
not to have the Fourth Committee concern itself with South West Africa, which 
always gives rise to acrimonious debates which affect the handling of other 
questions of direct concern to us.  But it would certainly be most unwise to 
mention this to Mr. Louw, since he would no doubt regard it as official United 
Kingdom support of the line he himself wishes to take of withholding from the 
United Nations any further reports on South West Africa, and would nullify the 
efforts of Mr. Andrews, of the South African Delegation, and others, to induce in 
Mr. Louw a more conciliatory frame of mind.198 
 
The British wanted to support South African actions, but they also wanted Louw to take a 
more diplomatic tone with the UN.  If he knew the level of British support, they worried 
that he would become almost impossible to deal with. 
 While Louw was in Paris trying to get support for the Union position, Scott was 
still trying to get permission to visit the Herero in the reserves.  After Malan’s victory 
Scott approached Malan hoping he would grant him permission, since the Smuts 
administration had refused him access.  Malan like Smuts also denied his request and 
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Scott was never able to give his report directly to Kutako.199  By October, Scott had given 
up on being able to visit the reserves, but hoped he could arrange a meeting between 
Kutako and Malan during the latter’s visit to Windhoek in mid-October.  Scott also tried 
to convince the Malan administration that representatives of the Herero should be 
allowed to travel to the United Nations to give testimony before the Trusteeship 
Committee.200     
 The Malan administration refused to consider the Herero request to travel to the 
United Nations.  Forsyth, who became Louw’s Secretary for External Affairs, told Scott  
the Union Government does not consider themselves accountable to the United 
Nations Organisation, to the Government of the United Kingdom, or to the British 
Commonwealth in respect of their administration of the Territory of South West 
Africa and cannot, therefore, look with favour upon the proposal that a delegation 
of the Herero people should visit Europe for the purpose of making 
representations along the lines suggested.201   
 
The Herero did not just rely on Scott to try to get them an audience before both the UN 
and Malan.  Kutako addressed a letter directly to Malan requesting permission to travel to 
Paris and for a return of Herero land.  His message implied that the current situation in 
South West Africa was detrimental to everyone involved and the UN should take over the 
administration of the territory.  Kutako believed that 
Despite the many problems and disputes which confront the United Nations after 
their victory we trust that our voices may yet be heard and that the wrongs which 
have been done to us may be rectified.  Last year we made our petition to the 
United Nations that this country being a Mandate of the former League of Nations 
should now be brought under the United Nations Trusteeship system, believing 
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this to be an impartial instrument for bringing peace and justice amongst those 
various sections in South West Africa both European and Non-European which 
formerly were enemies – the British and the Germans and the Afrikaners, the 
Hereros and the Hottentots and the Berg Damaras, all of whom must now find a 
way to live in peace and good will based upon justice.202 
  
If the Union submitted, a trusteeship agreement Kutako believed the situation would 
improve for all concerned and would allow a system of government and justice “whereby 
all races can look forward with confidence and hopes of fulfillment for the right 
aspirations of all sections.”203 
 The Malan administration informed Kutako “that the Union Government [did] not 
consider themselves accountable either to the United Kingdom government or to the 
United Nations in respect of their administration of South West Africa” and therefore 
they would not allow a Herero delegation to travel to either London or the United 
Nations.204  Malan argued that the Union had sole responsibility for the “administration 
of the Territory” and that it was always “ready to listen sympathetically to any reasonable 
representations from the Native peoples of South West Africa.” 205  The Malan 
administration continued to claim the international community did not have authority 
over South West Africa and so there was no reason for Kutako or others to visit the UN 
or any other nation. 
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 The Malan administration also refused to accept that Michael Scott had any 
legitimacy to represent the Herero.206  The South Africans held to this argument even 
after Kutako and the other Herero leaders sent Malan letters affirming Scott as their 
representative.  Kutako told Malan that if he did not recognize Scott then there could be 
no negotiations between the two groups.  Kutako had arranged a meeting with Malan, 
while the Prime Minister was visiting Windhoek, but told him that if Scott was not 
present then he would not be there either.207  The Malan administration refused to accept 
Scott’s position with the Herero because it believed he was a communist agent who was 
only trying to cause trouble.   
 In a detailed memo, the South African police described Michael Scott as a man 
who was “sympathetic towards all left wing organizations and takes an active part in 
demonstrations convened by these bodies” and a criminal who refused to pay taxes and 
instead donated the money to charity.208  This memo was eventually passed on to the 
Department of External Affairs so it could distribute it to delegations at the United 
Nations in an attempt to discredit Scott.209  It did not have the desired effect.  Scott’s 
“transgressions” consisted of supporting Indians and Africans who were fighting for 
equality.  The memo showed the world that Scott was willing to sacrifice his freedom in 
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his fight for equality and human dignity.210  These ideals made him a dangerous radical in 
South Africa.  The Union eventually declared him a prohibited immigrant and revoked 
his passport, effectively banning him from traveling to South Africa and South West 
Africa.211 
 For these reasons and many others, the Malan administration refused to recognize 
Scott.  They also believed the only legitimate concern for most Namibians was a desire 
for better housing in Windhoek.212  South African officials believed if Scott were out of 
the way, the Herero would also back away from their positions demanding more land.  
The meeting scheduled between Kutako and Malan was eventually cancelled.  The Union 
chose to believe that it fell apart because Kutako had fallen ill,213 but this belief ignored 
Kutako’s warning that he would not meet with Union officials until they recognized Scott 
as their representative.214  Even though the meeting never took place, the Herero still 
forwarded their demands that the Union make more land available for them and for the 
return of Maherero.  The Union once again refused to consider the option of providing 
more land for the Herero.  They were not willing to allow them to settle outside the 
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Police Zone nor were they willing to purchase private (white) land and give it to the 
Herero.215 
 At the UN, Louw began a full attack on the Fourth Committee for its examination 
and critique of South Africa’s report on South West Africa.  In a speech to the Fourth 
Committee on November 9, Louw stuck to the Smuts administration’s claim that the 
report the Union provided the UN was voluntary and for the purpose of information.  He 
believed “the United Nations [had] no supervisory jurisdiction” in South West Africa and 
the entire debate over the territory was pointless, as the Union would never recognize UN 
authority over the territory.216  He continued to reject the idea that South Africa had either 
a moral or a legal obligation to submit South West Africa to a trusteeship.  Louw also 
maintained that the process in which the Namibians were consulted in 1946 was done in a 
manner consistent with colonial rule throughout Africa and the majority of Africans 
supported incorporation with the Union, not a trusteeship agreement.  As a thinly veiled 
attack on the less democratic members of the UN Louw claimed, the consultation took 
place with “complete freedom” and that “No pressure—direct or indirect—was exerted.  I 
know of millions of people in certain countries who would be grateful if they could enjoy 
similar complete freedom from fear and pressure when participating in their national 
elections.”217  He told the UN that those who claimed that the consultation were flawed 
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and did not represent the true wishes of the Africans came from “political agitators” and 
“from certain well-meaning persons who have little or no knowledge of conditions in 
South West Africa,” and so they cannot be taken at face value.218  Louw believed people 
like Scott were causing problems in the territory and not respecting the traditional 
headman’s decision to proceed with incorporation would destroy the African population 
and lead to chaos within the territory. 
 Louw used this moment to announce that Malan and the South West African 
Legislature had agreed to a “closer association and integration,” but this did not constitute 
incorporation, merely self-government for the South West Africans.219  He was willing to 
push the UN away from South Africa, but did not have either the authority or the tenacity 
to declare this new relationship as incorporation.  Instead, it was a closer cooperation 
with South West Africans gaining seats in the Union Parliament, and having greater 
control over their internal affairs than the other provinces in the Union.  The Malan 
administration maintained that the South West Africa Act in effect gave the territory self 
rule and the legislature in Windhoek chose to move closer to South Africa. 
 The response to Louw’s speech was overwhelmingly condemnatory.  The Indian 
delegation in particular reacted harshly to the notion that race relations in both the Union 
and South West Africa were harmonious and the international community did not have an 
interest in the territory.  Louw responded to the Indians on November 11.  Instead of 
merely accepting criticism we went on the offensive he criticized Pandit on Indian rights 
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violations and claimed she had no right to criticize the union.220  Louw said it did not 
become  
any delegate of India to complain of “inhuman treatment” and of “ruthlessness” 
when the bombings of Hyderabad are still echoing in the ears of the world, and 
when there is still fresh in the minds of civilised people the ruthless slaughter of 
tens of thousands of fellow-Asians – the Moslems of Kashmir and the Punjab, and 
even of Delhi, to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands who were driven from 
their homes which were looted and destroyed. 
I repeat – it is not for a delegate of India to make charges of discrimination, of 
ruthlessness and of inhumane treatment.  She should remember the old adage that 
people who live in glass houses should not throw stones – and India is at present 
living in a house which is constructed of particularly fragile glass.221 
 
For the remainder of his career Louw and the various Indian delegates at the UN and in 
the Commonwealth would have a tense relationship that often spilled into personal 
attacks on each other. 
Cassim Jadwat, an observer for the South African Indian Congress, wrote an open 
letter to Louw criticizing his performance and actions before the Fourth Committee.  In 
his letter, he told Louw  
It is tragic to see the pathetic and lonely figure which you have cut at the Palais de 
Chaillot.  You and your colleagues in the South African Delegation are unable to 
understand why the delegation of over 50 nations are not enamoured by your 
pleas, protests and warnings.  In the Committee on Human Rights and now in the 
Trusteeship Committee, the delegation of the Union of South Africa finds itself 
the sole and solitary champion of a system of society which you regard as the 
bastion of the white man’s civilisation.  You find yourself completely out of tune 
with the delegates of other nations.  Many of these delegates have had quite a 
different training from yours.  Some have been agitators and even prisoners.  
Others have been resistance leaders while many have come as representatives of 
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Governments which do not derive their power from a tiny minority whose only 
virtue to enjoy privileged society is the measure of pigmentation of their skins.222 
 
Jadwat astutely pointed out to Louw that the South African delegation was not keeping 
up with the sweep of history.  Louw’s unwillingness to see that old imperial models of 
racism and direct control would not be maintained, particularly as UN delegations 
became staffed with people who spent their lives fighting imperialism. 
Jadwat also wanted to discredit Louw’s argument that the only people criticizing 
the Union were communists was not a valid argument at the United Nations and his 
“attempt to present the issues under discussion in another light as duel between East and 
West” would be unsuccessful.223  He countered the Nationalist’s argument that the 
criticism of the Union both within the Union and abroad was not because of communist 
agitation but because Namibians and South African saw in the UN 
a glimpse of hope for their future, that in spite of its limitations it is the only hope 
of mankind.  So long as we are denied elementary human rights, so long we will 
appeal to UNO, India and all nations that support our fight and South Africa will 
continue to be represented by two delegations, the official Government delegation 
and that of the non-white peoples. 
 
The discussions at UNO should be a significant reminder to you that the civilised 
nations of the world reject this doctrine of race and colour superiority, a doctrine 
which is the harbinger of fascism, the fount of countless murders.  The world was 
plunged into the terrible holocaust of a war because the voices of protest against 
this doctrine were too few and feeble.  But today, it is not so.  Gone are the days 
when this doctrine was permitted to be practiced with impunity regardless of 
world opinion.  Gone are the days when the Government of South Africa could 
remain comfortably in the camp of civlised governments when it continues to 
wield a hated doctrine.  Gone are the days when the non-whites in South Africa 
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remained passive spectators of their dwindling rights.  They are today dynamic, 
no longer willing to be dumb slaves of white masters but prepared to map out 
their own destiny according to their desires and wishes.224 
 
Jadwit, like Kutako, saw the UN as the forum in which their struggles and hopes could be 
expressed.  The UN, even with its virtually non-existent authority in domestic affairs, 
gave hope to the oppressed in the Union and South West Africa.  The shows of solidarity 
with Africans by Indians, Latin Americans, and other delegations gave them hope to 
continue their struggles for equality and freedom. 
The South African attempt to portray its critics within South West Africa and the 
Union as communists was a direct result of the heightening tensions of the Cold War.  If 
Union officials could frame the opposition to South African rule in Namibia as radical 
communists then the Americans would temper the criticisms of the United Nations.  By 
taking this strategy, the South Africans effectively eliminated support from the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc, but they hoped that American support in the name of anti-
communism would be strong enough to overcome Soviet opposition.  The attempt to 
portray Kutako and other advocates for Namibians, fell on mostly deaf ears.  For the 
Latin Americans, Indians, Arabs, and others the presence of South Africa in Namibia 
predated the Cold War and was not directly tied to it.  For both American and Soviet 
delegations the struggle over colonialism was key in winning allies in the Cold War and 
neither nation was willing to risk the support of the Third World by appearing to directly 
support colonialism.   
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 The Fourth Committee also reacted with hostility to the “closer” relationship with 
the Union the South West Africa Act created.  Many delegates saw this as incorporation 
by a different name, which the UN had rejected in 1946.  Louw responded to these 
criticisms by fiercely arguing that it was not incorporation, whether the UN believed it or 
not and South Africa would continue to rule South West Africa under the spirit of the 
mandate.  For the next four decades the Union maintained the position that the mandate 
had never ended and the UN was not the natural successor to the League and did not have 
authority over South West Africa.225  Louw’s arguments did not do enough to sway the 
Indians or Soviets, but in the end France, Belgium, Greece, and Great Britain voted with 
them in the Fourth Committee.226  American support was noticeably absent in early 
November, something the Union desperately wanted to change. 
 While the Union was being roundly criticized in Paris, a South African diplomat, 
met with Dulles and Forrestal to discuss the strategic importance of South Africa.  In his 
report to Malan, Water wrote that he  
found both Ministers particularly interested in the strategic importance which the 
Union has unhappily assumed as the result of the war, and as a consequence of the 
liquidation of the British Empire in the East.  The East had gone East in our time, 
and this historical process, taken in conjunction with the ideological threat of 
communism, had cast shadows, so I explained, upon Africa, and had affected our 
own lives in the South in a direct and disturbing manner.  Communistic 
propaganda had agitated native opinion throughout the continent, while the 
infiltration of Indians into Africa, a slow and unconscious process in the past, had 
become a conscious policy which was now exciting attention among the nations 
and powers concerned in the development of the African Continent.  These were 
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question which I suggested, the United States of America with its newly acquired 
world responsibility, could not afford to overlook. 
Both these processes threatened the western civilisation of the Union, which, at a 
time of emergency, would be found to be a material factor in the strategy of the 
western Powers.  The discovery of incalculable atomic resources, in association 
with our gold quarts; the place of South West Africa in the hegemony of the 
Union of South Africa; these were matters of inescapable significance in any 
intelligent strategic planning, demanding a  realistic mutual understanding 
between our two Governments227 
 
The Malan administration wanted to cultivate a relationship with the United States based 
on their fears of communist and “eastern” aggression.  The United States continued to 
support the Union behind the scenes, but was loath to come out directly in support of the 
Union.  US diplomats had to balance South African strategic concerns with alienating 
India and the rest of the “third world.”  American support would take the shape of 
continuing Sayre’s legacy of watering down UN criticism, but still voting for and 
supporting the resolutions.   
 Michael Scott arrived in Paris at the end of the deliberations of the Fourth 
Committee over South West Africa.  In a letter to all delegations, Scott wrote that he was 
sent not only by the Herero, but by the Damara’s as well, and they viewed the UN as their 
only hope for justice.  Scott told them that he came to Paris because for three years Union 
officials had refused to allow Kutako and others to come in person.  His support of the 
Hereros and other Namibians had come at great personal cost as his actions and 
movements had been closely monitored and interfered with by Union and US officials.  
In describing the conditions of the Herero he stated that they  
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are today a landless and voiceless people threatened with moral and physical 
disintegration by a force over which they have no control.  The lands which they 
occupy are occupied only at the will of their white overlords.  They have appealed 
to the United Nations and their appeal is the appeal of all the African people 
against the oppression and bad faith of a state whose present standards are a 
menace to Western or Christian civilisation.228   
 
Scott’s call for action was predicated on the idea that the Union’s policies not only defied 
the will of the United Nations, but was an attack on western and international values.  
Union officials responded to his charges by trying to discredit him in the eyes of the 
United Nations.  Louw had forwarded Scott’s police record to many friendly delegations, 
but this did not have the intended effect.  Union officials wanted the UN to know that 
Scott held “no mandate to make representations on behalf of the vast majority of 
indigenous population of South West Africa, and has not standing whatever with 
Administration.  He represents very small minority of disaffected natives who have no 
right to speak on behalf of native population as a whole.”229  Louw and the Union 
continually argued that the Herero were an unimportant group in South West Africa and 
that Scott’s legitimacy, if he had any, was only to speak for this small minority. 
 Louw’s attempt to convince the Fourth Committee that the majority of the African 
population supported the Union was ineffective.  The final report of the Fourth 
Committee was critical of the Union’s treatment of the non-white population and 
demanded that the Union continue to submit reports to the UN until the territory was 
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placed under a trusteeship agreement.230  Louw rejected the report and stated 
categorically that the Union was under no obligation towards the UN regarding Namibia. 
 On November 26, the Fourth Committee met to finalize their resolutions on South 
West Africa based on the Report on South West Africa.  It was an acrimonious meeting 
that did not go particularly well for Louw.  The Danish delegate and Rappateur, Hermond 
Lannung, began by reaffirming the Committee’s previous resolutions recommending 
South West Africa to be placed under trusteeship and expressing concern that the Union 
was planning on incorporating the territory against the wishes of the UN.  Lannung also 
argued that if the Union was going to insist that it was going to rule through the mandate 
then it must submit reports as called for in the mandate.  Gerona of Uruguay agreed with 
Lannung, saying that the Union’s responsibilities did not die with the League, but were 
transferred to the UN.231 
 Vijaya Pandit, the delegate of India, led the most effective charge against Louw 
and the Union.  She argued that while the Union claimed that they had abandoned 
incorporation in 1946, their recent actions showed that they had not done so.  Pandit 
believed that  
the rejection of the request for the trusteeship of South West Africa, the 
attainment of self-government by hundreds of thousands of backward people of 
South Africa is permanently retarded.  The truth of this becomes more evident 
when we remember that, in the proposed representation of South West Africa in 
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the Parliament of the Union under the scheme of so-called association, the 
Africans will have no representation.232 
 
Like many in the UN, she was concerned that if the Union pursued its plan of closer 
association with South West Africa, then it would permanently institutionalize white rule 
in Southern Africa.  Pandit also was one of the first members of the UN to demand that 
the Union allow Namibians to approach the UN.  In her speech before the Fourth 
Committee, she attacked South Africa’s claim that the committee did not have the right to 
come before the UN, by pointing out that the First Committee had allowed both Arabs 
and Jews to speak in the debates over Palestine.   
 Pandit was positioning India as a leader in the anti-colonial movement, a position 
that her brother Jawaharlal Nehru would accept and lead until Bandung in 1955.233  In the 
most powerful section of the speech, she told the committee that the 
 
General Assembly should know that India has no personal interest in South West 
Africa.  Our interest is based on certain convictions.  We were, until recently, a 
dependent country, suffering from all the handicaps of foreign rule.  Our fight for 
freedom was based on the principle that freedom like peace, is indivisible.  It was 
the symbol of our faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth 
of the human person.  Today we have the proud privilege of being a member of 
this august body.  This privilege involves corresponding obligations, and we 
cannot forget those who are unrepresented here today but who nevertheless aspire 
to freedom. Believing this as we do, we have been compelled to speak on behalf 
of those less fortunate than ourselves.234  
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She continued by saying that this applied to all African and Asian countries and this 
moment is one of the earliest mentions of what will eventually be known as the Afro-
Asian Bloc in the United Nations.  Pandit argued, “that there are some principles for 
which we of Asia must stand.  Of these, on is the ending of the colonial system; the other, 
equality between peoples and nations.”235  South West Africa was the perfect showdown 
for India.  The Indian delegation was not only waging a war in the UN against South 
Africa over the treatment of Indians in the Union, but also positioning themselves as the 
protectors of those still under colonial rule. 
 Louw did not allow the attacks on the Union to go unanswered.  He responded by 
quoting Malan’s argument that the “South African Government [was] exercizing (sic) a 
right which has never been disputed to administer the territory as an integral part of the 
Union pursuant to the power granted in the original mandate,” which the South Africans 
believed gave them a blank check in Namibia.236  He also continued to make the 
argument that neither a legal nor a moral argument could compel the Union to submit a 
trusteeship agreement.  Louw also made the now familiar argument that the UN was not 
the successor the league.  He based his  
stand particularly on these two facts.  First, at the last meeting of the League of 
Nations, just before that organization passed out finally, the representative of 
South Africa—who is a member of my delegation and is here to-day—made a 
distinct reservation on behalf of South Africa to the effect that South Africa was 
going to afford to South West African another international status.  Thus, on that 
occasion our position was formally reserved.  Second, there is the further fact that 
the League of Nations at its last meeting—and I am saying this because there are 
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certain representatives who will persist in going back to the League, and I say 
good, for argument’s sake let us go back to the old League although we hold that 
the United Nations is not heir to the League’s responsibilities in regard to South 
West Africa—at its last meeting the League did not pass any resolution asking 
any of the mandatory powers to place any of their territories under the trusteeship 
system.237 
 
The Union’s maneuvers at the final League meetings were consistently used to legitimize 
its actions regarding South West Africa.  Louw also refuted the allegations that the Union 
was not providing for the Namibian population by claiming that World War II prevented 
everyone from building adequate infrastructure and that the Union could not be 
condemned for choosing to fight instead of build.   
The resolution passed even though many nations believed as the Polish delegation 
did that it was not strong enough.  Resolution 227 called on the Union to not incorporate 
South West Africa and suggested that South West Africa be placed under a trusteeship 
agreement.238  While the resolution was critical of South Africa, it was not a strong 
condemnation, leading Louw to tell Malan “on the whole, we are satisfied,” even though 
he was concerned about the loss of some of their supporters, particularly those in 
Commonwealth countries.239   
After the passage of Resolution 227, the UN turned its attentions to other matters, 
but Michael Scott had one last parting shot.  He wrote a letter to the President of the 
General Assembly asking that the Herero be allowed to petition the UN as previously 
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requested.  Scott believed “the failure of South Africa to support the unanimously 
adopted Genocide Convention, and its abstention from the Declaration of Human Rights 
seem to many in South Africa as elsewhere to constitute a defiance of moral standards 
which the conscience of mankind is arriving to establish.”  He believed this could have 
drastic consequences for the African population in both South West Africa and the 
Union.240  Overall, many Union officials considered 1948 to be a success even though 
they were increasingly marginalized at the United Nations; they believed the firm tone 
taken by the Malan administration strengthened their control of South West Africa in the 
face of international condemnation. 
 Malan’s actions in bringing South West Africa into closer cooperation with the 
Union caused problems for South Africa.  Many UN delegates criticized the new 
relationship as incorporation by another name.  Louw wrote to Sayre arguing that the “the 
new arrangement was not ‘incorporation,’ for the simple reason that South West Africa 
will have a larger measure of local autonomy than any of the existing four Provinces of 
the Union, in addition to having a relatively larger representation in the Union 
Parliament.”241  Sayre and most UN delegates never bought this argument.  The Fourth 
Committee in particular viewed any action by the Union that did not lead to a trusteeship 
agreement as violating its previous resolutions.  The Union spent much of the spring of 
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1949 trying to convince its allies to continue to support it even as the nation moved 
further out of favor with the UN. 
 Louw told Sayre that the attacks on the Union at the UN meetings in Paris had 
created domestic problems.  He argued that agitators and communists had seized on the 
UN’s attacks and spread lies based upon the inaccurate criticisms from the UN to the 
people of the Union.  Louw informed Sayre that because the Union’s report on South 
West Africa, was used by the Fourth Committee only to criticize the Union, the Union 
would not be submit any more reports to the United Nations.  Smuts had only submitted 
the first report to the United Nations out of respect, not because he recognized UN 
authority over the mandate and that the Malan administration would not follow Smuts’ 
example.242 
 Louw also returned to the now familiar argument that the US needed the Union in 
the fight against communist and that South African racial policies were similar to those in 
the US.  Responding to criticism by Sayre and Dulles, Louw admitted that the Union had 
discriminatory policies in place to protect the white population from the much larger 
black population in and around the Union.  He said that the US would act in a similar 
way and argued “in spite of the fact that your negro population is a relatively small one, a 
policy of racial discrimination is in fact practised in the U.S.A.—not only in the South, 
but also in the rest of the Country.”243  Louw believed that the average American and 
South African were not so different.  However, the press was anti-South Africa and the 
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American people did not get a real sense of what is going on in South Africa.  He claimed 
that the journalists were out to get the Union and often reported verbatim what the 
communists and government opponents printed.  Louw believed that  
the white race in South Africa is fighting to survive. That is the plain fact of the 
matter.  The Non-Europeans are demanding full political equality – and in these 
demands they are greatly encouraged by discussions at United Nations meeting.  
If these demands are conceded then another generation or two the vastly 
numerically superior Non-Europeans will be in full control-and that will be the 
end of white civilisation at the Southern end of the African Continent.  
Furthermore, the control will be in the hands of a Communist dominated black 
proletariat.244 
 
Louw and other Union officials equated African demands for independence in South 
West Africa and against apartheid in the Union with communism.  The Malan 
administration saw itself as not just supporting and protecting Afrikanerdom, but also as 
being in the vanguard of the struggle against communism. 
 Reflecting on the 1948 session of the United Nations, Louw told the South 
African Broadcasting Company that the United Nations was struggling for legitimacy.  
He believed that “political considerations and emotion play[ed] the leading role in UN 
debates,” and that this prevented complicated issues to be resolved.245  Louw said this led 
to the UN just kicking issues to the next session or doing whatever was politically 
expedient, which could eventually lead to the end of the UN. 
 The Malan administration however, could not compete with the broadside that 
Scott was about to unleash on behalf of the Herero.  Michael Scott spent the spring and 
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summer of 1949 fighting incorporation and pushing for South West Africa to be placed 
under UN supervision.  Scott made sure that everyone with even a tiny interest in the 
issue was briefed.  In February, he wrote a letter directly to King George VI requesting 
him to step in and prevent the Union from following through with its incorporation bid 
against the wishes of the population of the territory.246  While there is no evidence that 
the king interfered, Scott’s letters to others within the British government were effective.  
In early March, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Gordon Walker, 
along with MP P. Noel-Baker, an eventual Nobel Peace Prize winner, met with a 
deputation representing anti-colonial and anti-racial organizations accompanied by 
Michael Scott, on the South West African issue. 
 Walker tried to control the meeting by stating that they would only discuss United 
Kingdom policies and not issues that were under the authority of the Union.  The 
deputation was unwilling, however, to accept that the UK did not have the right or 
authority to interfere in Union affairs.  C.W.W. Greenidge of the Anti-Slavery Society 
took the lead in demanding that the UK act forcibly in condemning South Africa’s 
attempt to incorporate South West Africa.  He told Walker that  
The eyes of the world, and especially of the backward peoples of the world, are 
on Britain today in her policy on the disposal of South Africa, because the African 
people regard this as a testing ground of whether lands of African peoples are 
going to be preserved for them.  If Britain continues to support the Union in her 
policy of annexation – which will result, from past experience, in depriving the 
African inhabitants of land – she will be branded as having supported a daughter 
nation which has openly repudiated that principle, and that while she has paid lip 
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service to the paramountcy (sic) of international trusteeship, she has supported a 
daughter nation which has repudiated that principle.247 
 
Greenidge set the tone for the meeting by making not only a moral, but a precedent 
argument in Britain’s lack of action.  Walker had a decision to make on how the UK 
wanted to posture in world affairs, as either a protector of the disposed or as one of the 
dispossessors.   
 Scott would take a similar tactic arguing that the “moral integrity of the British 
Commonwealth” was wrapped up in South Africa’s actions.248  He concluded with the 
argument that  
Africans today are looking to Britain at a very critical time in the history of their 
people.  Their status and their lands are bound up in this question, which is one of 
good faith and goodwill on the part of the Western civilisation and the British 
Commonwealth towards the African people: towards other, non-European 
nations, too, perhaps.  This question must profoundly affect the future 
development of the whole continent of Africa, and especially of the British 
African territories.  Involved in it also, as Mr. Greenidge pointed out, is the whole 
question of relations with the Africans.  Furthermore there are many who fear that 
this integration, so-called, of South West Africa must be feared and must be 
legitimately feared as a first step in a program of openly declared expansionist 
aims whereby annexation is also sought of British High Commission territories, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland.  Such a statement was made by the Minister of 
Defence a few days ago and he could not understand how her attitude could be 
defended as long as these territories remained under Britain.249 
 
Knowing this he asked how the British government could argue that they were not 
concerned or did not have any say in the actions of the South African government when 
they were still part of the empire. 
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Walker desperately tried to walk a fine line by arguing that the UK did not 
support South Africa, but the British were taking the position that the Union was not 
legally obligated to submit a trusteeship agreement.  He claimed the UK did not have 
authority over the Union and could not force them to do anything.  Walker continued by 
saying that even though the Herero should be unified and morally the Union should place 
SWA under trusteeship they were not required to under the Charter and the UK would 
vote with the UN Charter not based on moral considerations.  He also wanted to make 
sure the delegation did not report to anybody what was discussed at the meeting, only that 
a meeting took place.  Walker did not want to tie his hands when working with the South 
Africans, particularly since he would not claim they had a moral obligation to submit a 
trusteeship.250 
 In his report to Francis Cumming-Bruce, in the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
on the meeting Walker wrote that, he was able to prevent a condemnatory declaration that 
would tie the UK to a certain policy.  Walker believed that even if the British censured 
the Union it would “increase the influence of the hotheads among the Nationalist Party, 
make the Union more difficult to do business with and, in fact drive the Union to further 
extremes of isolationism and defiance.”251  The British government was still willing to 
work with and support the Union, but the intransigence of Louw and other Union 
officials was causing friction in the relationship.  The Malan administration’s 
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unwillingness to even consider negotiation was causing problems with its allies.  The 
British maintained the position throughout 1949 that no nation was legally obligated to 
submit a trusteeship agreement, but they were not willing to go to much further in their 
support of the Union.252  
 In the spring of 1949, Michael Scott began working on his approach to the United 
Nations meetings that were going to be held in Lake Success, New York, in 1949.  He 
wanted to avoid the difficulties he ran into during the 1948 session and tried to cultivate 
allies that could help him secure a visa.  Scott built a close relationship with US Delegate 
and NAACP President Walter White.  Scott wanted White to help him secure the right to 
petition for those in South West Africa and to recommend that the South West Africa 
issue should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.253   
 In 1949, the Union put pressure on the US to reject Scott’s visa to attend the UN 
sessions.  Scott asked Walter White to intervene on his behalf using the previous visa as a 
precedent.254  The Malan administration did not want Scott to travel to Lake Success, not 
just because it did not recognize his authority, but also because of the negative portrait 
that he would no doubt paint of the Union.  Scott had written to Malan criticizing the 
Union’s treatment of non-whites in the country.  He wrote that  
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to discriminate against a people on grounds of race, to obstruct and hinder the 
development of their divine skills and talents is a contradiction of the creative 
purpose in human life and society.  It can have no justification on grounds of 
Christian belief regarding the nature of God and Man. The propagation of the 
Colour bar as a tenet of the Christian Gospel is a deception and a perversion of the 
truth for which Christ died in order that all mankind might be saved from such 
hatred and contempt of one another and that they might find their unity in him.255 
 
Scott’s activism embarrassed the Union, and South African officials did everything they 
could to stand in his way. 
 Walter White eventually intervened on Scott’s behalf.  He pressured the NAACP 
to invite Scott to the United States as an advisor, which would allow Scott to stay for the 
duration of the UN meetings.256  The Malan administration argued that Scott’s 
communist sympathies were dangerous and that was why he should not be allowed to 
attend the United Nations.  White dismissed this notion, claiming that the Union was 
afraid of Scott only because of the good things he could do for people of color.  He told 
the NAACP board of directors “Rev. Scott has been accused of being a ‘Communist’ by 
the Government of the Union of South Africa.  The charge is in my opinion ridiculous.  
He is charged as such because he has had the unselfishness and the courage to fight for 
the rights of the native population.”257  Scott worked closely with White and the NAACP 
throughout 1949. 
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 Scott’s presence at the United Nations, as well as his petitions to the Fourth 
Committee created precedent problems for the UN.  Louw and the Union delegation 
argued that it was beyond the Fourth Committee’s authority to examine petitions from 
South West Africa.  He maintained the position that the Fourth Committee did not have 
the same authority as the Mandate Commission and so it could not hear petitions.  The 
question of Scott appearing before any UN body was especially troublesome and rejected 
out of hand by Union officials, but Union intransigence made the UN more sympathetic 
to hearing directly from Scott.  
The UN was warming up to the idea of hearing Scott because of the Union 
delegates’ refusal to negotiate over any substantial South West African issues.  The South 
African delegation once again informed the UN that the Union would not be submitting 
further reports because the United Nations did not have any authority over the 
mandate.258  The South African delegation took such a hard line because its members 
thought they had the support of the British and to a lesser extent the American 
delegations and that while most nations were against them, they may be able to take 
advantage of the “opportunist attitude of the Arab states and the rather mercurial 
temperament of the Latin Americans.”259  They overestimated their ability to influence 
the Latin American states, and the Arabs would not support them without a clear South 
African condemnation of Israel.  The Malan administration was also operating on the 
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belief that the people of South Africa were behind them.  Both the Cape Times and Die 
Burger had written positive articles praising Louw’s tough stance and refusal to back 
down.  Most South West Africans and South Africans wanted the Malan administration 
to fight any encroachment into what they believed were internal South African issues.260  
Union officials believed that they were acting within the limits of international law and 
the UN Charter.  In their letter informing the UN that the Union would no longer be 
submitting reports, J.R. Jordaan, the Union’s Deputy Permanent Representative, wrote 
that  
it is the intention of the Union Government to continue to administer South West 
Africa in the spirit of the mandate and that the new arrangement for closer 
association of South West Africa with the Union of South Africa does not mean 
incorporation or absorption of the Territory by the Administrating Authority”  
The Union had supplied information to the UN in good faith and had no legal 
obligation to do so, “The Union Government also expressed their confidence that 
the Fourth Committee would approach its task in an entirely objective manner and 
examine the report in the same spirit of goodwill, co-operation and helpfulness as 
had motivated the Union in making the information available.  These hopes have 
not been realised.  Instead, the submission of information has provided an 
opportunity to utilise the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Committee as a 
forum for unjustified criticism and censure of the Union Government’s 
administration, not only in South West Africa but in the Union as well.261 
 
Jooste, a South African delegate, reaffirmed this position in the opening session of the 
Fourth Committee and refused to discuss an alternative throughout the rest of the UN’s 
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meeting.262  The pressure for referring the issue to the ICJ became stronger as neither the 
Union nor the UN would accept the other’s legal position. 
 The delegates from the Norway, Thailand, Dominican Republic, Canada, and 
Liberia did not believe that further discussions at the UN would be fruitful and requested 
that the matter be turned over to the International Court of Justice to determine the legal 
status of South West Africa.  These delegates were tired of the running argument between 
the Union and the Fourth Committee over whether or not South Africa was required to 
submit a Trusteeship Agreement for South West Africa.263  Eleanor Roosevelt also 
pushed the UN to send the case to the ICJ, believing that only that institution could solve 
the legal impasse.264  
In a letter to Walter White, Roosevelt expressed concern over the role of Michael 
Scott at the United Nations.  White and others had been pressuring the US delegation to 
support Scott’s appearance before the UN.265  The NAACP opened up a salvo of press 
releases and letters designed to shame the US delegation into allowing Scott to give 
testimony.266  Roy Wilkins, the head of the NAACP, in a letter to CDB King of the 
Liberian Delegation wrote that if they helped Scott appear before the UN they would 
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have “not only the heartfelt thanks of the natives themselves, but those of all individuals 
and groups who look to the United Nations for aid in redressing injustice.”267 
The debate over Scott’s role at the UN caused a major debate on the right to 
petition for non-trusteeship territories.  Venezuelan, Argentinean, British, and Indian 
delegations were concerned that allowing Scott to appear would set a dangerous 
precedent and they were opposed to his presence before any committee.  The Mexican, 
Uruguayan, Cuban, Haitian, and Yugoslavian delegations all believed that Scott should 
be allowed to appear before the Fourth Committee and were eventually able to convince 
everyone with the exception of the British, French, Canadian, and Australian delegations 
that Scott should be allowed to appear before the committee.268  The decision to hear 
Scott took six days of deliberation that became increasingly heated.269  Many delegations 
voted to break precedent by allowing Scott to speak before the United Nations because of 
the intransigence of the South African delegation.  The refusal of the Malan 
administration to back down from rejecting trusteeship and moving into a closer 
relationship with South West Africa seemed to many delegates as an attack on the power 
of the United Nations. 
 On November 26, 1949, Michael Scott appeared before the United Nations.  To 
protest Scott’s presence, the South African delegation walked out of the UN.  Scott’s 
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speech lasted for over an hour, and in a soft stoic voice he described the horrors that the 
Herero had endured under German rule and the continued abuse they suffered under the 
South African administration.  Scott’s message before the UN stressed the hope the 
Herero had that the United Nations would end their suffering.270  Scott said he felt “a 
sense of enormous relief as [he] heard those statements, which [he] had taken down 
thousands of miles away by lantern-light under a thorn bush, being translated into the five 
United Nations languages.”271  Scott requested that the United Nations send a panel to 
South West Africa to see the reality of conditions within the territory.  Before the Fourth 
Committee Scott argued that the failure of the United Nations to act in favor of the 
Namibian people would not just damage those in South West Africa, “the future of all 
Africa, and of South Africa especially,” depended on UN action.272  Scott ended his 
statement with the following prayer that Hosea Kutako had give at their first meeting. 
You are the Great God of all the Earth and the Heavens.  We are so insignificant.  
In us there are many defects.  But the power is yours to make and do what we 
cannot do.  You know all about us.  For coming down to earth you were despised, 
and mocked, and brutally treated because of those same defects in the men of 
those days.  And for those men you prayed because they did not understand what 
they were doing, and that you only came for what is right.  O Lord, help us who 
roam about.  Help us who have been placed in Africa and have no home of our 
own.  Give us back a dwelling place.  O God, all power is yours in Heaven and 
Earth, Amen.273 
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One commentator wrote, “this is the first time one has heard the word “Amen” at Lake 
Success.  The silence [was] almost painful, especially since all members purposely 
avoided looking at the three black delegates.”274   
 Stanley Burch of the London News Chronicle wrote a glowing review of Scott’s 
speech.  He stated that the “the angry matter of Africa has broken through the crust of the 
United Nations.  This week-end has seen something new and unique happen to the 
Parliament of the World.  To some of the delegations – Britain among them – a ‘very 
dangerous precedent’ was established, by allowing Scott to speak.  To others, the United 
Nations have found their soul and recaptured the inspired mood of San Francisco.”275  
Scott was able to do this while facing extreme pressure from not only the Union, but also 
other delegations.  Burch believed that Scott’s speech “transformed the atmosphere of 
debate from arid legal disputation into a moral assize, to which the black victims have at 
last contributed their own evidence – a development which very few delegates expected, 
and which has been achieved by one dedicated man against apparently hopeless odds.”276  
One man had at least temporally shamed the UN into considering more than just the 
legal, but also the moral obligations of the United Nations.  Throughout the next four 
decades of UN debate over South West Africa and later apartheid, morality not legality 
would take center stage. 
                                                
274 “Report of the Hearing of the Rev. Michael Scott before the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations,” by Stanley Burch of the London News Chronicle, November 
1949, NAACP Papers, roll 4. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
137 
 
 Following Scott’s speech, the Fourth Committee passed a resolution regretting 
that the Union was refusing to submit reports and recommending that the matter be 
referred to the ICJ.277  Even after the speech by Scott, his supporters could not get a 
forceful resolution passed against South Africa.  The delegations of the United States and 
Great Britain had once again watered down the stronger drafts to help the Union.  The 
Fourth Session of the United Nations ended much like the previous years for the Union; 
the UN had formally censured the Union but, other than Scott’s appearance, the Union 
escaped relatively unscathed.278   
 The enduring legacy of the Fourth Session of the United Nations was the 
transformation that Scott had begun in the Fourth Committee.  While a strong resolution 
was defeated by the colonial powers, for the next forty years discussions within the 
Fourth Committee and eventually other committees would focus not solely on legal 
matters but on the moral implications.  The debate over the future of Namibia would 
demonstrate that the UN should focus on right and wrong, not on technicalities. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
OPENING THE FLOODGATES: THE ICJ, APARTHEID, AND THE RIGHT TO 
PETITION 
 
 
 The 1950s was a contentions decade in the post-war period.  The Cold War heated 
up in Korea, the “Third World” began to flex its muscles at Bandung, and imperialism 
began to crumble in Vietnam, Algeria, Ghana, and elsewhere throughout the globe.  As 
global pressure mounted to end colonialism, the United Nations strove to find a solution 
to the Namibian impasse.  Throughout the decade, the UN tried to negotiate directly with 
the Union of South Africa, resolve the legal disputes through the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), stop the implementation of apartheid in the territory, and Namibians fought 
to have their voices directly heard at the UN.  Following Michael Scott’s address in 1949, 
the Union of South Africa and the other imperial powers argued that his presence violated 
the charter of the United Nations and tried to prevent him and others from speaking about 
South West Africa.  In the face of strong British and South African resistance, Scott 
continued to wage his campaign for Namibia.  The actions of the South African 
government slowly increased its isolation and the Union flirted with leaving the United 
Nations.  South Africans became increasingly belligerent to the UN as the organization 
continued to push for a resolution to the South West Africa debate and became concerned 
with the implementation of apartheid.  Namibians also began to approach the United 
Nations directly, and after years of struggle, they won the right to speak before the United 
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Nations.  The 1950s was a pivotal decade in the relationship between the UN, South 
Africa, and the Namibian people. 
 One of the key issues the UN sought to resolve was over the legal status of South 
West Africa.  Union officials had consistently argued that the mandate had lapsed with 
the dissolution of the League of Nations and so had the Union’s obligation to the 
international community.  The British, American, and French delegations in particular 
consistently supported this assertion.  The majority of the Fourth Committee disagreed 
and believed the Union still had an international obligation, and should submit a 
trusteeship agreement because the UN had inherited the responsibilities of the League to 
oversee the territory.  In order to end this debate on December 19, 1949, Trygve Lie, the 
Secretary General, submitted the following questions to the ICJ: 
(a) Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations 
under the Mandate for South-West Africa and, if so, what are those 
obligations? 
(b) Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter Applicable and, if so, in what 
manner, to the Territory of South West Africa? 
(c) Has the Union of South Africa the competence to modify the international 
status of the Territory of South-West Africa, or, in the event of a negative 
reply, where does competence rest to determine and modify the international 
status of the Territory?279 
 
 The Union argued that its obligation to the international community as well as the 
mandate had collapsed with the League of Nations and that Chapter XII of the UN 
Charter did not require the Union to submit a trusteeship agreement.  Mandatory powers 
were encouraged to submit an agreement, but the Charter did not demand they do so.  
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South African officials also argued as discussed in Chapters One and Two that at the 
League’s final meeting, the League did not require the mandates be transferred to the UN.  
The Union did not present any new information, but simply rested on the arguments it 
had been making since 1946.   
The United States prepared the main legal argument against the Union.  State 
Department lawyers had decided the Mandate did not end with the League of Nations and 
the United Nations was the natural successor to the League and inherited its supervisory 
functions over South West Africa.  Throughout the 1950s, the US government presented 
two different faces to the South Africans over the South West African issue.  The State 
Department continuously called on the Union to submit a trusteeship agreement, while 
delegates at the UN quietly supported many South African positions.  The Indian 
government also prepared a brief for the ICJ that not only argued that the mandate 
continued to exist, but that the Union had continuously violated the mandate and must 
submit a trusteeship agreement with the UN.  Many observers viewed the case as a legal 
struggle between the US and the Union, and the Indian position was seen as the lesser of 
the reports to the ICJ.280  While the Indian brief may not have had the impact of either the 
American or South African opinion, it demonstrated to the world that India was not going 
to sit idly by and allow a colonial power to run roughshod over a colonial territory.    
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Regardless of the outcome of the ICJ decision, Malan had declared the Union 
would never submit a trusteeship agreement281 and Dr. A.L. Geyer, the South African 
High Commissioner in London, stated the Union would continue to rule South West 
Africa as an integral part of South Africa.282  British officials nervously watched the 
debates at the ICJ and the struggles of the Union to explain her actions at the UN and ICJ.  
As the US State Department hardened itself against the Union, Great Britain wanted to 
continue to work with South Africans.  The British were concerned if the ICJ ruled firmly 
against South Africa then it would set a dangerous precedent, which could allow the UN 
to interfere in other dependent territories and require all metropolitan powers to send 
reports to the Fourth Committee.  However, the British had to temper their support 
because of opposition to the native policies in the Union.  Ultimately, the British Cabinet 
decided to help the Union because it came to believe that supporting the Union had more 
long-term benefits than negative consequences.283  The British were concerned that the 
rising anti-colonial feelings in the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly would 
spread from being opposed to South Africa, to all imperial powers.  Supporting the South 
Africans was seen as protecting what remained of the Empire, especially with the 
growing power of nationalist movements throughout the world.   
In the end, the decision came down to the ICJ, which on July 11 issued its ruling.  
The court unanimously decided that Namibia was still under the mandate.  Since South 
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West Africa was still under the mandate, the ICJ ruled that the Union was obligated to 
send reports and petitions to the international community, and given that the League had 
collapsed, the UN had inherited the supervisory functions over the mandates.  The Court 
also ruled that Chapter XII allowed for the transfer of mandates to the trusteeship system, 
but did not require the transfer.  Additionally, it ruled that the Union was “not competent 
to modify the international status of South-West Africa,” on its own, and that it could 
only do so with the consent of the United Nations.284  The ruling was a partial victory for 
both the Union and the Fourth Committee.  The Union still had an international 
obligation and could not unilaterally change the status of the territory, but it was not 
required to submit a trusteeship agreement.  Malan responded to the decision by stating 
“the declaration of the International Court must appear to the ordinary man as a bundle of 
contradictions,”285 he continued by saying the ICJ ruling was only an opinion, not a 
binding judgment and the Union would not submit reports to the UN.286 
The British were concerned that Malan’s adamant refusal to submit reports would 
hurt the Union’s position.  They believed he was taking a hard line because “the adoption 
now of an intransigent attitude may put them in a better bargaining position when the 
next General Assembly meets” and because he was trying to win the general election in 
South West Africa in August.  South West Africans were “strongly opposed to 
                                                
284 I.C.J., Communique 50/30, 11 July 1950, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=30&case=10&code=sswa&p3=6.   
285 SAPA, “Malan Attacks Advisory Opinion on South-West Africa,” 15 July 1950, Windhoek Advertiser, 
pg. 1. 
286 UK High Commissioner in Pretoria, Memo: “South West Africa: Reactions in South Africa to Findings 
of International Court of Justice,” 27 July 1950, DO 35, file 3817, National Archives of the UK. 
143 
 
intervention by the United Nations in their affairs,” and if the Nationalists won the six 
South West African seats, the party would have a majority in parliament.287 
The fight between the United Party and Nationalist Party in South West Africa 
revolved around the role the international community would play in the future of the 
territory.  As the British High Commissioner noted, if Malan could sweep the seats in 
South West Africa, they could dominate the Union parliament, therefore, both parties 
campaigned extensively in the territory.  In a speech in Windhoek, Malan drew a line in 
the sand stating that he “refused to bow to the United Nations Organisation.  I appeal to 
you to support me in this attitude, and to send a message to UNO when it meets in 
September stating unequivocally our attitude and the wishes of South-West Africa.”  
Malan also said he did not want to annex or incorporate SWA, as that would cause 
further issues with the UN, but he would not submit a Trusteeship Agreement.288  He also 
criticized the ICJ decision stating,  
“they want UNO to exercise the right of considering petitions from South-West 
Africa.  This means that every year Michael Scot and people like him will be able 
to appear before UNO to insult and falsely accuse South Africa and South-West 
Africa.  In the League of Nations we had to do with a reasonable body.  The 
League trusted the Union and South-West Africa.  But UNO is quite another 
body.  The League never tried to force an ideology on South Africa and South-
West Africa.  UNO wants to thrust down our throats its ideology of equality 
between White and non-White.” 289 
 
                                                
287 Letter to P.C. Gordon Walker from High Commissioner in Pretoria, July 27 1950, DO 35, file 3817, 
National Archives of the UK. 
288 Norman Taylor and J.A. L’Estrange, Dr. Malan Asks S.W.A. for Support on UNO Stand,” 9 August 
1950, The Windhoek Advertiser, pg. 1. 
289 Norman Taylor and J.A. L’Estrange, Dr. Malan Asks S.W.A. for Support on UNO Stand,” 9 August 
1950, The Windhoek Advertiser, pg. 5. 
144 
 
Malan wanted the people of South West Africa to vote with him to show the UN their 
support for his stand and that he would not “throw South West Africa to the wolves,” or 
allow anyone outside South Africa to interfere with South West Africa. 290  According to 
The Windhoek Advertiser, the speech was welcomed by South West Africans and was 
met with thunderous applause.291 
Smuts took a different approach to the role of the international community.  He 
argued that Malan’s resistance to the UN weakened South Africa’s position, and the 
Union should work with the UN, not against it.  Smuts also changed his mind once again 
on whether or not the Union should submit reports on the administration of South West 
Africa.292  Smuts believed the handing over of reports to the UN was “the proper line for 
us to take as an act of courtesy to UNO and in the general interests of the Union itself,” 
and he feared if the Malan government continued its campaign of defying the UN, then it 
would find itself completely isolated internationally.  He argued that the current problems 
with the UN could have been avoided if the Nationalists had continued submitting 
reports.  Smuts argued that the submitting of reports did not undermine the Union’s 
sovereignty over South West Africa, and the reports built good will at the UN.293  The 
August, 1950 election would be Smuts’ final political campaign and even though he 
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wanted to continue to work with the UN, the United Party was fractured.  J.G.N. Strauss, 
the head of the United Party, took a harder line than Smuts by declaring South West 
Africa was an integral part of the Union, and its people were inseparable.294  In South 
West Africa and the Union, the vast majority of the white population supported the closer 
relationship the Malan administration orchestrated and were inherently hostile to the 
United Nations.  The 1950 election was the last time the United Party was relevant in 
either South African or South West African politics.  After Malan’s victory in both the 
Union and South West Africa, the United Party became fractured over the Union’s 
foreign policy and apartheid. 
Louw, too, blasted the ICJ decision arguing “that the favourable decision of the 
Court on trusteeship had been expected, and that the unfavourable opinions on other 
points were also not unexpected because the majority of the United Nations had always 
proceeded on the wholly unjustified assumption that the United Nations was the legal 
heir to the rights and powers of the League of Nations.”295  Jordaan echoed Louw’s 
position to the Turkish, Bolivian, and Australian delegations, adding that the Union 
refused to consider the submission of petitions or reports to the UN.  The delegations told 
him that the intransigent attitude of the Union put friendly delegations in a tough 
position.  He was told many “respected [the Union’s] scrupulous honesty but that [it was] 
following the wrong tactics in the United Nations.”  Jordaan thought the Union should 
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focus on the court’s opinion regarding trusteeship and ignore the rest.  The Union should 
refuse to get into debates and simply state that it disagreed with the UN’s position.  He 
hoped this way they could “avoid an acrimonious debate” and this strategy would “pay us 
handsome dividends.”296 
Jooste adamantly rejected Jordaan’s argument for a passive campaign in the UN.  
He argued that friendly delegations, particularly the US, were having problems 
supporting the Union because “to align themselves with the Union would be to estrange 
still further the non-white Member States whom, it is their policy to woo in the present 
ideological conflict.”297  With India, Liberia, Egypt, and others questioning imperialism 
and the intensifying of the Cold War, the Americans were unwilling to trade the support 
of the Third World for South Africa.  Jooste was worried if the Union did not force the 
issue, then the United States would try to pacify the anti-colonial body by selling out the 
Union. 
Jooste wanted to go on the offensive and prevent any resolution or plan that 
allowed Michael Scott or any similar persons to testify before the UN.  Jooste believed if 
the Union could succeed in securing watered down resolutions if they fought those who 
opposed them.298  On August 7th Jooste met with John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of 
State for UN Affairs, to discuss the ICJ ruling and South Africa’s actions at the UN.  
Hickerson told Jooste the State Department wanted to help the Union if it could, but 
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American help was conditional.  The State Department agreed with South Africa that the 
ICJ judges who ruled the Union should submit a trusteeship agreement were out of line, 
but they did agree the Union should submit reports and had an obligation to the 
international community regarding South West Africa.  Jooste attempted to convince 
Hickerson that because the Union supported the joint US and UN efforts in Korea, then 
the US should stand with the Union in the UN.  When the Korean War broke out, many 
in South Africa did not want to work with the UN forces, but others believed that sending 
military aid would strengthen their cause.  South African pilots in South Korea also 
strengthened the Union’s position as an anti-communist foe, and Union officials believed 
they could turn this to their advantage when working with the Americans. 299   
Hickerson questioned the Union’s commitment to the UN.  He argued that 
submitting reports to the UN would demonstrate South Africa’s commitment to 
compromise and would allow South Africa to be a full and productive member of the 
United Nations.  Hickerson argued that the criticism of reports would not be as 
intolerable or harsh as the absolute refusal of the Union to submit anything.  In his report 
on the meeting, Jooste wanted the Department of External Affairs to pay attention to the 
changing nature of the UN.  He believed the growth of communism would push many of 
their “friends” to “appease Eastern and other non-white peoples,” which could have a 
disastrous effect on Union efforts.300  He also believed the military efforts in Korea could 
set a precedent to use sanctions against those who were violating UN authority.  Jooste 
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thought US support would dwindle as the Union moved further and further away from 
compliance with UN resolutions.  He argued that the US wanted the UN to be a powerful 
force in the ensuing decades and would not do anything to weaken the UN’s authority.301  
Union officials did not feel like they could count on US support as long as the Third 
World remained opposed to South African policies in both South West Africa and the 
Union.  The American government did not believe South Africa was worth isolating the 
Third World.   
Throughout the 1950s, the British tried to walk a fine line of supporting South 
Africa without alienating the UN.  They were leery of openly defying the ICJ and UN, 
but were also concerned the turn against colonial powers could force them into a 
precarious position.  Atlee informed Malan that while the British disagreed with the ICJ 
decision, the Union had to submit reports; they were not willing to support the Union if it 
completely rejected the ICJ decision. 302  The British believed they should support the ICJ 
and did not want to do anything to weaken it.  They recommended the Union accept the 
entire decision and not focus on the issue of giving reports, because that could open up 
the larger issue of the right of the Union to continue to rule under the mandate.  The 
British recommended that the Union accept the decision because it did not require more 
supervision than the mandate allowed.  The mandate system often operated behind closed 
doors and the UK could then help the Union within the new committee.  British 
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diplomats warned the Union if they were not willing to compromise then British support 
would disappear.303  One official went a step further believing “If the South Africans 
persist in their present attitude, we must inevitably tell them that we shall be unable to 
give them any support whatever, in which case South Africa will find herself with the 
whole world ranged against her at Lake Success including all the rest of the 
Commonwealth.”304  Malan, however, had backed himself into a corner by adamantly 
refusing to submit reports.  Many Union officials were “suspicious of certain nations in 
the United Nations and felt that South Africa could not rely on them for any sort of fair 
play.”305  They did not believe anything they submitted would be accepted as the truth; 
therefore, they adamantly refused to consider submitting reports to the UN.  
Michael Scott, meanwhile, was desperately trying to get to the UN for the 1950 
session, against heavy South African and British opposition.  In September, a campaign 
was started to get organizations such as the NAACP and International League for the 
Rights of Man to push the State Department to grant Scott a visa.306  Scott also wrote to 
Walter White of the NAACP, asking that he help him secure a visa and use his “good 
offices” at the UN to help secure a final victory for the Namibian people.307  Walter 
White responded by writing to Dean Acheson and accusing him of bowing to South 
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African pressure, and then released a public broadside demanding that Scott be allowed 
to come to the United States.308 309  Eventually the State Department relented and granted 
Scott a visa.310 
While Scott’s reputation was soaring among the activist and anti-colonial 
community, the white population of Windhoek had a different view of him.  Robert 
Stinson of the BBC reported that  
Every time I talked to one of them I made a sort of private bet with myself about 
how long it would be before I heard the name of the Reverend Michael Scott. Mr. 
Scott, you will remember, is an English clergyman who last year appeared before 
the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations to speak on behalf of a number 
of African tribes in South-West and particularly the Hereros.  Mr. Scott expressed 
the view that the Hereros were being treated unfairly by the South African 
Government which administers the territory under a Mandate.  Now, the 
Europeans of Windhoek are obsessed by Mr. Scott.  They complain heatedly that 
he spent too little time in South-West Africa, that he saw almost nothing of the 
way in which the Hereros live in the remote reserves, and that he didn’t check his 
facts from official sources.311 
 
After spending time in Windhoek, Stinson believed that the presence of Scott at the UN 
had caused the white population of South West Africa to dig in and become increasingly 
hostile towards the United Nations.  Malan also continued to dig in his heels.  In January 
of 1951, he told the Union Parliament that the UN would ultimately fail and regional 
organizations would take over.  Malan argued the “principal duty of U.N.O. was to 
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maintain peace.  But by mixing itself up with affairs of South West Africa it had begun at 
the wrong end of the stick.” 312  He also stated the Indian question was a non-starter 
because “If United Nations succeeded in placing Indians on basis of complete equality 
with Europeans that would mean the end of Natal as a European country.  I shall not hand 
over to the wolves either Afrikaans-speaking South West Africa or English-speaking 
Natal.”313  This statement was representative of the Union position throughout the 1950s.  
Union officials would balk at discussing any issue they deemed an internal issue, 
including South African actions within Namibia. 
The Herero viewed  
Mr. Scott as a saintly, courageous man who, with all the odds against him, 
managed to bring to the notice of the world the plight of a people who were 
treated atrociously by the Germans and are still waiting, after thirty years of South 
Africa rule, for what they consider justice.314 
 
Scott had become the Herero’s source of hope and inspiration.  Throughout 1950, Kutako 
desperately tried to maintain contact with Scott, but many of the letters sent between the 
two never made it to their final destination.  In November, Kutako wrote to Mary Benson, 
Scott’s aide, thanking her for sending news of Scott’s success in gaining support at the 
UN and the ICJ decision.  He also told her that the government had been intercepting his 
letters and confiscating those that did reach him.  Mary Bensons worked without Scott 
throughout the late 1940s and into the 1950s.  She was a South African who after reading 
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Cry the Beloved Country decided that she wanted to do something to change the lives of 
Africans in South Africa.  After hearing Scott speak about Namibia, she volunteered to 
work for him and became his right hand, helping him organize his efforts and 
administering his campaigns when he became ill.  The ICJ decision eventually reached 
Kutako via a friend, as the copies sent through the post office had been intercepted.  
Kutako wanted to be kept informed of the actions of the UN and since the mail was 
unreliable, he had created an intricate system of friends and couriers to get letters 
through.315  Kutako sent a letter to Scott telling him that the post office was not reliable, 
but that he could receive stuff through a “friend,” but did not mention who that friend 
was. 316  Kutako was eventually able to forward letters to Scott and Scott forwarded them 
to the UN.  These letters reiterated Scott’s position as his representative and requested the 
UN pressure the Union to allow Scott back into South West Africa.317  Kutako also told 
Scott that both the Nama and Damara supported his actions at the United Nations. 318  
 After the ICJ decision, the Union, Scott, and the UN all tried to figure out how to 
go about coming up with a solution to the South West Africa issue.  The Union had 
already decided it would not submit reports and wanted to make sure any condemnation 
from the UN was non-binding and weak.  Union officials were assured the US and UK 
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delegations would prevent the Fourth Committee from passing harsh resolutions.319  
Louw also wanted to emphasize that the ICJ ruled that UN supervision had to be identical 
to the mandate.320  Scott planned to continue to lobby the UN for more effective 
supervision of the territory through a trustee agreement by arguing since the Union had 
violated the terms of the mandate, the UN should take direct control over the territory.  
The UN desperately tried to come up with a solution.  Throughout the 1950s, the Fourth 
Committee and the General Assembly created many committees and sub-committees to 
negotiate with the South Africans.   
These conflicting goals and behind the scenes maneuverings weakened any 
actions the Fourth Committee proposed.  Walter White described the 1950 session of the 
General Assembly as one of limited progress.  The UN had created a Committee to 
examine the situation, but he was not optimistic on its outcome.  However, he believed 
that since  
The United Nations have been in process of dealing with this question for the past 
five years, so that it has now become the symbol, on the one hand, of African 
people dispossessed of their lands and rights and, on the other, of the great efforts 
that have been made throughout a century of colonial history to establish the 
principle of international accountability by administering powers who are 
regarded as trustees in Africa of the international community.321 
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For many activists, the South West African case had become the signature issue in which 
to challenge colonialism.  The hope and future of the colonized rested in the United 
Nations and it must pull together to protect those who were being abused by the imperial 
powers. 
 In 1951, the Union began negotiating with the United Nations through a series of 
Ad Hoc and permanent committees.  The impetus behind the negotiations was an 
implementation of the ICJ decision of July 1950.  The first Ad Hoc Committee was 
composed of delegates from Denmark, Syria, the US, Uruguay, and Thailand.  The goal 
of the committee was to negotiate with the Union to try to work out an acceptable 
solution to the impasse over Namibia. 322  Jooste wrote to Forsyth, the new Secretary for 
External Affairs, that he had  
doubts as to whether the Committee would be prepared to agree to an 
arrangement regarding South West Africa which would be realistic in the light of 
all the circumstances, the Government had decided to participate in the discussion 
in the hope that reason would prevail and that a solution would be possible.  I 
intimated that our experiences in the United Nations had not been such as to 
justify undue optimism and that our people had misgivings as to whether the 
discussions could serve any good purpose.  On the other hand, I added, we had 
always endeavoured (sic) to have regard to the legitimate wishes of the 
Organization (e.g. when we did not proceed with annexation after our plea had 
failed in 1946) and that the Prime Minister had decided that we should cooperate 
with the Committee if it was the sincere desire of that body to bring about an 
arrangement which would remove South West Africa as an obstacle in the way of 
our closer cooperation with the United Nations.”323 
 
                                                
322 UN, 5th Session, Summary Record of the First Part of the First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
South West Africa, 15 March 1951, A/AC.49/SR.1. 
323 Letter from Jooste to Forsyth, 29 May 1951, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 20, NASA. 
155 
 
Union officials believed the negotiations with the Ad Hoc Committee was a waste 
of time because each side was too far apart to have a realistic chance of coming up with a 
solution.  They believed even if they could get the committee to come to an agreement, 
the Union would accept and the General Assembly would not accept the agreement.  In 
response to these assumptions, the Union decided they would meet with the committee, 
but not negotiate on anything of substance.324  Jooste informed the committee that the 
Union would participate but he wanted to make sure the committee would have an 
“impartial or objective consideration of the South African case” and not act with the 
“emotionalism which was characteristic of debates related to the administration of 
dependent areas,” like the rest of the UN. 325   He also told the UN that the Union decided 
to join the committee because it had always sought to work with the UN and it wanted to 
settle the South West African issue.326  The opening year of negotiations went better than 
expected.  Both the Committee and the Union appeared to want to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion.  However, the discussions of petitions and reports would bog down 
discussions in the committee.  Jooste maintained that any compromise could not extend 
the level of responsibility present under the League and if the UN examined reports it 
would function in a different capacity as the Mandates Commission had. 327 “The ultimate 
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aim” of the Union was “that South West Africa must ‘be taken out of hand’ of United 
Nations” and that any agreement that did not do this was unacceptable to Malan.328  The 
problem was the UN would never agree to a compromise that excluded them from 
overseeing the mandate. 
 The Union tried to create a new Mandate Commission comprised of the US, 
Great Britain, and France who would oversee the mandate, and this new commission 
would send reports directly to the UN.  The Union wanted to have a discussion to end the 
conflict and claimed it was willing to work with the international community to come to a 
mutually beneficial moment based on the ICJ ruling.  They were willing to work with the 
UK, France, and US because they were the principle allied powers who created the 
League after WWI, and were deemed reliable by Union officials.  The Union claimed this 
was a major compromise from previous Union positions because it was no longer arguing 
that the mandate had lapsed, and were willing to accept some measure of international 
responsibility for South West Africa.  Union officials believed this would pacify the 
Fourth Committee by accepting the “creation of machinery for judicial supervision 
through the International Court.”329  Union officials also believe the above measures 
would conform to the ICJ’s recommendation.  In a meeting with the American 
delegation, The South Africans were told the US would support this move; however, the 
UN Committee on South West Africa refused to accept any compromise they were not a 
part of.  Union officials argued nations that were not part of the League of Nations could 
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not have a say in issues dealing with the mandate.  Since many of the members of the 
Fourth Committee and Committee on South West Africa were not part of the League, the 
Union did not want to discuss the mandate with them.  The South Africans were also 
concerned the resolution that created the Committee on South West Africa called for the 
protection of Human Rights in Namibia.330  The inclusion of Human Rights in the 
language of the Committee’s proposals struck a chord with the Malan Administration 
because they did not exist under the Mandate.331  The South Africans were opposed to 
any discussions of Human Rights, as they believed them to be outside the scope of the 
United Nations and a direct violation of state sovereignty.332  South Africa’s opposition to 
Human Rights put Namibian activists in a tough situation.  Any negotiations that 
included Human Rights rhetoric was immediately dismissed by the Union, and yet as 
apartheid advanced into Namibia, it was a key aspect of their struggle.  Much like the 
NAACP did in the era, Namibians, Scott, and their supporters were careful to argue for 
human rights without using the language of the UDHR.333   
In a well-publicized speech, Louw claimed that South Africa was a “victim of . . . 
unwarranted interference in domestic affairs,” and warned any other member state could 
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be next. 334  He believed the UN and South Africa were at a crossroads because most 
members were hostile towards the Union’s racial policies.  Even western nations that the 
Union supported openly attacked South Africa.  He said “they [were] obsessed with the 
slogan of ‘Human Rights’, even though many of them do not give practical effect to those 
rights in their own countries.”335  Louw questioned the UN’s existence, arguing it had 
continuously violated its Charter and was on the brink of falling apart.  He warned if it 
continued to violate the Charter by interfering with the internal affairs of states, then the 
UN would not last.  He argued that the lack of full participation in the Korean War 
demonstrated the UN could not get a majority of its members to act, as South Africa had 
in support of the UN forces in the war.336 
 Louw was particularly concerned with the Fourth Committee’s insistence that 
Scott and Kutako should be allowed to give oral petitions before the committee.  In early 
November 1951, Neser, the Secretary for South West Africa, received a request from 
Kutako and Festus Kandju, which requested permission from the administration to visit 
the UN meetings in Paris.337  Scott, Kutako, David Witbooi, Nikanor Hovaka and 
Thphilus Katjuongua all requested hearings before the Fourth Committee and in 
November, the committee decided to allow them to appear before them and asked the 
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Union to facilitate their travel to the UN. 338  The decision to allow Namibians to address 
the UN caused a firestorm of accusations and negotiations between the Union and the 
Fourth Committee.  The Union argued the Fourth Committee was only able to hear 
petitions from trustee territories and South West Africa was not under the Trustee 
System.  Union delegates claimed once again the vast majority of Africans supported 
South African rule and those who requested a hearing did not have the authority to do so.  
They also argued the Fourth Committee did not have the legal right to hear petitioners 
from South West Africa.  Only the British, French, Belgium, and Australian delegations 
joined the Union in protesting the request.  The Union delegation realized that preventing 
the Namibians from traveling to Paris would allow Scott to once again speak before the 
United Nations, but this was better than having Kutako directly attack the Union.  Donges 
wanted the Union to ignore the invitations, rather than fight them with the hope that the 
situation would eventually dissipate.339 
 The British delegation worried about the precedent that oral hearings by citizens 
from a non-trustee territory would set.  If the Fourth Committee heard petitioners from 
Namibia, then they could claim it had jurisdiction to hear petitions from other non-trust 
territories.  The British, as well as the French, wanted to make sure the UN did not 
become a forum for anti-colonial activity.  They referred to the Latin Americans, Arabs, 
and others who supported oral petitions as the “Crazy Gang.”  The British believed there 
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would not be a strong resolution in 1951 because of the Crazy Gang’s intransigence and 
the Union’s “extreme touchiness.”  They were also concerned with maintaining a strong 
relationship with the Union.  The British hoped everything would work out eventually 
because as “far as United Kingdom-Union relations are concerned the United Kingdom 
Delegation are in very close touch with the South Africans at Paris and are sure that the 
South Africans will have no hard feelings about us; on the contrary they know that we are 
doing our best to help.”340 
 The South Africans were adamantly opposed to Kutako and other Namibians 
traveling to the United Nations.  The Star, a liberal English newspaper in South Africa, 
wrote the Union should allow Kutako and the others to travel because they could not 
damage the Union more than it was doing itself by turning South West Africa into a 
prison and refusing to allow Namibians to leave. 341  Donges wrote to Malan saying  
the Union should refuse passports for the Namibians because they “do not (repeat not) 
wish to be party to improper and illegal action of Fourth Committee.  Moreover, 
communication addressed to Kutako by Secretariat ignore[d] correct official channels 
which strengthens our position.”  He was also concerned that Herero in Botswana could 
make it to the UN if the Union refused to allow Kutako to travel. 342  
Kutako was waiting to hear back from Neser on whether or not he would be 
allowed to travel to Paris.  Neser told him that passports could only come from the Union 
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government and he had not yet heard back from them.  Kutako was also recovering from 
an illness and he was worried about traveling.  However, he felt that it was his duty to 
represent his people and for most of November, he had been waiting in a tiny house in 
Windhoek for his passport. 343  Throughout his illness, Scott sent reassuring letters to 
Kutako.  All of the expenses for his travel would be paid out of fund that had been set up 
to care for Scott when he was sick in 1950.  Scott would handle all of the travel 
arrangements and encouraged Kutako not to let anyone talk him out of coming to Paris.  
Scott told Kutako “that now is the time for you to speak yourself and tell the story of your 
people as you have known it and lived through it.  No-one but the people themselves can 
tell their own story and the United Nations wants to know the whole truth about it in 
exact detail from the earliest time you can remember until to-day.  No-one must fear the 
truth either to tell it or to hear it.”344 
 As the South Africans stalled in officially denying Kutako’s passport, Scott’s 
associate Mary Benson traveled to Windhoek to lobby Neser into allowing Kutako to 
travel.  Mary Benson pushed Neser to advance the passports as the UN expected the 
Herero by December 9th.  There was only enough money for a representative and a 
translator, and she believed Kutako would be well enough to make the trip but that action 
needed to happen soon.345  Benson tried to reassure Neser that her presence in Windhoek 
was not malicious.  She told him that she had arrived on November 26th to facilitate 
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Kutako’s trip to the UN.  She met with Kutako in the Church Hall and once in the native 
location to help him fill out travel documents.  Benson also gave a presentation to the 
Herero in which she described the actions of the Fourth Committee.  She told them while 
the colonial powers did not want Kutako to travel to the Paris, the rest of the members of 
the UN wanted to hear their story.  Neser told Benson that she was only getting the 
Herero’s hopes up and was not actually helping them.  She responded to this by saying 
that Kutako and the others never really believed the South Africans would let them travel 
to UNO but they had to try.346  While in Windhoek, Benson met with the Chief Native 
Commissioner, who she reported was helpful but expressed a negative attitude towards 
“meddlers like [her] who came for a few days, involved the simple tribesmen in 
complicated discussions, raised their hopes, then went off and left them in the lurch.”347  
She said the South Africans were particularly angry with the UN for sending the 
invitation to Kutako and the others directly instead of through them.  Benson also 
commented that the European population of the territory complained about 
misinformation spread at the UN, but did little to correct it or help the African 
population.348   
 In early December, the Fourth Committee invited Michael Scott to appear before 
them since South Africa had prohibited the requested chiefs from arriving.  In his 
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address, he called on the UN to send an impartial commission to South West Africa, to 
investigate the situation in the territory.  He also called on the UN to give assistance to 
Namibians under South African rule.  He told them the UN was of  “great importance in 
the eyes of Africans as a force for liberation and justice and it is for this reason as well as 
from respect for international law that many people from different parts of the world have 
tried strenuously to secure the presence of these African chiefs at the Trusteeship 
Committee when matters of such great importance to them are being taken up.” 349   
Dr. T.E. Donges, the South African Representative, refused to participate in the 
proceedings and withdrew the South African delegation from the Fourth Committee.  He 
argued the Committee had overstepped its bounds and had ignored the ICJ decision.  The 
ICJ ruled that the mandate was still in effect, and the UN could not hear petitioners 
because that exceeded the authority of the Mandate Commission.350  As a result of the 
Fourth Committee’s invitation to Kutako, the South African delegation announced they 
would not participate in the committee’s deliberations.  Jooste told the Fourth Committee 
that the Union had been willing to discuss the Ad Hoc Committee’s report, but the 
actions of the committee showed it had “disregarded the specific instructions of the 
General Assembly as to the manner in which petitions should be dealt with” and the 
Union could not support that violation.351  Malan announced South Africa’s withdrawal 
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from the Fourth Committee was only temporary.  He stated the Union wanted to remain 
in the UN but the actions of the Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa would 
determine whether the Union would come back into the UN.352 
 The Union’s withdrawal was an extreme reaction and was met with mixed 
reviews in the General Assembly.  Tweedsmuir, a UK Delegate, called on the UN to 
focus on negotiating with the Union rather than antagonizing it by inviting the chiefs to 
come before the Fourth Committee, which only heightened the problems between the UN 
and the Union. 353  The UK press, unlike Tweedsmuir, did not blame the UN, but the 
Union for the failure of the negotiations and roundly criticized the Union for 
withdrawing.354  Most nations in the UN, particularly the non-colonial powers, reacted 
angrily and called on Scott to speak before the Fourth Committee. 355  This only 
exacerbated the problem and eventually led to the Union withdrawing from the General 
Assembly as well. 
 Malan justified the Union’s withdrawal from the Fourth Committee by stating that  
From the outset South Africa – and even before the issue proper had come under 
discussion – has been injured in its good name, defamed and insulted. And in 
conflict with the United Nations own Charter and rules of procedure, contact has 
been made over our heads with individuals in South West Africa and Mr. Michael 
Scott, a well-known hostile and fanatical foreigner and agitator has been called 
upon to give evidence against us.  The rights allocated to us under the Treaty of 
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Versailles have been violated.  The United Nations have committed aggression 
against us.356   
 
Malan recalled Donges and announced the Union would be withdrawing from the 
General Assembly.  Malan argued that Smuts misjudged the UN even though it was 
partially his creation and by asking for permission to incorporate SWA and submitting 
reports, he unintentionally opened the Union up to criticism that Malan believed 
threatened the security of the Union.  He finished by saying “the honour and the right and 
even the freedom of South Africa are at stake.  And most certainly we will not leave 
South West Africa in the lurch.”357  He also made it clear the Union had not terminated 
membership in the UN but that it would not be participating in the General Assembly or 
the Fourth Committee.  The Union also promised to continue to work with the UN in 
Korea. 358 
 The official word from the UK government over South Africa’s withdrawal was 
one of tacit support.  Percival Liesching, a UK delegate, commented the Union had acted 
with dignity and the Union withdrawal might cause the moderates in the Fourth 
Committee to rethink their actions and will hopefully work with the colonial powers.  He 
intimated the “more responsible countries of the West” would be harmed if the Union left 
the UN.  He cited Union support for the Korean War and the creation of a NATO Middle 
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East Command as signs of Union/Western solidarity.359  Liesching was concerned the 
loss of Union support would be a heavy blow to the West in the Cold War in general, but 
particularly in Korea.   
 Jooste stayed in Paris and tried to judge the strength of the commitment of the 
Western powers to the Union.  He met with the ambassadors representing the 
administering powers in order to gauge whether or not an indictment of the Fourth 
Committee in the General Assembly was worthwhile.  While many of the ambassadors 
were concerned with the actions of the Fourth Committee, the Dutch were the most in 
honest saying they were unwilling to “take their stand on the South West Africa issue,” 
because “Union policies [were] suspect and unpopular and the chances of rallying strong 
support for us [were] not strong.”360  Jebb, a British official, believed the “present 
position was unsatisfactory and that unless the Fourth Committee was prevented from 
continuing its unconstitutional action, a wedge would be driven in between the 
administrating and other powers.”361  Keith Officer of Australia was frank with Jooste 
stating that while the actions of the Fourth Committee were suspect, the South Africans 
would be lucky to get ten supportive votes in the General Assembly and that a united 
stand would cause more problems than it would solve.  He suggested that higher-level 
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officials discuss the problem and would not commit the Australian delegation.362  The 
French Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann expressed sympathy with the Union 
delegation and was concerned the Fourth Committee could decide to investigate French 
North Africa next.  Schumann was in favor of acting against the anti-colonial faction, 
particularly the Arabs, but he would not move without British and US support.363  Wilson 
of New Zealand was non-committal, stating it was his government’s position that the ICJ 
decision be enforced and perhaps the Fourth Committee’s invitation to the Herero be 
referred to the ICJ, but he would not rule out attending a meeting to discuss the issue.364   
Jooste also approached the Canadians even though they were not an administering 
power but part of the Commonwealth.  The Canadian ambassador Johnson was 
noncommittal, but said that the problem was worrying the Canadian Foreign Minister.  
Jooste argued even if a resolution condemning the Fourth Committee would not pass 
through the General Assembly, if all the colonial powers took a stand they might be able 
to stem the tide of anti-colonial aggression.365  M. Van Langehove of Belgium informed 
Jooste that Belgium had always supported the Union in regards to Michael Scott and the 
invitation of the Herero, but wanted him to know the Belgians and the others only 
supported the Union in this constitutional issue, not on their racial policies.366   
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After conferring with his government, Wilson told Jooste that his delegation 
would not cosponsor any resolution and would want to see the text before they would 
commit themselves in support.  He also told Jooste the New Zealand government was 
unsure if a failing resolution would be beneficial.367  After consulting with his 
government, Officer said the Australians thought it was unwise to bring up the matter in 
the General Assembly, but he would be willing to discuss the issue at a Commonwealth 
meeting.368  The Dutch told Jooste while they wanted the Fourth Committee to clarify its 
relationship/obligations to administering nations they did not think the Union’s 
suggestion was the best way to go about it.369   
The British also vetoed the idea of indicting the Fourth Committee and thought it 
would only weaken the Union’s position further and the Union should abstain from doing 
more damage to itself.  Jebb also implored the Union to remain in the UN and resume full 
participation.  He stated that leaving only helped the Union’s enemies and would make 
things for difficult for South Africa.  Jooste informed him that it was the intention of the 
South African Government to continue with their resolution even without the support of 
the other administering powers.370  Jooste finally got around to seeing the American 
delegation on January 3, after being informed by the others that his tactics would be 
unsuccessful.  Phillip Jessup told Jooste that he would confer with his government but 
was not supportive of the measure.  On his way out, Jooste told Jessup it was the position 
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of his delegation that the American policy of appeasement had encouraged the Fourth 
Committee to act irresponsibly and implied things would only get worse if the US 
continued appeasing the anti-colonial faction.371  Even before the negative reactions of 
the Administering powers, Jooste had started to doubt whether their resolution would be 
added to the agenda of the General Assembly.372   
Following the meeting of the Commonwealth countries, the Union was even more 
discouraged.  While all expressed hostility to the actions of the Fourth Committee, none 
were willing to support South Africa and many would abstain rather than vote with the 
Union if the resolution made it to the floor of the General Assembly.  Even those that did 
support the Union would “be embarrassed and will do so reluctantly.” 373  Donges pushed 
for backing away of the proposed resolution and instead hoped the “old Commonwealth” 
countries would speak against the Fourth Committee’s resolutions and then abstain, 
which would do more good than alienating the rest of the Fourth Committee.  He 
believed this strategy would put the Union in the best position the next year to push 
against the Fourth Committee.  Donges also recommended the Union not work with the 
Ad Hoc Committee.374  Events in the Fourth Committee started to catch up to their 
negotiations.  Rumors floated that the Fourth Committee would pass a resolution 
condemning the Union for not giving travel documents to the Union, which would bring 
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up the constitutional issue without the Union having to submit its own resolution.  The 
French also told Jooste if the US and GB voted with the Union so would they, but that all 
administering powers would speak against the Fourth Committee’s resolution and abstain 
at worst.375   
 The Union plan to weaken the Fourth Committee never got off the ground.  None 
of their allies was willing to challenge the Fourth Committee.  All of the imperial powers 
wanted to limit the power of the Fourth Committee, but they were not willing to risk its 
ire.  The UK’s legal counselor, Fitzmaurice, poked holes in all of Donges’ plans and 
weakened his resolve.  Tweedsmuir described Donges as “nothing if not practical, in 
contrast to his government,” but he did not have leg to stand on.  Tweedsmuir was also 
concerned the Union delegation was going to try to blackmail the UK into supporting 
them, but was not sure how. 376  He thought Union officials might threaten to annex the 
protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland if the UK did not support South 
Africa in its struggle against the Fourth Committee.  Tweedsmuir also discussed the 
South West Africa issue with Scott.  He found Scott to be “quite open about everything,” 
but warned him not to push for sanctions as that would only make matters worse.377 
 Back in Windhoek, Kutako and the others were still waiting to hear back about 
their passports and they began an intense letter writing campaign to the press in order to 
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get permission to travel.  Kutako wrote to South African Press Association that “We 
think the biggest world organisation – the United Nations- would free us and restore 
happiness and brotherhood to the South-West African tribes by placing South-West 
Africa under the international trusteeship of the United Nations,” and if their passports 
were refused then a UN delegation should come to South West Africa.378  Things would 
get worse for Kutako’s hopes before they got better.  In November, the Union had 
declared Scott a prohibited immigrant and officially barred him from ever returning.379  
Scott still held sway at the United Nations.  On January 15, 1952, he spoke before the 
Fourth Committee so they would know the “whole truth” of the situation in South West 
Africa.  Scott wanted the UN to know while he had not been told why he was declared a 
prohibitive immigrant to the Union, it might be for more than just his appearance at the 
UN.  While stating he was not a communist, he admitted he had worked with “what are 
regarded as undesirable movements in South Africa,” that he joined “from a belief that 
they were leading resistance to racialism, Nazism or imperialism.”380  Scott wanted to 
make sure all the facts were in and to show South Africa that dialogue was important.  He 
expressed the desire that both the Union delegation and the South West African Chiefs 
could be at the Fourth Committee to clear the air and have a true conversation on 
conditions in South West Africa.  Scott said since he cannot travel to South West Africa 
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and Kutako cannot travel to the UN, it is his request that the decisions and conversations 
at the UN be delivered to Kutako to ensure he is kept informed.  Scott also wanted to 
notify the UN of two letters that he received from South West Africa.  Kutako’s letter 
was full of hope and stated the Herero were “determined to fight this battle up to the 
end.” The other letter from David Witbooi expressed a different sentiment.  The Nama 
were “very downhearted” because they felt they were being ignored by the government 
and they have been unable to hear what was happening at the UN.  Witbooi wanted “to 
know whether the United Nations are thinking of us in South West Africa; and whether 
they are making inquiries about our living in South West Africa.”381  Scott wanted to 
make sure the Nama and Damara were not left out of the deliberations at the UN and he 
called upon the UN to “establish its jurisdiction in that territory where the creative spirit 
of God is defied and civilisation is called ‘white’.”382  The next day, the Herero were 
officially denied a passport.383   
 Donges responded angrily to Scott’s and the Ad Hoc Committee’s attacks on 
South Africa.  He criticized the Ad Hoc Committee because the constraints placed upon it 
made it impossible for it to negotiate an acceptable solution with the Union 
representatives.  Donges was also very upset that the Fourth Committee invited Scott and 
the Herero Chiefs to come speak before them.  He questioned why the Herero were 
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invited to come to the Fourth Committee, since discussions were focused on finding a 
solution to the legal impasse not conditions within South West Africa.  Donges did not 
believe the Herero were prepared to testify on that issue.  He also had a problem with the 
idea the Damara were working with the Herero because he believed the Damara were 
slaves to the Herero before Europeans liberated them and they would not work with their 
captors.  He cited a telegram signed by Augus Gariseb, Abraham Gariseb, Johannes 
Griseb and Hans Uirab, all Damara headmen, that stated the Damara did not support the 
Herero and they “have confidence in the Government” and trusted it to protect their 
rights.  Donges used this information to question whether Scott really represented the 
Damara or just the Herero.  He also argued that Scott’s support from the Nama only 
represented a fraction of the Nama in South West Africa (400 out of 23,000).  Donges 
told the UN the only reason the Fourth Committee passed a resolution was to attack 
South Africa and that South Africa had certain rights as a member state to fair treatment, 
which they have not been receiving.  He said, “For the past five years, with almost 
monotonous regularity, we have had to endure these outrageous insults from countries 
whose energies could have been far better employed in sweeping before their own 
doors.” 384 
 Donges accused members of the Fourth Committee of not honoring the Charter 
of the UN, which the ICJ declared did not force South Africa to submit a trusteeship 
agreement.  However, the Fourth Committee acted as if South West Africa was already a 
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trust territory by inviting the Herero to Paris.  He argued that the actions of the Fourth 
Committee was a danger to the UN and that  
South Africa has, therefore every right to claim its rights under the Charter—
nothing more, but also nothing less.  Foremost among those rights is the right to 
know definitely where we stand in regard to the Charter—where the United 
Nations stand.  Are our rights and duties to be determined by the provisions of the 
Charter, as conceived and understood by its authors, or by a fortuitous majority of 
votes in a committee often founded on political expediency or prejudice? 385 
 
He argued the Union was a strong member of the UN, which was demonstrated by Union 
support in the Korean conflict.  South Africa, according to Donges, had been doubly 
penalized because they were refusing to discuss matters that were internal matters and 
have been attacked on its positions, but because the Union believed in the Charter the 
South African delegation refused to comment on the hypocrisy of its critics.  Donges 
warned if this pattern continued then the UN itself would fail because the Charter would 
mean nothing if nations tear the UN apart by constantly interfering the domestic concerns 
of a member state.386  
 Tweedsmuir felt sympathy for Donges.  He wrote that Donges was having a hard 
time because he was the only Union official that believed in compromise, but he was 
unable to because he was ordered to fight to the last.  Donges had also alienated the 
Americans by being rude to Roosevelt, and Tweesdmuir believed he had overestimated 
the support he would receive from the Commonwealth.  Tweedsmuir thought the UK 
                                                
385 “Destroy this Evil which Threatens to Destroy the Organization,” Speech by Dr. T.E. Donges, 18 
January 1952, BLO P.S. 4/11, vol. 8, NASA. 
386 “Destroy this Evil which Threatens to Destroy the Organization,” Speech by Dr. T.E. Donges, 18 
January 1952, BLO P.S. 4/11, vol. 8, NASA. 
175 
 
should be prepared for the possibility of a complete withdrawal from the UN and Korea 
by the Union if conditions continued to deteriorate.  He was not impressed with Scott’s 
speeches, but Scott had started a discussion over whether the UN should send a group to 
South West Africa to investigate the conditions of the territory.  Even if he was 
unimpressive before the UN, Tweedsmuir acknowledged the following about Scott.   
One fact is inescapable.  Michael Scott is now regarded as the champion of the 
poor and oppressed of the non-White world, by a growing number of people in a 
growing number of countries.  Nothing can stop the steady momentum of his 
reputation.  If we could only find some crusade for him to follow which ran 
parallel to our own ideas he would be a tremendous source of strength to us.  If 
we are regarded as perpetually opposed to him our cause will suffer heavy moral 
damage. 387 
 
He also wrote “our stand will be misrepresented and misunderstood all over the world” 
because they did not censure the Union and voted against hearing Scott.388  For those who 
supported Scott and his quest to end South Africa’s control of Namibia, all who worked 
with and not against the Union were suspect.  Tweedsmuir and others within the British 
government were concerned that by not criticizing the Union they were part of the 
problem, not the solution. 
 In the end, the Fourth Committee passed a resolution condemning the Union for 
failing to negotiate with them and calling on the Union to follow the ICJ decision by 
submitting reports. 389  The sixth session of the UN ended once again without a solution 
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to the South West Africa issue, even after the ICJ’s ruling.  Over the next few years, the 
Fourth Committee wanted to figure out how the UN and Union could work together to 
implement the decision.  The biggest hurdle they would face revolved around the role of 
petitioners, both oral and written.  The Union maintained the Fourth Committee and the 
United Nations in general had no right to hear petitions, while the Fourth Committee 
argued they could. 
 Under the League, petitions were submitted to the Mandate Commission by the 
mandatory power, and the commission did not have the permission to request petitioners 
to address the committee.  Union officials argued the ICJ ruling did not allow the UN to 
have any more supervision than existed under the League.  The Fourth Committee took a 
vastly different approach.  They believed the UN as the heir to the League could hear 
petitioners, and since the Union would not forward petitions, the Fourth Committee had 
to act on the petitioners’ behalf.  The issue of the petitions was more of a threat to 
reaching a settlement than the failure of South Africa to submit reports.  The issue would 
eventually be settled by another ICJ decision that would allow petitioners to address the 
UN, but this would take years of struggle by Kutako, Scott, and their allies.  Throughout 
the 1950s, Namibians and their supporters never gave up on their right to petition the 
United Nations for help in the fight against South African rule.  The Union used this time 
to consolidate their control of South West Africa, and all but annexed the territory.  As 
apartheid spread in South Africa, it also found its way northward, giving the Namibians 
another reason to ask the international community to free them from South Africa.   
177 
 
 Kutako continued his campaign to gain international support for the UN to take 
over the administration of Namibia.  He was concerned about the attitude of the Union 
“towards the United Nations in connection with the case of South West Africa.”390 He 
asked the UN to send a commission to South West Africa, stating that if the South 
Africans had nothing to hide, then they would welcome an impartial delegation.  Kutako, 
using the rhetoric of the Cold War, also said it was important the UN “intervene, because 
an iron curtain has been placed between our spokesman and us,” because the Union had 
prevented Scott and Kutako from meeting by refusing to allow them to travel freely.391  
Scott was also working on a solution abroad.  He had secured a letter of support from the 
Convention People’s Party of the Gold Coast asking the UN prevent the Union from 
consolidating their control of South West Africa.  A petition was signed by key party 
leaders including Kwame Nkrumah arguing that South West Africa “[was] a matter of 
vital concern for all Africans.”392  Even before independence, Nkrumah and others in 
Africa realized the presence of South Africa within Namibia was a threat to the security 
of the entire region.    
 A key issue that kept coming up in the UN was the proper role of petitions and 
petitioners from Namibia.  Under the UN Charter, the Fourth Committee was allowed to 
hear petitions from trustee territories and only trustee territories.  Citizens of trust 
territories were the only people allowed to directly petition the UN in any forum.  
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Michael Scott and the anti-colonial faction of the Fourth Committee argued since 
Namibia had the right to petition under the mandate then Namibian petitions and 
petitioners could be addressed by the Fourth Committee.  This claim was incredibly 
contentious.  The colonial powers wanted to prevent Namibians from gaining the right to 
petition because they believed if the UN heard from Namibians then other colonial 
territories would also seek the right to petition. 
Union officials refused to discuss petitions saying they were a distraction to the 
true deliberations, which was to figure out the future of South West Africa.393  Most 
members of the Fourth Committee disagreed and a discussion over petitions dominated 
the Ad Hoc Committee’s deliberation.  The Syrian delegate, Zeineddine, argued if they 
followed the way the Mandates Commission dealt with petitions then it could put people 
at risk because all petitions had to go through the mandatory power.394  Over the protests 
of the US delegate, Gerig, the Committee eventually decided to adopt Zeineddine’s 
position that they should accept petitions that came from outside of the Union’s official 
channels in order to protect the petitioners, while acknowledging this might hurt any 
chance of negotiation with the Union.  The Ad Hoc Committee decided before they could 
discuss a solution to the impasse over the territory they needed to know what was 
happening within Namibia.  Since South Africa refused to submit reports, the 
committee’s only source of information would come from the petitioners.  Unbeknownst 
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to the Ad Hoc Committee, their discussions were in vain because Malan had already 
decided that the committee was a waste of time, and the Union planned on dragging out 
the meetings without ever agreeing to anything. 395 396  
 The Union plan was to stall any decision while trying to gain support from the 
UK, New Zealand, Canada, Holland, and Belgium to stop the Fourth Committee in 
granting oral testimony to Scott or any others.397  The Dutch, like the British, were 
concerned the nature of the Fourth Committee’s discussion of South West Africa was 
problematic.  They believed the Committee was ignoring the Charter and acting solely on 
political considerations and that all non-self-governing territories could be placed under 
the purview of the Fourth Committee if the administering powers did not stick 
together.398  South West Africa and the issue of petitions and oral testimony were once 
again setting a dangerous precedent for the colonial powers.  Jooste wrote the actions of 
those mentioned above helped the Union in 1951, but Khalidy of Iraq informed him that 
the anti-colonial bloc “could not be suppressed” and things would only be worse for the 
Union.  He believed future sessions of the UN would  
be characterized by a ‘showdown’ between the Administering Powers and the 
anti-colonial group.  I agree that the latter group may decide to pursue their 
ascending authority.  It is difficult to see, however, how a ‘showdown’ is to 
eventuate.  Anti-colonialism is rampant in the Organisation and any concerted 
effort on the part of the Administering Authorities to deny their opponents full 
scope in criticism, despite the fact that the right of criticism has developed into 
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licence, will undoubtedly lead to an explosion.  Moreover, unless such a 
concerted move is actively and strongly supported by the United States the anti-
colonial group must emerge victorious, which would place the Administering 
Powers, including the United States, in an impossible position.  And if the United 
States should decide to remain aloof Western solidarity could be seriously 
impaired.399 
 
Khalidy and Jooste recognized the Fourth Committee had already turned the corner 
against colonialism.  While the current issue was South West Africa, the Arabs, Asians, 
and Latin Americans, with the support of the Eastern Bloc, were set on destroying 
colonialism.  Jooste hoped if the Union became active in the UN by working in various 
committees, while staying away from the South West African and Indian issues, then 
they could build good will and hopefully slow the attacks emanating from both the Fourth 
Committee and the General Assembly. 
 Jooste informed Forsyth, the Secretary for External Affairs, that the Ad Hoc 
Committee was unlikely to accept any agreement that did not include submitting reports 
to the UN, recognized the rights of petitioners, and be with the UN, not the Three Allied 
Powers.  His recommendation was to stall the negotiations.  He wanted to meet as late as 
possible and to spend the majority of the time going over the negotiations of the previous 
year.  He hoped if they could push negotiations into 1953 then maybe the Fourth 
Committee would not be as hostile as it currently was.  Jooste claimed petitioners were 
not heard under the mandate and the Union should stick with this position.400  Since the 
Union did not believe a compromise could actually be achieved, they wanted to make 
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sure “the onus for any ultimate deadlock [fell] on the Committee and not on the Union 
Government,” so they would appear to be trying to find a solution when in reality they 
were merely stalling.401  
At the end of August, Jooste sent a long letter to Forsyth regarding the upcoming UN 
meetings and Ad Hoc Meetings.  He said “no arrangement will be acceptable unless: 
(a) it recognizes the United Nations as the ultimate international authority to whom 
we are committed in regard to the administration of the Territory; 
(b) it provides for the submission, directly or indirectly, to the United Nations, or one 
of its agencies, of reports; 
(c) it establishes some means by which petitions from inhabitants of the Territory will 
reach the Organisation.” 402 
 
Jooste thought they might get around C if they allowed A and B, but was not confident.  
He recommended they stall and try to get others on to their side.  Jooste thought the 
negotiations would not solve anything, but that the Union should continue negotiating for 
appearances.  Jooste also told Forsyth that he was “increasingly apprehensive of 
American influence in our part of the world and the possibility of still greater American 
interest in the development of backward peoples of Africa towards self-government.”  
The British and French were also against Union racial policies, which he was worried, 
could cause problems even if the Three Powers solution was agreed upon.  Since the 
three things the UN wanted were impossible to accept by the Union, Jooste suggested 
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they just drag things out and try to avoid any new instrument or system for petitions and 
reports.403 
At the opening meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on September 10th, Jooste 
pushed the Union’s proposals.  Union officials heavily publicized Jooste’s efforts before 
the Committee and claimed they were willing to negotiate so they could blame the UN 
when negotiations failed to resolve the impasse.404  Jooste thought the US delegate in the 
Ad Hoc Committee was helping them stall in order to get a favorable report because of 
the Union’s bluff in the negotiations.  Jooste also believed the US would go further in 
helping the Union this year in order to solve the dispute.405  One strategy suggested was 
to declare South West Africa as strategic trust, which would limit UN interference.  Sir 
John Le Gougetel, High Commissioner for the UK in Pretoria, did not believe Malan 
could accept putting South West Africa under the umbrella of a “strategic trust” because 
that was too close to a trusteeship agreement and Malan did not trust the Fourth 
Committee.406  In a private conversation between Jooste and Acheson, Acheson said the 
South West Africa issue might be the only one of the “dreadful things” on the agenda that 
could be solved.  Jooste thought this was why the US delegate in the Ad Hoc Committee 
was helping them play for time and to get a favorable report.407  Union officials thought 
about pushing for a General Assembly resolution that would cement the three powers 
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concept and prohibit oral testimony from “any non-governmental person or 
representatives ever again being heard by the United Nations or any of its Committees 
concerning the affairs of a territory that is not under United Nations trusteeship.”408  This 
resolution never bore any fruit because the Union recognized it did not have enough 
support to pass the resolution, but they were looking for anyway to keep Scott or any 
other individual from addressing the UN.    
As negotiations stalled within the Ad Hoc Committee, Scott and Kutako ratcheted 
up their attempts to gain travel documents for Kutako.  Scott protested the “arbitrary 
restrictions place upon the freedom of movement of your African petitioners that I appeal 
to you that no final settlement of the question of South West Africa should be reached 
until the African inhabitants have been consulted themselves by the UN,” and demanded 
the Herero be allowed to come before the UN.409  Scott had also arranged for Kutako to 
be invited to St. Paul’s in London for a religious service and Kutako requested a visa in 
the spirit of Christian brotherhood.410  The Malan administration also blocked this avenue 
because they feared anywhere Kutako went would be used politically to hurt the Union.  
Additionally, Kutako had requested that the Union allow him to travel to Switzerland for 
medical treatment.  Forsyth instructed the Secretary for South West Africa to tell Kutako 
he could have the passport to Switzerland on two conditions.  First, that he provide a 
medical certificate stating that he needed to travel for medical care and if a visa was 
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given then the Union wanted “written assurances that he wil (sic) not make use of his 
overseas visit to receive medical treatment for the purpose of participating in any form of 
political or public activity.”411  Neser informed Kutako of this decision, but Kutako 
eventually declined because he also wanted to travel to London to speak at St. Paul’s.412  
Neser told him the Secretary for External Affairs made all decisions on who travels and 
why they travel outside of the Union and implied he would not approve Kutako’s travel, 
so Kutako dropped the request.413 
  Kutako then wrote to the UN and requested once again that South West Africa be 
placed under a trustee agreement and reaffirmed Scott as the spokesman for the 
Herero.414  Scott also continued his lobby efforts by writing to the President of the 
General Assembly that “the Union Government [was] not yet prepared to implement its 
international and moral obligations with respect to South West Africa, particularly with 
regard to the supervisory responsibility of the United Nations towards the Mandated 
Territory.”  Scott put pressure on the Fourth Committee to demand the Union turn over 
South West Africa to the UN and allow Namibians to represent themselves in the 
committees where their future was being decided.  He also suggested the committee send 
a group to study the impact of apartheid on South West Africa.  Throughout the letter, 
                                                
411 Letter to Secretary for South West Africa from Forsyth, 15 November 1952, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 25, 
NASA. 
412 Letter to Kutako from Neser, 24 November 1952, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 26, NASA. 
413 Notes on Interview Given to Hosea Kutako by the Secretary for South West Africa Mr. Neser at 
Windhoek, 5 December 1952, to Secretary General from Kutako, 8 December 1952, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 26, 
NASA. 
414 Letter to the Secretary General of the UN from Kutako, 27 October 1952, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 26, 
NASA. 
185 
 
Scott kept linking the work on apartheid with South West Africa imploring them to “not 
abandon its jurisdiction in the matter of South West Africa.”415 
On December 8, Kutako wrote to the Secretary General saying he wanted South 
West Africa to be placed “under the direct supervision of the United Nations but not 
under any other independent instrument.”416  He also asked once again for a commission 
to be sent because they were prohibited from representing themselves.  In case the letter 
did not arrive, Kutako sent a shorter telegram to the UN saying he “strongly object to 
appointment of Britain France and USA as proposed by Union government.  We Accept 
UN Supervision.  Send impartial commission to South West Africa.”417  Kutako wanted 
Scott to continue to push for the United Nation as the “only instrument which is 
competent to restore happiness to us, as well as to perform the work that has been 
neglected by the Union Government in South West Africa.”418 
By the end of 1952, Scott began to change tactics.  The UN’s negotiations with 
the Union were not progressing and he believed it was time to move to another venue.  
He requested the UN submit the issue of petitions and the future of South West Africa 
over to the ICJ.419  By the early spring, Scott began to write to former League members to 
gain support for the case being sent to the ICJ or to the Security Council.  Union officials 
thought this might actually work in their favor because it would take the issue out of the 
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General Assembly and into the hands of the Security Council where they would have a 
stronger percentage of allies.420 
 The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Khoman of Thailand, was also 
becoming frustrated with the lack of progress in the negotiations.  He told Jooste the 
Committee “could not accept, as a basis for detailed discussions, any proposal which did 
not recognize the principle of supervision of the administration of the Territory of South 
West Africa by the United Nations.”421  Jooste continued to stall and push for other 
unreachable goals, telling Forsyth that things were deadlocked and he could “probably be 
able to keep Committee going for another few weeks in circumstances were 
responsibility will rest with Committee if negotiations are broken off.”422  Jooste also 
protested the Fourth Committee’s decision to hear Scott by refusing to comment on the 
Ad Hoc Committee’s draft report,423 and then subsequently blasting the Ad Hoc 
Committee for submitting a report before the Union could comment on it.  He blamed the 
committee for breaking off the negotiations without telling the Union how they could 
modify their proposals in order to meet the UN standards.  The Committee responded by 
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stating the negotiations had not been ended, but they had submitted their report only to 
keep the General Assembly informed.424 
The Union’s delaying tactic paid dividends when the General Assembly voted to 
push the discussions on South West Africa until the 8th session.425  After all of the turmoil 
over the report, the Fourth Committee also decided to push the issue to the next 
session.426  Khoman, trying to end the stalemate, began informally meeting with the Ad 
Hoc Committee members in an attempt to force the issue.  He said that if no progress was 
made then he would resign which would hopefully make the Union realistically work 
with the committee.  The Indian delegation had also been informally meeting with 
various delegations highlighting the fact that the Union was refusing to honor its 
international obligations.427 
 Jooste’s plan to lay the blame on the Ad Hoc Committee was in serious jeopardy 
at the beginning of June.  The Chairman of the Committee was threatening to resign 
because of South Africa’s intransigence.  Jooste was hoping he could delay this action by 
getting the Committee to state they would only accept a new instrument through the 
United Nations.  He could argue this plan would increase the Union’s obligations and he 
could then lay failure of the negotiations on the Committee.  He also wanted to make sure 
the Union did not repeat their previous suggestions as that would clearly show they had 
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not changed a single proposal.428  Jooste implemented this plan and received a firm 
rejection of the proposal the Three Powers operating independently of the UN would 
manage the Mandate.  He subsequently accused the committee of negotiating in bad faith 
because they had never rejected the three powers plan in the two years of negotiations.429 
430 431 
Union officials still felt they had support from the UK and were becoming more 
obstinate.  In an “informal note,” the Parliamentary Under Secretary gave the High 
Commissioner a note outlining the UK’s position at the UN.  He linked the South West 
African, Indian Issue, and racial policies to the questions on Tunisia and Morocco and 
said this could cause “a highly charged emotional atmosphere” which must be avoided.  
He pushed for a more moderate debate “while maintaining a firm but unprovacative (sic) 
stand against attempts to persuade the Assembly to excede (sic) its powers.”  In meetings 
with the Ad Hoc Committee, the UK’s position was that any agreement that fell within 
the ICJ decision they would have to support, but they would also support any measure 
that could realistically be accepted by the General Assembly.  However, they could not 
support the Union if they rejected the ICJ decision out of hand.  The UK also said it 
wanted to support the Union but could only do so with heavy limitations because they 
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could not avoid public opinion within Great Britain.432  The Union delegation wanted the 
Union High Commissioner in London to express their gratitude to the Secretary of State 
for the “helpful attitude of the United Kingdom Government on those items on the United 
Nations agenda which are of special concern to the Union.”433 
In a meeting to discuss the upcoming 9th Session, Malan, Donges, Jooste, and 
Jones decided if Scott was allowed to address the UN, Jooste and the delegation would 
immediately walk out during his talk.  Malan also told Jooste he was not permitted to 
give any ground from the Union’s proposal and to use the words “concession” when 
talking about what the Union has already given up.434  In addition, Forsyth communicated 
to Jooste that the Union was no longer willing to supply reports even to the Three 
Powers, which would make them even more unlikely to go along with the Union’s 
proposal, but they must keep that information secret.435  Once again, the Union set itself 
up to negotiate with the Ad Hoc Committee in bad faith.  Malan wanted to string along 
the UN while the Union strengthened its hold of Namibia. 
In a speech before the Fourth Committee, Jooste thanked the Ad Hoc Committee 
for its work and said even though a final settlement was not reached, they had 
accomplished a lot.  He cited the three years of work as showing both sides were willing 
to try to seek a common ground even though they came from such disparate viewpoints.  
                                                
432 Telegram from High Commissioner, London to Forsyth, 31 October 1952, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 25, 
NASA. 
433 Telegram to High Commissioner London from South African Delegation New York, 3 November 
1952, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 25, NASA. 
434 Jones, Note for File, 13 August 1953, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 27, NASA. 
435 Telegram to Jooste from Forsyth, 11 September 1953, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 27, NASA. 
190 
 
He also rehashed the history of the debate from a decidedly South African point of view 
making sure to point out over ninety percent of South West Africans, white and black, 
supported incorporation even though the UN did not.  He also mentioned the attacks on 
South African racial policies made it hard for the Union to negotiate with the UN because 
feelings in South Africa were that the UN was hostile towards them and in spite of this, 
the Union has continued to negotiate with the UN to solve the impasse.  He also lamented 
the fact that the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Committee were too narrow to solve 
the problem so he suggested the Fourth Committee do so.  He laid out the South Africa 
position as follows:   
(a) that we revive the “sacred trust” as a legal obligation; 
(b) that we embody that sacred trust in a new instrument; 
(c) that we re-assume international accountability towards the three nations, who, 
we can assume, would not be less diligent in supervision of our administration 
than any organ of the United Nations; and 
(d) that we make provision to ensure that the sacred trust is carried out by 
accepting beforehand the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court.436 
 
Jooste was concerned the Union position would lead to problems and the debate over 
South West Africa would “degenerate and become very acrimonious,” and the Union 
delegation should do what they could to prevent this.  He believed the best course of 
action would be to set up a new committee to start the negotiations over.  However, he 
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was instructed that the Union was not willing to change its position even though it knew 
the three powers solution was not feasible.437 
During the 8th Session, the delegate from the Philippines said if the South West 
African issue cannot be resolved, then under Section 7 of the mandate, it might be 
necessary for a former member of the League to bring the issue to the ICJ, but it would 
be preferable if the UN brought the suit instead.  The Indians and Soviets also were 
against them and the Latin American nations pushed for a stronger resolution, but the 
criticism was tamer than Jooste expected.  The administering powers did not take part in 
the debate because they believed all the proposed resolutions called for the UN to have 
greater authority than had existed under the mandate.  The resolutions created a new 
committee and encouraged the Union to continue to negotiate.  Sole believed they would 
be asked to work with the new committee, but they could refuse because of the 
“inflexible position taken up with regard to the Committee’s terms of reference.”438  
Jooste responded to the committee’s discussion by praising some of the delegations for 
refraining from attacking the Union and issued regrets that not everyone could be 
unbiased.  He also reemphasized the Union position that the ICJ decision was wrong 
because the mandate had lapsed and that UN supervision would not be possible, as it did 
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not function in the same way as the League.439  This demonstrated once again the Union 
was merely toying with the UN in order to buy time. 
Jooste was becoming worried about the negative media in the US, particularly the 
New York Times.  He told Forsyth because the Union refused to submit reports then the 
only information the committee received on conditions on South West Africa was from 
the Newspapers and they should be prepared to answer charges based on fraudulent 
reporting.440  At the last session of the General Assembly, Jooste’s fears came true.  The 
General Assembly requested a report on South West Africa, which was based upon 
hearsay as the Union refused to participate.  The Union believed this report would be 
critical of the Union because they believed “the Committee first decided on its 
conclusions and then looked at the ‘facts’ in an effort to substantiate its findings.”  The 
Union refused to “take official cognizance of the Committee’s report” because Union 
officials refuse to “recognize the supervisory functions claimed by the United Nations.” 
441  An official report recommended the Union not ignore the report because it implied 
the Union was failing its obligations under the mandate, but they will have to do so 
without implying the UN has supervisory functions.  The tone of the report only forced 
the Union to dig in even further.  Because to them, it showed the UN was trying to gain 
control over the territory.442  Neser, Secretary for South West Africa, was not too 
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concerned about the report.  He believed with the exception of the position of the Herero 
and Nama, the report was correct.443 
Once again in 1954, the Union refused to negotiate and there was a push from 
some delegates to send the petition issue to the ICJ, but the debate did not get very far 
because the US and Iraq argued against it.444  Sole believed this debate did not go very far 
because it was too late in the session to discuss an ICJ reference.445  However, the 
General Assembly passed two resolutions concerning South West Africa.  Resolution 851 
(IX) requested that South Africa work with the Committee on South West Africa and 
asked the committee to see which organs of the UN could operate in the territory to help 
the local inhabitants.446  The General Assembly also passed Resolution 852 (IX), which 
stated the only way to move forward on South West Africa was for South Africa to place 
it under Trusteeship.447 
On January 24, 1955, the Chairman of the Committee on South West Africa wrote 
to the South Africa Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting the Union honor Resolution 
851 (XI) by working with the committee and giving reports on the conditions in South 
West Africa as well passing on petitions.  The Union told him they had made their 
position on the issuance of reports perfectly clear and had not changed their minds.  They 
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also were dismayed that the Union suggestion to work with the “Three remaining 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers” to work out a solution had failed.  The Union 
believed since the League had collapsed so had the mandate and South Africa held no 
further obligation to the international community regarding South West Africa.448  In the 
end, the UN decided to refer the case to the ICJ.  Fourie was concerned if the Union 
responded to the Advisory Panels case on the UN’s right to hear petitions then it would 
have backed down from their position that the mandate had lapsed.  He wanted Jones to 
come up with a solution where they could defend their position without acknowledging 
UN supervision.449 
While the UN spared with Union officials, the Malan administration was 
consolidating its position in South West Africa.  The inclusion of South West Africans 
into the Union parliament opened the door for even more Union policies to infiltrate the 
territory.  The most far reaching of these was apartheid.  By late August 1954, the Chief 
Secretary of the Nationalist Party in South West Africa, A.H. du Plessis, declared the 
mandate no longer existed and “the Union and South-West Africa have become one, that 
is one territory and one people as far as the outside world is concerned.”450  With this 
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closer relationship came formal apartheid in the territory.  By 1955, the South African 
Department of Native Affairs had taken over the administration of the territory. 451 
The Committee on South West Africa was very concerned with the conditions of 
the country and categorically stated in the forty years of South African rule living 
conditions for the African population had not improved.  They recommended a complete 
overhaul of conditions in the territory.452  The UN report was met with strong resistance 
by Union officials who believed apartheid was an internal issue outside of the purview of 
the United Nations, even when it was implemented in South West Africa.  Forsyth did 
not believe equality under the law would be beneficial to “non-Europeans” because they 
would exchange legal protection “for a theoretical equality of which they would not be 
able, in their present state of advancement, to make use of.”453  He also argued the 
“Native areas” were owned by the Africans as a whole and land cannot be taken from 
them without the approval of the Union parliament.  Forsyth made the claim that the 
Union had improved the lives of the African population but was “at a loss to understand 
what steps the Administration should or could have taken in the last one or two years 
which would have shown such discernible results that the Committee would have found 
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‘a significant improvement in the moral and material welfare of the Native inhabitants.’  I 
am afraid we cannot achieve miracles.”454 
Kutako continued to send the UN letters detailing the deteriorating conditions in 
the territory and expressing gratitude for the work being done.  He was particularly 
concerned the pass laws had been extended and those who were not following them were 
being arrested and those who resisted were persecuted.  He says the government was 
refusing to allow Africans to work at anything other than menial labor and was limiting 
the number of livestock Africans could own.  Kutako also drew attention to difference in 
white and black living conditions.  Europeans lived in beautiful modern houses while 
Africans were forced to build “pondokkies” made out of scrap metal.  Kutako believed 
the only way to reverse the tide of apartheid was to revoke South African rule and have 
the UN manage the territory until it reached independence.455  In the 1950s, the United 
Nations began to expand its long interest into the treatment of Indians in South Africa 
into a larger discussion over apartheid.  The expansion of apartheid into South West 
Africa furthered UN interest in apartheid.  The South West Africa case and apartheid 
were entwined throughout the decade.   
Benjamin Cohen of the UN Trusteeship Organization visited South Africa and 
told the Cape Argus that while other nations were granting recognition for human rights 
South Africa was moving in the other direction.  South African actions in Namibia and 
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the Union were moving against the tide of progress and because “Coloured people who 
are the world’s majority are acquiring ever-increasing international political power,” 
South Africa would only become more isolated as time went on.456  Louw would 
continually refute this argument and would push the idea that segregation was natural as 
evident by the treatment of blacks in the United States.  He also received a number of 
letters from people around the world pushing for South Africa to remain firm in the face 
of calls for integration.  R. Carter Pitman, an attorney from Georgia, wrote that all the 
world’s problems stem from racial issues and no one was demanding that the Arabs and 
Israelis integrate and the South Africans should stand firm in their policies.457   
The UN viewed the consolidation of the Native Affairs department as well as the 
representation in Cape Town as incorporation by a different name.  The Union delegation 
argued it was not incorporation, but the Union could annex South West Africa if it chose.  
Sole considered using the South West African Legislature’s request in the interwar period 
to be incorporated as evidence the territory had always wanted to be ruled as a fifth 
province.  The South Africans would argue the mandate allowed the people of the 
territory to choose their own future and the South West Africans had repeatedly asked to 
join the Union.458  The Delegation also argued the Union had not incorporated South 
West Africa because mining and finance where still under the South West African 
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Legislative Assembly and claimed, “General Smuts, the father of the Mandates system, 
actually envisaged annexation under the expired mandate.”459 
In this spirit, Sole maintained that in 1946 that Smuts only wanted “to consult the 
international community, and if possible to secure its blessing for step which he firmly 
believed would be in the best interests of all the inhabitants of South West Africa.”  He 
did not do this out of a legal obligation but out of respect to the international community, 
and he could legally have unilaterally annexed the country.  Sole also argued against the 
idea of resolutions on South West Africa as being legally binding.  He was particularly 
annoyed with the yearly resolution imploring South Africa to place South West Africa 
under a trusteeship agreement stating, “If a single recommendation has no binding legal 
force it is surely obvious that constant repetition of the same recommendation cannot 
imbue it with any such force.”460 
 Even though Sole believed the Union had operated within its legal jurisdiction 
and could have annexed South West Africa, he maintained the Union had not done so 
when they moved into a closer relationship with the territory.  Speaking on a draft 
resolution based on the idea that the Union had incorporated SWA, he stated 
categorically that this was false and it was regrettable that the Committee did not believe 
the Union.  He said, “since 1945 South Africa ha[d] been completely frank as to its 
attitude on the South West Africa question.  It [was] therefore a matter of very deep 
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regret that when we make a statement – for example that there has been no incorporation 
– it is sometimes suggested, by implication or otherwise, that such a statement cannot be 
believed.  Surely this sort of thing cannot contribute to an improvement in South Africa’s 
relations with the Organisation.”461  The South African Ministry of Native Affairs took 
over the administration of Africans in South West Africa.  The Union also transferred the 
Native Reserves of South West Africa to the South African Native Trust so there could 
be a unified native policy.  The Union took argued that since South West Africa was 
represented in the Union parliament then it did not need to have redundant native affairs 
administrations.462 463 
Throughout the debates over South West Africa, Kutako and Scott never ceased 
their campaign to break the territory away from South African control.  Their first goal 
was to have the UN come to South West Africa to see conditions for themselves.  Since 
Kutako and other Namibians were prohibited by the Union government from traveling, 
they wanted the Committee on South West Africa to come to them.  The Committee 
agreed with this idea, but was unable to gain permission from the South Africans.  The 
Union argued the UN did not have jurisdiction over the territory so the presence of a UN 
body in South West Africa was out of the question.464  Scott and Kutako also tried to get 
the UN to negotiate with Namibians as well as the South African government.  They 
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believed any agreement reached over the territory should include the opinion of the 
Namibians.465  Further Kutako wrote to the UN stating “the Union of S.A. [was] not our 
representative at U.N.O; moreover she has proved beyond all doubt that she is unfit to 
rule anybody.  The people of S.W.A. need the assistance of the U.N.O. at once, but they 
feel very much hurt when the U.N.O. thinks the assistance is only subject to the approval 
of a Government that works against the interest of the indigenous people of S.W.A.”466  
Scott and Kutako worked tirelessly to get information to the United Nations against the 
wishes of the Union government who actively interfered with their ability to petition the 
UN. 
Scott also worked closely with other delegations in order to resolve the dispute 
over Namibia.  He appealed to the former League members as well as the Principal Allied 
and Associated power the Union had hoped to coop to condemn Union policies for the 
“loss of [Namibian] political rights . . . and for the sufferings they have endured,” as the 
Union finalized their incorporation of the territory.467  He also reached out to the Arab 
League for support.  In August 1954, Abdul Hassouna, the Secretary General of the Arab 
League, informed Scott the Arab League supported his and the UN’s efforts to grant 
South West Africa self-determination.  Hassouna told him the  
Arab League strenuously upholds the cause of right and is a staunch supporter of 
the principles of the United Nations and other international organs with regard to 
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the freedom of non self-governing countries and the cause of their self-
determination, as it firmly believes that the domination exercised over a country 
against the will of its inhabitants, and the imposition of a repugnant rule, are 
susceptible of engendering collision between nations and fomenting trouble.468 
 
Scott’s network of support in the UN increased the pressure on South Africa, and in 
1954, he was requested by the Czechoslovakian delegation to speak before the UN.  In 
this speech, he not only called for an end to South African occupation, but tangible UN 
assistance.  He requested the various specialized agencies of the United Nations should 
intervene in South West Africa to help alleviate some of the problems the people of 
Namibia faced.  He specifically asked for Technical Assistance because of the intense 
drought, medical services outside the police zone, malaria help, help with livestock 
maintenance, education services, and for UNICEF to help provide food to the rural 
poor.469    
 In the mid-1950s, Kutako was not the only Namibian appealing to the United 
Nations.  Jariretundu Kozonguizi, began his campaign by writing to the UN arguing even 
if the Union did not have a legal obligation to place South West Africa under a 
trusteeship agreement then they had a moral one.  He called for the Union to be kicked 
out of the territory because “they [had] no status in S.W.A.,” and that Namibians should 
“do with our country whatever we consider best in our interests.”470  Kozonguizi worked 
with Kutako, was a founder and first president of the South West African National Union 
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(SWANU), and would work throughout the world to gain independence for Namibians.  
He was asked by Kutako to travel to the UN to directly represent the Herero in 1957, but 
was also denied a passport.  By 1959, he made it to New York and would represent both 
the Herero Chief’s Council as well as SWANU.471   
Following the 9th Session Scott prepared a memo stating while the session was 
not spectacular the Session did seem to mark a new stage in the development of 
the U.N. towards its sefl-realisation as a responsible instrument of humanity’s 
hopes of liberation from the bondage of poverty, ignorance and backwardness. 
Even a little greater enthusiasm and magnanimity on the part of the “Colonial 
Powers” would help in the development of the U.N. as a universally recognized 
forum and instrument of the awakening conscience of the world:  conscience 
which is awakening to the gigantic tasks of applying the present technological 
renaissance to the use of the natural resources of the earth in order to defeat those 
enemies of civilisation which are no less formidable than war itself.472 
 
Scott’s persistence in fighting for the Namibian people was a major reason for what he 
saw as the UN’s continuing transformation into a strong anti-colonial body.  He was also 
uniquely qualified to handle this task.  One observer described him as “not a misinformed 
fanatic nor yet an irresponsible trouble maker.” 473  Scott was “a consistent human being, 
with rather more than the usual amount of social conscience, and much more than 
average determination to see a job through,” and “the publicity he gets he seeks only for 
the cause of the underprivileged.  He is, personally, extremely reticent and asks nothing 
from life for himself, which is perhaps why so many misconceptions about him 
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abound.”474  Scott’s determination to see the job through helped in the long years where 
he worked alone to build support for Kutako.   
 Scott’s appearance before the UN once again caused the Union to boycott the UN.  
In 1955, however, they took it a step further.  Union officials closed their offices in New 
York and temporarily withdrew from the UN.475  It did not matter what Scott had to say, 
his mere presence before the UN was seen as an insult to South African sovereignty and 
they refused to partake in any committee where Scott was present.  Scott’s that 
Namibians were not citizens of the Union and were stateless peoples; the UN should 
allow them to come to the UN.  They did not need South Africa’s permission and because 
they were stateless, others should issue Namibians passports and travel documents.476  He 
also stated the African population still hoped the UN would intervene and this hope 
“sustain[ed] them in all their difficulties and dangers.”477 
Scott’s efforts at the UN were appreciated and supported by Kutako.  Kutako told 
Scott “we are all very grateful to you for the invaluable service you have rendered us.  
Although I am old and sick it is my greatest wish that we should meet before I die.”478  
After this letter, Scott began to campaign for the UN to force the Union to allow him to 
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return to South West Africa and meet with the Herero leadership. 479  However, as the 
South Africans were refusing to participate in the UN, they were unwilling to consider 
granting Scott a visa.  In fact, while the UN was discussing the situation in South West 
Africa, conditions had steadily deteriorated in the territory.  The pass laws had been 
extended and the Windhoek location, the Namibian section of the city, was in the process 
of being moved against the wishes of the Namibian population.480   
In 1955 and 1956, the ICJ issued advisory opinions on two related subjects, the 
procedures over petitions from South West Africa and the admissibility of oral testimony 
before the Fourth Committee.  The South Africans refused to take direct part in either 
case.  They claimed since the UN did not have jurisdiction over South West Africa, 
neither did the ICJ.  The Union administration, however, tried to influence the outcome 
of the cases by lobbying friendly delegations behind the scenes. 
 On December 6, 1954, the UN asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion asking 
whether or not petitions and reports on the South West Africa issue was considered part 
of the “important questions within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter 
of the United Nations.”481  If the UN was incorrect on this then they wanted to know the 
proper voting procedures that were to discuss the South West Africa issue in both the 
General Assembly and Fourth Committee.  Under the mandates commission, all petitions 
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had to be submitted by the mandatory power and adopted unanimously by the 
commission before they were discussed.  Since the previous advisory ruling by the ICJ 
stated UN supervision over South West Africa could not exceed that allowed by the 
mandate, the Fourth Committee wanted to know how to examine petitions since the 
Union refused to submit either petitions or reports.    
 Union officials lobbied the US extensively in an effort to prevent the American 
report to the ICJ from supporting the Fourth Committee’s right to petition.  These efforts 
were unsuccessful.  The US report to the ICJ stated the Fourth Committee should be able 
to examine and report on petitions based on a two-thirds majority, not the unanimity that 
had existed under the mandate.  Union officials were angered by the US petition and H.T. 
Andrews encouraged Louw to make a private complaint to the US Ambassador and link 
South African displeasure with South African shipments of uranium to the US.482  Sole 
believed the US’ support of the 2/3 measure would “inevitably, in respect of South West 
Africa, loading the balance against South Africa in the international scales.”483  The 
Union delegation felt betrayed by the US because they felt they had consistently stood 
with the US in the UN and expected the same.  Sole recommended that as a consequence 
of the US decision, the Union should refrain from supporting US positions in future 
debates.484  Since the US supported the Fourth Committee’s desire to examine petitions, 
Union delegates looked elsewhere for support.  The French delegations refused to get 
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involved because they did not want the ICJ or UN to think they had jurisdiction in French 
territories and wanted to lay low.485  The Union was unable to find a champion to help 
them before the ICJ and on June 6, 1955, the ICJ ruled that the UN was able to examine 
petitions regarding South West Africa, even if they did not come from the Union as 
stipulated in the mandate. 
 Prior to the decision, Andrews was instructed by Forsyth that the Union avoid 
discussing the voting procedure.  The official Union position rested on the opinion that 
any action by the ICJ was “superfluous,” because “the Union Government [did] not 
consider themselves under any obligation to submit reports and petitions to the United 
Nations and in the view of the Union the procedural question does not arise.  The South 
African delegation should therefore abstain from voting.”486  Immediately after the 
decision, Louw categorically stated “We don’t care tuppence whether the United Nation’s 
observes the two-thirds majority rule of the unanimity rule in dealing with South West 
African affairs because we have consistently said the United nations has no right to 
concern itself with the affairs of South West Africa.”487  Even after the ruling, the Union 
continued to regard the issue as an internal South African problem and refused to engage 
with the international community over the future of Namibia. 
Going into the Tenth Session of the UN, the Union delegation was instructed not 
to comment on the ICJ decision because they did not recognize UN supervisory powers 
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and so the ICJ decision was irrelevant.  They were also instructed not to respond to 
reports by the Committee on South West Africa because they believed that would give 
the Committee legitimacy.  The only thing they were informed to state was the 
Committee was illegal and the report contained numerous errors and falsehoods.488  
British officials informed the Union that their delegation would “take up a non-committal 
position on the International Court’s opinion” because it allowed more supervision than 
the mandate allowed.489  In discussions with the Fourth Committee, the South Africans 
realized the ICJ decision put them at a “tactical disadvantage” and they could not avoid 
discussing South West Africa.  Going into the 10th session, the Union delegation wanted 
to ensure the Committee and General Assembly would denounce the possibility of oral 
hearings, as well as prevent any resolution that limited South African actions in South 
West Africa. 490    
In the debates over the granting of oral hearings, the American, Mexican, Thai, 
Chinese, British, and Belgian, delegations spoke against them, while the Indonesian, 
Israeli, Venezuelan, and Lebanese delegations supported oral testimony.  During these 
discussions, Slote reiterated the Union’s position that the UN did not have supervisory 
powers over the territory and that oral petitions could only be heard from Trust 
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Territories.  Since South West Africa was not under the trustee system, granting of oral 
testimony violated the Charter. 491 
Even with the opposition within the Fourth Committee, Scott was once again 
allowed to address the UN.  In his address, he stated Namibians were concerned that 
Native Affairs were now being run from the Union and they were forbidden by new pass 
laws from traveling freely from the reserves.  He challenged the notion that the people of 
SWA were backward and needed gradual entrance into the modern world.  The only 
reason they could be considered “backward” was the Union denied them adequate 
education or freedom of movement by the “white dictatorship,” which ruled South 
Africa.  Scott also called on the Fourth Committee to send the oral testimony issue to the 
ICJ, because while he was able to speak before the committee, others wanted the 
opportunity as well. 492  
 Friendly delegations informed Sole the decision to hear Scott was “a direct 
consequence of the withdrawal of the South African delegation.”493  Many within the UN 
believed the Union’s opposition to Scott’s testimony gave it legitimacy.  If he was merely 
the misinformed trouble maker, then the Union would not worry about him.  Sole 
believed  
the withdrawal of the South African delegation accordingly meant that the more 
irresponsible elements in the Fourth Committee (Liberia, Indonesia, Syria, etc.) 
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could have an almost free rein, uninhibited by any prospect that their 
irresponsibility would be shown up in its true light.  Furthermore they could make 
the most of the traditional feeling in the Fourth Committee that all requests for 
oral hearings are virtually sacrosanct and may not be denied.  Finally there is no 
doubt that Liberia and Indonesia (both represented by women delegates) were 
guided and advised by the Reverend Scott.  He was anxious to make the most out 
of the opportunity provided by the absence of the South African Delegation.” 494 
 
Sole was incredibly worried the refusal of the Union to participate in the proceedings 
regarding South West Africa weakened their position. 
 Sole was also concerned the Liberian and Indonesian delegations “were mere 
instruments in Mr. Scott’s hands,” and were incapable of acting without his puppet 
strings.  He had emphasized in a report that these two delegations were headed by women 
and implied they were not capable of acting on their own initiative.495  South African 
officials continuously had issues working with delegations that were not led by white 
males.  Louw previously had trouble with Eleanor Roosevelt and had requested that 
Sayre keep her in line, and Pandit continuously gave the South African delegation fits. 
Following Scott’s testimony, the United Nations decided to end the debate over 
oral testimonies and on December 19 requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ to clear 
up the issue.  Union officials were reassured by the UK Attorney General since oral 
petitions were not allowed under the mandate, then the ICJ would rule that they were 
inadmissible. 496  Wieschoff, of the UN Trusteeship, division also informed Jordaan that 
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he did not believe the ICJ would go against their previous decision and allow oral 
petitions.497  Both officials were wrong.  On June 1, the ICJ ruled the UN could allow the 
Fourth Committee to hear oral petitioners.  This decision radically changed the nature of 
the debate within the Fourth Committee.  From this moment forward, Namibians became 
a permanent fixture at the United Nations and would continuously give oral testimony on 
conditions within the territory. 
Almost immediately after the decision, the first Namibian to appear before the 
United Nations requested an audience.  Mburumba Kerina, a student at Lincoln 
University in Pennsylvania, had begun to send in reports to the United Nations in 1955 
and by beginning of 1956, he became a regular fixture at the United Nations.  In his first 
letter to the UN, he wrote he wanted to speak as a common citizen and not interfere with 
Scott’s work, but he had to tell the UN about the abhorrent pass laws and police brutality 
that controlled the life of Namibians.498  Kerina paved the way for future Namibians to 
make their way across the Atlantic and speak before the UN. 
 The presence of Scott and Kerina as well as the decisions of the ICJ angered the 
South Africans.  Sole thought argued the Union should rejoin the Fourth Committee, 
because the South West African issue was going to discussed, but if they were present 
they had to  
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avoid any action by the Fourth Committee harmful to the basic interests of the 
Union Government.  In 1956, if we continue attending and participating in the 
discussions on South West Africa, I am confident that by pursuing the same 
attitude as in the past, we shall best be able to avoid any action by the United 
Nations which may seriously injure the interests both of the Union and of South 
West Africa. 
However, whether we are present or not, even if we were to withdraw from the 
United Nations and to incorporate the Territory in the Union, I see no prospect in 
the immediate future of avoiding annual discussion of this item by the General 
Assembly.  I recognize that the question of our presence at, and participation in, 
the South West Africa discussions must be resolved in the light of wider 
considerations affecting our relationship with the United Nations as a whole, but I 
am satisfied that, so far as the South West Africa item itself is concerned, our 
participation in the debates not only acts as a restraining influence, but is on 
balance more beneficial to the interests of the Union and South West Africa than 
our absence would be.”499 
 
Sole’s assessment of actions in the Fourth Committee proved to be correct.  The 
1956 report of the Committee was the most critical one to date.  Khoman’s, the Chair of 
the South West Africa Committee,  attitude had soured on the Union and Sole believed he 
had begun trying to identify himself and his country as closely as possible with the 
extremists amongst the anti-colonials of the Arab-Asian group.” 500  Gerig had also turned 
away from the Union and refused to act as a moderating influence.  According to Sole, 
the US continued its “past policy on South West Africa, that is, to do nothing which 
would alienate the vast majority of members of the Fourth Committee and was therefore 
a matter of some disappointment.” 501  Sole wrote “on South West Africa we stand 
completely alone in the United Nations.  There is not one country which agrees with us in 
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our interpretation of our obligations.  At best, our friends are inclined to abstain rather 
than vote with us.” 502  He believed, however, if the Union remained within the Fourth 
Committee then they could possibly gain some ground in the debates. 
On December 6, the Fourth Committee decided they would hear oral testimony 
from both Scott and Kerina.  In his speech before the Fourth Committee, Scott reiterated 
his previous concerns over conditions in South West Africa and read portions of letters 
from Kutako and Witbooi, which described how the takeover of the South West African 
Native Affairs department by Union officials had led to deteriorating conditions within 
the territory.  Both Kutako and Witbooi protested they were being pushed into smaller 
reserves and there was already not enough room for all of their people.  Witbooi wanted 
the UN to know all of the African people were one, and they all needed to work together 
to stop the pass laws and forced relocation of their people.  Scott summed up their 
petitions by stating in both the South West Africa and the Union “the law [had] become 
an instrument not of justice but of draconian oppression for the majority of the people by 
a privileged caste of white-skinned people.”503  Scott was citizen by the Khoman who 
told him that he could only discuss South West Africa, not the Union because the Fourth 
Committee did not have jurisdiction in the internal issues of a member state.  Even when 
describing the appalling conditions within South West Africa, apartheid was off limits in 
the Union. 
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Kerina’s first speech in front of the Fourth Committee came on 11 December 
1956.  He was the first Namibian to be heard in front of the Committee and his presence 
was a transformative moment in the South West African issue.  He began by clearing up 
some issues with his name.  Union officials referred to him as Mburumba Getzen and 
claimed he was a coloured from South West Africa descended from a German settler.  He 
said in order to receive a passport he changed his name, but his true name was Murumba 
Kerina and he was a Herero from Namibia.  Besides changing his name to receive a 
passport, he was told by the South African authorities in order to gain permission to study 
in the US he had to promise that he would not discuss race relations in South West Africa 
and he was not to come back to South West and discuss equality.  He was led to believe if 
he violated either of these rules he would be shot on his return. 
The South Africans did not stick around to hear either Kerina’s or Scott’s 
speeches.  On November 30, Sole informed the Fourth Committee that the South African 
government would only “be represented in the General Assembly on a nominal basis” 
and they would not be participating in the activities of the Fourth Committee.  The South 
African delegation essentially withdrew from the United Nations because of the 
deteriorating conditions regarding the South West Africa debate and the General 
Assembly’s decision to discuss apartheid and the Indian issue.504  With the ICJ allowing 
both written and oral decisions, the only voice heard at the end of the 10th and throughout 
the 11th sessions of the United Nations was that of Namibians.  The fight for the right to 
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be heard throughout the 1950s created a major victory for the people of Namibia, and 
from then on, they would be able to bring their message directly to the United Nations 
over the protests of the Union. 
215 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:   
A NEW APPROACH, MOBILITY, MASSACRE, AND NATIONALISM 
 
 
 As D.B. Sole predicted at the end of 1956, the Union’s withdrawal from the 
United Nations did not stop the Fourth Committee from discussing the Union occupation 
of South West Africa.  Three ICJ decisions between 1950 and 1956 reiterated the role of 
the UN in determining the future of South West Africa. After the ICJ rulings he Union 
could not avoid UN interference in its administration of the territory.  The 1956 ICJ 
decision regarding oral petitioners radically transformed the nature of the debates over 
South West Africa.  Namibians now had the legal right not only to petition the UN, but 
also present oral testimony before the Fourth Committee.  With the boycott of the UN by 
South Africa, the only voices heard from Southern Africa were those in support of 
Namibians including for the first time, Namibians themselves.  From 1956 until 
independence in 1990, Namibians continuously presented testimony to the Fourth 
Committee in their bid for independence.   
 South Africa’s withdrawal from the UN in 1956 had one unintended consequence.  
The hostile rhetoric against South Africa over the proceeding decade began to taper off in 
1957.  The British and American delegations in particular, were concerned by the 
Union’s boycott of the UN and wanted to bring South African officials back to the 
negotiating table.  Even during the frustrating of periods of negotiations between Union 
officials and the UN in the early 1950s, many delegations hoped an acceptable solution 
could be agreed upon between the UN and the Union.  However, with the Union refusing 
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to participate in the discussions, many feared the Union would speed up its 
implementation of apartheid and the UN would be left out of any decision regarding the 
future of Namibia.  With these concerns in mind, the Committee on South West Africa 
began to discuss a new approach to the situation in South West Africa.  Led by the US 
and British, the committee formed a Good Offices Committee that would have a lot of 
leeway in coming up with a solution to the impasse over the territory.  The Good Offices 
Committee was charged with the task of bringing the Union back to the negotiating table.  
The new approach by the Fourth Committee as well as the General Assembly mostly 
avoiding the apartheid issue convinced the Union to return to the UN as full members in 
1958.   
 The negotiations would not go as planned, as two Namibian issues would 
prejudice the Fourth Committee against the Union and cause Union officials to close 
ranks and push the UN aside.  In 1959, a young Namibian, Hans Beukes, “illegally” 
traveled to the UN’s meetings in New York.  His story captured the attention of activists 
around the world and threatened the Union’s relationship with the UN, Great Britain, and 
the United States.  In December of the same year, the long dispute over the future of the 
Native Location in Windhoek came to a head as a protest over relocation and beer ended 
with the South African Police opening fire into a crowd and killing eleven Namibians in 
what became known as the Old Location Massacre.  The arrival of Hans Beukes in New 
York and the murder of protesters in Windhoek helped end the congenial atmosphere 
within the United Nations and transformed the nature of the struggle for Namibian 
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nationalist.  By 1960 leading Namibians realized that the previous strategies of each 
group representing themselves abroad was ineffective and two competing multi-ethnic 
nationalist organizations emerged and competed for global support and funds in their 
attempts to end South African rule. 
 Even after the victory at the ICJ regarding oral petitioners and South Africa’s 
temporary exit from the UN, Kutako was pessimistic about the future of Namibia at the 
beginning of 1957.  He wrote to the Secretary General to express gratitude for the work 
being done on behalf of the Namibian people, but that the situation in the territory 
continued to deteriorate.  The Union still refused to grant passports to Namibians and had 
expanded apartheid and the pass laws.  He believed that “persuasion of the Union 
Government has so far failed and will always fail as long as the Union Government is 
allowed to continue having an undisturbed hold over South West Africa and an unlimited 
right of determination of Policy in S.W.A.” and that the “Non-Europeans are retrograding 
in every way.”505  He wanted the UN to expand their activities regarding South West 
Africa and to push for an immediate end to South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. 
 Scott, however, was not relying just on the United Nations to bring about the end 
of South African rule.  Kwame Nkrumah had invited him to Ghana to celebrate Ghanaian 
independence.  While there, Scott began to work on Nkrumah to commit to helping him 
both within and outside the United Nations.  He told Nkrumah that while he wished the 
UN could do more, they might be able to slow the transition to apartheid within Namibia.  
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He also requested that Nkrumah work with the United Nations to work on a new 
approach to the entire situation.506  Scott wanted to ensure that as more African nations 
entered the United Nations that they would come in firmly on the side of the Namibian 
people.  This strategy proved to be effective.  Asare, the Ghanaian Minister of 
Communications, told the UN in October that the Union’s “flagrant disregard” of the 
Mandate was a “challenge to the very existence of the United Nations” and that the 
treatment of Namibians was the “very worst form of imperialistic exploitation.”507  He 
demanded that the UN move quickly to resolve the situation. 
 Both Scott and Kerina spoke before the Fourth Committee in September.  Scott 
reemphasized the deteriorating conditions for Africans within the territory stating that 
over the last ten years the Union had “whittle[d] away the few rights possessed by the 
indigenous people.” 508  He described the people of Namibia as wards of the UN that the 
international community had an obligation to protect.  Most of his evidence was based on 
a letter from Kozonguizi who described the horrendous conditions within the territory.509  
Kerina spoke in a similar vein, but seemed confused over the legal status of the territory.  
He stated that for the last eleven years the people of South West Africa have earnestly 
hoped that South Africa as a member of the UNO would be persuaded to place their 
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country under the UNO Trusteeship System, as it is required by the Charter.”510  Kerina’s 
unfamiliarity with the decisions of the ICJ made him seem irresponsible to many 
delegations.  One South African official wrote that Kerina had not made a good 
impression and that friendly delegations viewed him as irresponsible if not an outright 
liar.511  While Kerina’s opening talk at the UN was underwhelming, he became a fixture 
of Namibian activism over the next decade. 
 With the exception of the Ghanaian delegation and the presence of Scott and 
Kerina, the criticisms at the UN in 1957 were muted.  P.W. Botha, Slote’s replacement, 
wrote “that the rather wild and hostile atmosphere which has in the past been a trademark 
of the Fourth Committee on the question of South West Africa, has not been much in 
evidence this year.”512  The Fourth Committee was still critical of the Union, but the 
violent condemnation from previous years was noticeably absent.  Khoman and others 
were concerned that the Union’s withdrawal from the UN would lead to a deteriorating 
situation and many were looking for a new approach that would finally resolve the 
situation and attacking South Africa would not help the situation.513  In an effort to 
resolve the situation, Khoman introduced a resolution that would create a Good Offices 
Committee (GOC) to negotiate with the Union.  The Good Offices Committee would 
have wide latitude in discussing a possible solution, unlike the previous committees that 
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dealt with the issue.  Khoman had discussed the possibility of the Committee with a 
multitude of South African officials to find out if they would be receptive to this 
approach.  It was hoped that this committee could achieve a compromise where the others 
had failed.514 
 The membership of the committee was of paramount importance.  The Union had 
to have a working relationship with the committee members.  The United States and 
United Kingdom were selected to be on the committee, but the third delegate was debated 
within the Fourth Committee.  The Indians wanted to be a part of the delegation, but the 
Americans and British successfully argued that the inclusion of an Indian on the 
Committee would destroy any chance at a compromise.  The Indian and South African 
delegations had been feuding for years and would not be able to set aside their 
differences.  In the end, the committee decided that Brazil would be a neutral voice the 
Union could work with.515  Khoman was heavily criticized for pushing the Fourth 
Committee to accept the British, Americans, and Brazilians onto the Good Offices 
Committee.  He defended himself by arguing that the lack of a hostile delegation gave the 
committee a legitimate chance to succeed were others had failed.  The Union had agreed 
in principal to meet an impartial or friendly delegation and the GOC was designed to 
succeed.516 
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 The British delegation told Botha that they believed the Good Offices Committee 
could be successful as long as the UN avoided strong condemnations against apartheid or 
the Indian issue.  The British also wanted the GOC to take public opinion within the 
Union seriously and not to push for unrealistic compromises.  In that vein, it was 
suggested that the GOC meet in London, not in the United States.  Some feared that if the 
meeting was held in the US then the State Department’s insistence that the Union submit 
a trusteeship agreement would derail the entire operation, because the Union had 
categorically rejected the concept of trusteeship.517  Botha was optimistic about the 
possibilities of the GOC.  The purpose of the GOC was to negotiate with the Union, not 
make proposals that the Union must accept or reject.  The Committee also would only 
last as long as the South Africans were willing to negotiate with it and since the British 
and Americans were not openly hostile towards the Union, then it had a chance to 
succeed.  The initial plans were for the Committee to begin negotiations with the Union 
in March or April of 1958.518  The Committee for South West Africa also decided that 
they would not try to negotiate with the Union because that was now the job of the 
GOC.519  Louw told the South African press that there was “no serious objection to our 
meeting the ‘Good Offices Committee’ and hearing what ‘new approach is envisaged,” 
                                                
517 Letter to Jooste from Botha, 15 November 1957, BTS 1/18/12, vol. 1, NASA. 
518 Letter to Jooste from Botha, 6 December 1957, BTS 1/18/12, vol. 1, NASA. 
519 Letter to Jooste from Botha, 9 January 1958, BTS 1/18/59, vol. 38, NASA. 
222 
 
but that the Union would continue to maintain complete sovereignty over South West 
Africa.520 
 In the months before the meetings between the GOC and Union officials, each 
side planned how to resolve the situation.  Heinrich Wieschhoff, a confidant of UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and member of the UN Secretariat, wrote that the 
GOC was designed “not be to negotiate a treaty but merely to seek common ground for 
an understanding and subsequently to report to the General Assembly.”521  He believed 
that this approach could solve the issue because it would create a neutral forum to discuss 
how to bring South West Africa under the jurisdiction of the UN, but in a way that would 
not exceed the mandate.  Wieschhoff wanted to make sure the United Nations recognized 
the direct link between discussing apartheid and the negotiations over South West Africa.  
He argued that along with allowing oral petitioners, discussing apartheid was 
counterproductive and would only anger the Union.  If the General Assembly or Fourth 
Committee acted irresponsibly then the Union would just leave and the international 
community would lose their ability to resolve the situation.  His advice to the GOC was 
to not take anything off the table and he advised the General Assembly to seriously 
consider any deal reached between the GOC and Union.522   Wieschhoff also gave Botha 
a letter that suggested possible strategies to take with the GOC.  He believed that a 
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solution would take years and that he would recommend that the Fourth Committee, not 
allow oral petitioners and even avoid discussing the South West African issue while the 
GOC met.523  One reason Union officials were so willing to work with the GOC was 
because they took Wieschhoff’s personal advice as the policy of the Secretary General.  
If followed it would effectively censor the Namibian voice at the UN.  The right to 
petition and give oral testimony would be circumvented and the Union would be able to 
present their case without being challenged. 
 During the initial meetings in London, Union officials did not meet with the 
GOC.  At this meeting, the Committee decided how they were going to proceed with the 
negotiations.  Wieschhoff told Botha that Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the British delegate, 
and Ambassador da Cunha, the Brazilian delegate, were realistic and open to any 
suggestions, while the American Walmsley was “too much bound by what the State 
Department might think.” 524  Walmsley thought that the GOC should push the Union to 
accept a trusteeship agreement for the territory.  During the course of their deliberations, 
the GOC discussed creating a South West Africa committee that would act identically to 
the mandate commission, and that this might be an agreement the Union could accept.  In 
the end the GOC did not come to any firm conclusions about how their negotiations with 
the Union should go, but remained optimistic that an agreement could be reached.525  In 
his discussions with Botha, Wieschhoff wanted to ensure that Botha knew that all of the 
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information about the meetings in London was told under the strictest confidence.  He did 
not want the other members of the GOC to know that he was informing the Union about 
the negotiations within the committee.  They planned to hold discussions with the Union 
in South Africa in early June.526  UN officials wanted to ensure that the proposed trip to 
South Africa was paid for entirely by the UN so that it did not appear as if the Union was 
buying off the committee.527   
The GOC arrived in South Africa in early June and began their deliberations with 
the Union.  Louw wanted to ensure that the nature of the meetings be kept under wrap 
and that the press be kept uninformed of the discussions, because they could be 
embarrassing for all involved.528  Louw’s plans were successful, the meetings between 
the Good Offices Committee and Union officials were done in secrecy, and nothing was 
let out.529 Union officials immediately rejected any UN supervision over the territory 
either through a revived mandates style commission or by submitting a trusteeship 
agreement.   
During their meetings in May, the GOC suggested that partitioning South West 
Africa could be a viable option, but that they should wait for the Union to bring it up.  
Partition could solve the problem with the areas outside of the Police Zone becoming 
independent or placed under a trusteeship agreement and the southern portions of the 
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country could then be annexed by the Union.  The GOC did not think this would be able 
to pass the General Assembly without major negotiations, but that it was worth 
considering.530  During the deliberations between the Union and GOC in Pretoria, the 
partition issue was seen as a chance to solve the problem.  The majority of the African 
population lived outside of the Police Zone north of Windhoek.  Both the GOC and 
Union officials believed that if it was packaged correctly partition had a chance of 
passing through the UN.  Virtually zero whites lived in the police zone and so even with a 
trusteeship agreement placed over the territory, South African racial policies would not 
be a concern.  The Union would only agree to go along with this agreement if the UN 
would then stop worrying about apartheid in either South Africa or South West Africa.  
The Committee decided that they could recreate the mandate system with France, UK, 
and the Union as permanent members with the election of former League members to 
round out the new Mandates Commission.  They also suggested partition with the 
northern portion being placed under trusteeship and the southern portion joining the 
Union after UN supervised elections that included universal suffrage or ruled as a 
mandate as before.   
During the discussions, Union officials protested that the UN had poorly handled 
the SWA issue beginning with the refusal to allow incorporation in 1946 even though 
90% of the population wanted it and oral petitions, which the Union believed, violated 
the charter and were never permitted under the mandate.  Union officials were also upset 
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over the constant interference in their internal affairs by the UN.  While the negotiations 
were more productive than any other, at the end the Union still refused to accept UN 
jurisdiction over the mandate or the territory, but they would enter an agreement with the 
US, UK and France.  In the end, the GOC believed that partition would be the best bet for 
an agreement.531 
Sir Arden-Clark in a meeting with members of the Commonwealth Relations 
Office relayed his experience in Pretoria.  He believed that “Union Ministers were 
genuinely anxious to work their way back into the United Nations, provided this could be 
done without loss of face.”532  He saw the agreement of the South Africans to the issue of 
partition to be evidence of this.  Union officials were willing to give up a portion of South 
West Africa in order to get back into the good graces of the UN, but were still “adamant 
that they would not accept any form of accountability to the United Nations.”533  Arden-
Clarke suggested that the British delegation should work closely with other delegations to 
convince them that the partition plan was a legitimate solution and should not be 
dismissed as a stalling tactic.  He believed that with British and American support that the 
plan had a chance to succeed.534 
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 The British Foreign Office was not as optimistic as Arden-Clarke over the success 
of the partition plan.  While they believed it was administratively workable, they did not 
think that the Third World delegations would accept partition.  If South West Africa was 
split and became part of the Union then the legal ability of the United Nations to discuss 
the racial situation in South Africa would be harmed.  Some in the General Assembly saw 
South West Africa as the window in which they could attack South Africa racial policies.  
Not only would members of the Afro-Asian bloc try to stop the plan, but there was a real 
possibility that the US State Department would refuse to support any plan that did not 
lead to a trusteeship agreement for the entire territory.535 
 Unfortunately, for the Union, news of the partition plan leaked to the press before 
the British could begin their lobbying efforts.  Louw wrote to both Arden-Clarke and da 
Cunha telling them that the leak did not come from the South Africans.  He reassured 
them that only senior ministers knew of the plan and hinted that the leak came from the 
US State Department.536 537  In his letter to Walmsley about the leak, Louw reiterated that 
it did not begin with the South Africans, but he did not accuse the Americans of spilling 
the story to the press.  Wieschhoff also believed that the leak came from the Americans.  
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He overheard the Soviet and Indian delegates joking about the partition issue before his 
office was completely informed, so it could not have come from the Secretariat.538 
 Union officials decided that they would participate fully in the United Nations in 
1958, because of the positive steps the Fourth Committee and General Assembly to work 
with and not against the Union.  The negotiations between the Union and the Good 
Offices Committee demonstrated the new commitment of the UN to hold real 
negotiations rather than accuse the Union of acting improperly.539  Louw hoped that this 
new moderate UN would last and that the two parties could solve their many differences.  
Louw told parliament that if the UN once again attempted to interfere in internal South 
African affairs, by discussing either the apartheid or Indian issues or being demanding on 
the South West African issue then they would have to reevaluate their role in the UN.  
Louw hinted that if the UN acted as they had in previous years then the Union would 
permanently withdraw from the United Nations.540   
 Arriving back at the United Nations, Union officials believed that they could 
finally proceed on the South West African issues and believed that the “new approach” 
would shield them from attacks in both the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly.  
Botha thought that the negotiations with the GOC went really well with one major 
exception.  He argued that the attacks on the Union over Apartheid and the treatment of 
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Indians within the Union should stop if the UN was going to negotiate in good faith.  He 
desperately tried to link the negotiations over South West Africa with the attacks on the 
Union and tried to get the apartheid and Indian issue declared as a violation of the UN’s 
charter.541 
 Kutako, Kerina, Kozonguizi, and Scott did not sit idly by while the Union 
negotiated with the Good Offices Committee.  Leading Hereros wrote to the UN about 
the new Chief Native Commissioner, Blignaut.  Blignaut had told the Herero to stop 
writing to Scott and the UN, because they could not help the Herero and to accept the fact 
that they were under South African rule.542  Scott publically compared South African 
control to the Cold War, saying that by refusing to allow Kutako and others to travel to 
the UN they had created an Iron Curtain around South West Africa.543  The Fourth 
Committee throughout the late summer and fall continued to read and analyze petitions 
from Namibians and Scott.  The Union tried to discredit Scott as an extremist and a 
communist who only was trying to cause problems.  They used his recently published 
memoir A Time to Speak, particularly his flirtation with communism in the interwar 
years.  Union officials described him as an “unstable and vacillating character with his 
self-confessed double standard and ‘duplicity’ is the type of person that Members of this 
responsible Committee blindly accepted as the representative of the Natives of South 
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West Africa!  Members of this Committee should think twice before allowing a witness 
of this type”.544  This broadside was not particularly effective.  Scott had previously 
acknowledged his flirtation with communism and successfully convinced most UN 
delegations that he no long accepted communism and that his concern with South West 
Africa came from his deep Christian faith. 
 The Fourth Committee in its deliberations over South West Africa accepted a 
request by Scott to speak before them.  Louw claimed that by hearing Scott the Fourth 
Committee was undercutting the Good Offices Committee and that the Fourth Committee 
was trying to destroy the “new approach”.  In response, Louw withdrew the South 
African delegation from the Fourth Committee and said that the Union would only 
discuss South West Africa with the GOC.545  In a conversation with Walmsley, Assistant 
Secretary of State, Union officials questioned whether Scott should be allowed to speak 
before the Fourth Committee.  Walmsley cautioned the Union on reacting to strongly to 
Scott’s presence, because the more South Africa protested the more others wanted to hear 
what Scott had to say.  Union officials believed that the issue was larger than Scott and 
that the Fourth Committee was actively trying to destroy the work of the GOC and must 
be stopped.546   
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 On 12 September, The Windhoek Advertiser published a letter from Kutako that 
spoke out against partition.  Kutako wrote that, “South West Africa is a geographical unit 
and can therefore not be partitioned without endangering its inhabitants socially, 
economically and politically.  If it is partitioned, it would not be able to exist as a 
territory and it would be robbed of its rights as an international Territory whose aim is to 
foster the sacred trust of civilization.”547  Under the partition plan the Herero would be 
incorporated into the Union and lose what little protection their international status 
provided them.  Kutako was not the only one who fought against the partition plan.  
Africans universally criticized partition.  The Afro-Asian group in the UN also 
preemptively sponsored and pushed through a resolution criticizing partition before the 
issue could even be discussed by the Fourth Committee over the protest of the US and 
British delegations.548   
 With the increasing hostility of the Fourth Committee Jooste began to question 
the wisdom of continuing to negotiate with the UN over South West Africa.  He told the 
Secretary for External Affairs that in his opinion “continued participation would 
considerably weaken Union’s tactical position and also damage Union’s prestige,” so the 
Union should not work with the UN.549  Louw in his first address before the UN since 
1956 criticized the Committee on South West Africa for sabotaging the Good Offices 
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Committee and destroying the spirit of reconciliation that had convinced the Union to 
return to the UN.  He also warned that if the Fourth Committee continued attacking the 
Union then the progress over South West Africa would cease.550  The Fourth 
Committee’s attack on South African became rampant in October.  The Liberian delegate 
demanded that South Africa leave the territory at once and called it one of the key 
problems in the world.  The Soviet delegation referred to the treatment of Africans 
comparable to a “feudal state” and criticized the illegal incorporation of the territory by 
the Union.551  Arden-Clarke was also targeted for his participation in the negotiations 
over partition.  The Yugoslavian delegate asked him if the committee had considered the 
Namibian population in their discussions with the Union.  Arden-Clarke reacted angrily 
stating that   during his 35 years of work in Africa, with Africans and for the good of 
Africans, nobody ha[d] ever found it necessary to put such a question to him,” but that it 
raised a good point that the committee should do more to show that they “at all times 
have the interests of the indigenous population at heart”.552  The Union delegation was 
informed by Pretoria that any future negotiations with either the GOC or the UN would 
be based upon the “spirit by which it is animated, and the manner in which it is framed,” 
as well as the nature of the conversations in the Fourth Committee and General Assembly 
and the composition of the new committee.  Union representatives were warned not to 
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commit the government to any position, but to state that they would be open to 
negotiation as long as it was based on the above criteria.553 
Within the Fourth Committee, a contentious discussion over the future of the 
Good Offices Committee broke out.  The Tunisian Delegate, Dr. Abdesselam, said that 
Tunisia had not believed in the GOC, but that it did manage to bring the South Africans 
back to the Fourth Committee, even if only for a short time.  He supported a continuation 
of the Committee only if partition or annexation were removed as possible solutions to 
the impasse.554  The Polish delegate, Mr. W Roozinski, did not understand why the UN 
was discussing the continuation of the Committee arguing that it had already been “killed 
by none other than . . . Eric Louw,” and that Poland opposed going through with another 
Committee that will only showcase South Africa’s refusal to work with the UN.555  
Portuguese delegate, Alberto Franco Nogueira, supports the reestablishment of the 
Committee, because he believes it has the best chance of working out a solution.556  The 
US delegate, Irving Salomon, also argued that the Committee should be renewed in its 
current form.557  Salomon continued by arguing that the Committee is the only option to 
move forward in the quest to provide the “indigenous people of South West Africa” to 
secure “equality, the inalienable dignity of human beings and the opportunity for 
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political, educational and economic improvement.”558  Gilbert Longden, the UK 
Delegate, pointed out that the Union has been cooperating with the UN, and that “some 
delegates had been less than generous in failing to acknowledge and welcome this change 
of attitude.”559  The Liberian delegate, Angie Brooks, said the Committee should be 
renewed and expanded by two representatives, one from Africa the other from Latin 
America.560  The British also believed that the South West Africa situation needed to be 
resolved and that the Good Offices Committee was the best method for a resolution.  In 
light of that they voted for the resolution renewing the Committee.561 
Ronald Blecher, the Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in South 
Africa, informed Louw that the UK would not nominate a new delegate for the Good 
Offices Committee unless the South Africans were willing to negotiate with the GOC.  
Blecher warned the South Africans that if the Union refused to work with the GOC, then 
the failure to find a solution would fall squarely on the Union.  However, if the Union 
continued with the negotiations and either the Fourth Committee or the General 
Assembly became hostile towards the negotiations then the failure to come up with a 
solution would fall squarely on the UN. 562  Louw and Jooste recommended that the 
Union follow Belcher’s suggestions and continue working with the committee in the hope 
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that the UN itself would prevent a solution, which would make the South Africans look 
like the victims.   
While Union and UN officials tried to negotiate for the future of the GOC, 
criticism was springing up around the globe.  The All Africa People’s Conference in 
Ghana condemned the Good Offices Committee and demanded that Namibia be placed 
under a trusteeship agreement.  The All Africa People’s Conference further demanded 
that all non-self governing territories be granted immediate independence or be granted 
trusteeships.563  Toivo Ja-Toivo and F. Isaacs of the Ovamboland People’s Congress also 
wrote a letter directly to the Secretary-General questioning Wieschhoff’s participation in 
the GOC.  Ja-Toivo and Isaacs were concerned with the amount of praise that Louw and 
been giving Wieschhoff and believed that anyone that Louw like was dangerous for the 
Namibian people.564  They had a reason to be concerned.  Wieschhoff had worked to 
keep the South Africans informed about the secret meetings of the GOC and seemed to 
want a solution even if it was not in the best interest of the Namibian people.  Wieschhoff 
told Fourie that he did not believe that the letter criticizing him came from the 
Ovamboland People’s Conference, but that it was created by Kerina and then sent to 
Namibia.  Fourie agreed with him because he thought “the second signature is obviously 
that of a European or a well educated Coloured-the handwriting of F. Isaacs is certainly 
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not that of a Native.”565  As late as 1958 the South Africans were in denial that legitimate 
criticism of their rule could originate within Namibia or Africa.  Herero and Liberian 
criticism were the work of Scott, and ja-Toivo and Isaacs were merely stooges of Kerina.   
The work of the Good Offices Committee and the willingness of the South 
Africans to negotiate with the United Nations hit a major roadblock in 1959 when the 
Committee on South West Africa invited two Namibians, Fanuel Jariretundu Kozonguizi 
and Hans Beukes to appear before them.  Kozonguizi had written the UN in 1954 and the 
Fourth Committee had requested his presence.  However, as with Kutako, Union officials 
had refused to grant Kozonguizi a passport to attend the United Nations meetings. After 
writing his initial letters to the UN, Kozonguizi faced repercussions from the South 
African authorities.  He was prevented from working and struggled to make it in 
Namibia.  He told The Windhoek Advertiser that his early letters to the UN were written 
in the folly of his youth and did not represent his views in 1957.  The editor of the 
Advertiser believed that Kozonguizi became radicalized because he could not find 
employment.  He had become certified as a teacher, but was unable to find work so he 
moved to Cape Town to study international law.  In Cape Town Kozonguizi became 
active in trying to improve the conditions for the Herero in South West Africa.566 
Kozonguizi joined the ANC while in Cape Town and regularly met with other 
Namibians who were interested in unifying the Namibian people to oppose the South 
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African government.  He became the president of the South West African Student Body 
and was the first president of the South West African National Union (SWANU).  
SWANU was founded in 1959 and was the first pan-Namibian nationalist organization.567  
Kozonguizi worked with Ja Toivo to organize the Ovambo and Hereo into SWANU, with 
the blessing of Kutako.568  Both Ja Toivo and Kozonguizi left Windhoek in 1958, which 
slowed the development of SWANU.  Ja Toivo was arrested and imprisoned by the South 
Africans and the Herero Chief’s Council decided to send Kozonguizito the UN.  In an 
interview with historian Tony Emmet, Kozonguizi said that Scott had become 
disenchanted with Kerina and requested that the Herero send a delegate to the United 
Nations to present evidence against the South Africans.  Scott argued that neither he nor 
Kerina had not been to Namibia in years and therefore could not speak authoritatively on 
conditions within the territory. 569   
Kozonguizi left Namibia on February 10, 1959, via Bechuanaland, on his way to 
the New York as a representative of the Herero Chief’s Council.570  By the middle of 
April Kozonguizi had reached Accra where he sought the help of both the United Nations 
and Scott to secure an American visa.  Scott wrote to the Committee on South West 
Africa asking them to request his presence as they had in 1957, which would facilitate an 
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American visa.571  On April 15, Kozonguizi appealed directly to the Committee on South 
West Africa, requesting an oral hearing so that he could “put the case of the Herero 
People of South West Africa.”572  When Kozonguizi left Namibia in February, he had a 
temporary passport that allowed him to travel to Ghana for missionary work that was set 
to expire at the end of April.  His passport contained a rider that any request to renew the 
passport should be referred to the Union Department of the Interior.  Since his passport 
did not allow him to travel to the US, when he asked for a renewal, the South African 
embassy in both Leopoldville and Accra denied him an extension.  However, once he was 
in Accra he approached the US embassy and was eventually granted a visa to travel to the 
UN.573  Kozonguizi left the Union without travel documents, which was why he needed 
UN support to continue his journey from Accra.574  The UN granted Kozonguizi’s request 
for an audience on 20 April and by the end of the month he was in New York. 
Kozonguizi spoke before the Committee on South West Africa on May 1.  Unlike 
Scott and Kerina who claimed to represent individual groups in Namibia, Kozonguizi 
told the Committee that he  
want[ed] to make it very clear that I am here today to speak for all the indigineous 
people of South West Africa, that is, those who are conscious of the deplorable 
and appalling conditions under which they live, as well as those so spiritually 
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enslaved under the demoralizing conditions that it has not been possible for them 
to realize what a morally anesthetized administration has done to them.575 
 
Kozonguizi’s work with ja Toivo to create a national party to oppose South African rule 
gave him the confidence to claim to speak for all Namibians.  While he was authorized 
by Kutako to speak for the Herero, his opening statement before the Committee 
demonstrated the shift away from ethnic organizations into the beginning of national 
resistance. 
 Kozonguizi’s speech before the United Nations was both an appeal for help and a 
warning.  He told the Committee that the Namibian people led by Kutako held great faith 
in the United Nations, but in the thirteen years since its founding South Africa had 
extended its control of Namibia and that Namibians were growing tired of waiting for 
justice.  While, Kutako, was patient and believed that the UN would eventually save 
Namibia from the South Africans, the younger generation was not as patient.  Kozonguizi 
chastised the UN for acting quickly to solve the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising, but 
the organization seemed content to push the Namibian crisis down the road.  He told the 
UN that Namibians were “not blind to the fact that all the issues in which the Union of 
South Africa is involved seem not to be taken with the same urgency as the others.”576  
The UN’s willingness to negotiate with the South African administrations that built their 
society on apartheid was a lost cause because neither Malan, nor his successors Johannes 
Strijdom or Hendrik Verwoerd would give up apartheid.  Africans whether they were in 
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Namibia or South Africa did not expect the Union “budge an inch,” and Kozonguizi 
called on the UN to abandon the false hope that the Union would change.577  He also 
warned the Committee that if the UN did not act then Namibians would find others who 
might help them.  This was not an idle threat.  In 1960, Kozonguizi traveled to Beijing to 
gauge Chinese support in driving the South Africans out of Namibia. 
 Kozonguizi also informed the UN that conditions within Namibia were 
deteriorating rapidly.  Those who spoke out against the Union’s administration were 
arrested and harassed.  Union officials also warned the Ovambo and the Herero not to 
petition the UN, because it had not accomplished anything, and would lead to trouble.  
Kozonguizi was particularly concerned with the case of ja Toivo.  Ja Toivo had been 
expelled from Cape Town after writing to the UN and was arrested in Windhoek.  He had 
been placed under virtual house arrest in Ovamboland, all for speaking the truth about 
conditions in the territory.  Kozonguizi also described the forced removal of Namibians 
from the Hoachanas reserve.  The police had violently expelled the people from the 
reserve and their leader the Rev. Markus Kooper had been removed from office.  
Kozonguizi was concerned that the events in Hoachanas would repeat themselves in 
Windhoek, where the South Africans wanted to move the native location outside of the 
city.  These events demonstrated clearly to Kozonguizi that the situation was worsening 
and that the UN should immediately step in to stop the Union’s barbarity.578  
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 Back in Windhoek, South West Africans were upset at Kozonguizi’s portrayal of 
the situation in Namibia.  The Windhoek Advertiser argued that Kozonguizi represented 
Kutako, and the South Africans had their representatives, but no one was representing the 
white population of South West Africa in “the ‘war’ which is raging at the moment about 
the future of the Mandate State.”579  While, whites in Namibia overwhelmingly supported 
the South African position, many began to feel as if everyone else was overshadowing 
their views as the future of their country was being discussed on the international stage. 
Following his speech the Committee on South West Africa debated what to do, 
but in the end decided that they would wait until Kozonguizi spoke before the Fourth 
Committee in June before taking action.  Some within the Committee thought that as long 
as the GOC was trying to negotiate a settlement, then the Committee should not discuss 
conditions within South West Africa.  In June Kozonguizi gave a more detailed 
description of conditions within the territory and still the UN wanted to wait and see how 
negotiations in the GOC were progressing.  Kozonguizi decided not to renew his 
American visa, which expired at the end of July.  He planned to return to the Union even 
if he faced imprisonment, to build up the nationalist front at home.580  Back in Namibia 
the Herero Chief’s Council moved to create SWANU with Kozonguizi and ja Toivo 
away from Windhoek, they formally created the organization in August of 1959.  
SWANU was collaboration between the Ovomboland People’s Organization, 
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spearheaded by Sam Nujoma, Kozonguizi’s organization SAPA, the Herero Chief’s 
Council and other smaller groups around Namibia.581  In September, Kozonguizi was 
elected the first president of SWANU and began to plan his return to the UN with all of 
Namibia behind him. 
 As Kozonguizi planned to travel home from the UN, the attention of the South 
Africans and South West Africans turned to Hans Beukes.  Hans Beukes was a young 
man from Rehoboth who had received a scholarship to study in Norway.  Buekes was 
studying at the University of Cape Town and was awarded a three-year scholarship to 
study at Oslo University by the National Union of Norwegian Students.  Attending school 
in Cape Town, Beukes would have heard about the activism in his fellow South African 
and Namibian colleagues.  Kozonguizi, ja Toivo, and others were meeting and forming 
the ideas that would lead to SWANU when Buekes arrived in Cape Town, but there is no 
evidence that Beukes worked with any of the nationalists while in school.  Union officials 
issued Beukes a passport on June 15 allowing him to travel to Oslo, however as he tried 
to board his ship for Europe, his passport was revoked.582 
 Union officials claimed that his passport had been revoked because they had 
uncovered materials that indicated “Beukes had been associated with political activities 
deemed inimical to the interests of the State.”583  What these activities consisted of was 
never clearly explained by the Union.  Beukes father believed that his passport was 
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revoked because Jacobus Beukes had written to the UN criticizing the conditions within 
Rehoboth.  Union officials put the two names together and assumed they were related.  
His father disagreed saying that, Jacobus Beukes was not directly related to the family 
and they had not criticized the Union.  However, he agreed with what the letters sent 
from Rehoboth to the UN stated.  In a letter to The Windhoek Advertiser, Beukes wrote 
that “Can anybody who writes letters be right and left today be blamed?  Or is it not right 
for a non-European who lives in a democratic country to feel hurt if he has been hurt?”584  
All evidence points to Hans Beukes activism beginning after his hopes for an education 
in Norway were dashed.   
Allard Lowenstein, an American activist who toured South Africa and Namibia in 
1959 to expose the horrors of apartheid, arrived in Cape Town shortly after Beukes 
passport was revoked.  Lowenstein wrote about his findings in his book Brutal Mandate: 
A Journey to South West Africa.  In Brutal Mandate he recounted meeting Beukes the day 
after he became famous for his passports revocation.  The story of Beukes immediately 
appeared in newspapers throughout South Africa, as the Union argued that like Kerina 
before him Beukes was only using his studies to work against South African interest.  
Lowenstein disagreed.  He said that Beukes was “a depressed and disorganized young 
man, too shattered to plan, too frightened to fight back.  He had no money and no idea 
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where he could get any to continue his education.”585  Beukes reportedly told Lowenstein 
that he “was always so careful,” and “did nothing they could object to—nothing.”586 
Lowenstein claimed that Beukes did not have any interest in appealing to the UN, 
because he did not think that his issue was big enough to trouble the UN.  Lowenstein 
informed Buekes that as a Namibian, his case was special and he should consider 
protesting to the UN.  Beukes cabled the UN.  He then approached Lowenstein about 
traveling to the UN arguing that if his letter could make an impact, then so could his 
presence.  The seizing of his passport and stalling of his future radicalized Beukes and 
gave him the determination to fight the apartheid state.  He requested Lowenstein’s help 
in traveling to the UN, because he did not know whom else he could turn too.  Beukes 
began speaking out against the South African government to student organizations in 
Cape Town and ratcheted up the pressure against him.  By early July, the Beukes Affair 
had taken over the newspapers as protestors gathered and raised funds for him to continue 
his studies.  The Committee on South West Africa responded to Beukes and requested his 
presence on July 31.  The seizure of Hans Beukes passport galvanized opposition to the 
South Africans in Cape Town and gave activists around the world a symbol to hold on 
too.587 
 Beukes and Lowenstein then planned his escape from South Africa.  Since he 
would be traveling without documents Beukes had to smuggle himself out of the Union.  
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Botswana felt like the safest landing point and Lowenstein along with his colleagues, 
Sherman Bull and Emory Bundy, and Beukes loaded up their Volkswagen and began the 
journey north from Pretoria.  Beukes hid in the back under their luggage for the majority 
of the trip to avoid being recognized and they drove into Botswana.  Arriving in 
Botswana was only the first step; Beukes had to find a way to New York.  Lowenstein, 
Bull, and Bundy dropped Beukes off at Sereste Khama’s house and headed back to 
Pretoria to plan their trip to Namibia.588  Hans Beukes found himself in Botswana without 
a concrete plan to make it the rest of the way to New York.  He arrived in Botswana 
around July 12.589  The Windhoek Advertiser weeks after Beukes had arrived in Botswana 
was tyring to find out where he had gone.  Beukes stopped attending classes the moment 
he heard the UN would hear his petition and no one had seen him for weeks.590591 
 Beukes tried to cross into Rhodesia at the Plumtree railway stating, but was turned 
away because did not possess travel documents. 592  Union citizens were legally allowed 
to travel into Botswana without passports, but could only enter Namibia or the Union 
from there.  Travel into the Central African Federation, also known as the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was prohibited.  With the help of Sereste Khama, the leading 
African in Botswana, Beukes was able to eventually cross the border and arrive in 
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Salisbury, the capital of Rhodesia.  His arrival in Salisbury caused an international 
uproar.  Papers in South West Africa, South Africa, and around the world had followed 
his travels and by the middle of August, Beukes was still one of the top news stories in 
the Union.593  An article in the Rand Daily Mail speculated on his location as he had 
disappeared from Botswana, but had not yet arrived in the Federation.594 
 Khama, Beukes, the United Nations, and Michael Scott pressured the British 
government to allow Beukes to travel through the Federation and London on his way to 
New York.  Beukes’ presence in Salisbury put Federation and British officials in a 
precarious position.  The relationship between South Africa and the United Kingdom had 
been deteriorating for years and British officials wanted to keep South Africa within the 
Commonwealth and the western orbit in general.  Hans Beukes’ presence within the 
Federation threatened this relationship.  The Central African Federation was nominally 
independent, but the United Kingdom remained in charge of the Federation’s foreign 
policy.  Africans within the Federation where also becoming increasingly active in 
demanding an end to white rule and to be granted independence which guaranteed 
majority rule.  British officials had to decide whether to honor the wishes of the United 
Nations and allow Beukes passage or to send him back to South Africa as the Union 
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demanded.  One British official described it as a “very awkward situation” that needed to 
be solved as quickly as possible.595 
The British decided that they should help Beukes because the consequences of not 
facilitating his travel were worse than facing “the wrath of the South Africans.” 596  The 
Dominions Office was concerned that if it came out that they prevented Beukes from 
traveling through the Federation the UK position at the UN would be imperiled.  L.E.T. 
Storer believed that the best-case scenario was that the GOC’s work would fail because 
the UK was the chairperson of the Committee and at worst a resolution condemning the 
British for working against the wishes of the UN could be passed. 597   British policy 
rested on the idea that even though they did not believe Beukes was an authorized 
representative for Namibia, holding up his passage was not worth angering the Fourth 
Committee.598 
Storer’s position that the UK should help Beukes travel into and through the 
Federation from Bechuanaland,w as questioned by many within the British government.  
Some believed that the British should only help people who clearly were UK citizens, 
which Beukes was not, and that allowing Beukes through could set a dangerous 
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precedent.599 W.A.W. Clark wrote to the Secretary of State Selwyn Lloyd, recommending 
that if Beukes could produce an invitation from the United Nations then the British 
should recommend that the Federation allow him to travel to New York.  The problems 
within the UN would not be worth holding him up.600 
H.L.M. Oxley was concerned that no matter what the British decided, the South 
Africans might issue an arrest warrant under the Departure from the Union Regulation 
Act of 1955, which stated that no one could leave the Union unless they were going to 
one of the protectorates without a passport.  Since Beukes had entered the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, he had broken this law.  Oxley said if a warrant was issued for 
his arrest the UK might be obligated to extradite him back to the Union; however, they 
could allow Beukes to appeal the decision and it might take care of itself.  He also wrote 
that the UK High Court would be hard pressed to find an excuse not to send Beukes back 
if formally requested by the Union Government.601  British officials were also concerned 
that Beukes might request asylum.  Sir Samuel Hoare, of the Home Office, informed 
Storar “we would not be in breach of any of our international obligations, moral or 
obligatory, in refusing Mr. Beukes political asylum.  The U.N. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (which is only morally binding in any case) recognises the right to seek 
and enjoy asylum, but was carefully drafted to omit the right to obtain asylum – not, of 
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course, that his will deter the anti-Colonials from using it against us in the U.N. if the 
point arises!”602 
 While the British were deciding how to proceed, Louw was putting pressure on 
the British to “prevent Beukes’ onward passage” out of Botswana, because his actions 
clearly demonstrated that he always planned on going to the UN not to Norway to study.  
Louw continually used Beukes letters to the UN, after his passport was revoked, as 
evidence that the South Africans were justified in preventing his travel to Norway.  Sir 
Jon Maud, the UK High Commissioner, explained to Louw that the British were not 
willing to alienate the UN by preventing Beukes from traveling, especially since he had 
already left Botswana and made it to Salisbury.  Maud explained that if Beukes was sent 
back to South Africa, the British who would shoulder the blame, not the South Africans.  
One union official informed the British that in light of the already deteriorating 
relationship between the Crown and the Union that they British should not do anything 
else to weaken their connection.603  Union officials also discussed trying to extradite 
Beukes from the Federation, but ultimately decided that it would not come to anything as 
the British were too afraid of the UN to accept extradition. 
Union officials also approached the Americans in an attempt to stop Beukes from 
traveling to New York.  The Americans informed the Union that “Because of their site 
agreement with the United Nations it was most difficult to withhold visas.  They could 
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confine people to parts of Manhattan in the case of known communists.  They could be 
stricter if the person concerned planned to overthrow the United States Government. 
The fact that the person had no valid travel document was not a material one.  The main 
thing was that the person should be able to identify himself to the satisfaction of the visa 
officer.  The visa was issued as a separate piece of paper and did not have to be attached 
to a passport.”604  The US wanted to make sure that if Beukes was prevented from 
traveling to the UN it would be on the UK or Federation, because they had issued the 
proper travel documents.  Neither the American nor the British were willing to allow 
themselves to be blamed for not granting the wishes of the Fourth Committee.605 Beukes 
had applied for a US Visa and since the UN requested his presence, the US was obligated 
to grant one.  The British were excited about this turn of events because it let them off the 
hook.  Even without a passport, the US Visa would allow him to cross through the 
Federation and through London on route to the US, without the British having to make an 
active stand one way or the other.606 
Hendrik Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of South Africa, informed Maud that 
allowing Beukes to travel through British territory was a violation of Union sovereignty. 
Union officials believed that allowing Beukes to travel through the Federation was 
problematic because, “the authority of the State was being undermined, how subversive 
action in the Union could be promoted by assisting agitators, Communist and fugitive 
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offenders to escape ‘the authority of the Union Government’ and to find their way to the 
United Nations, which was gradually becoming a refuges for such persons.”607  Verwoerd 
and Louw were concerned that by allowing Beukes to cross through the Federation, a 
pipeline of Africans would be established and attack the Union abroad. Union and 
Federation officials discussed arresting and extraditing Beukes back to the Union, but 
Federation officials said they would be unable to do so as the British said to let him pass 
through.608 
On September 1, Beukes was given permission to travel to London and he arrived 
on the ninth.  Lowenstein sent $600 to help facilitate his travel onwards from London.  
While in London, Beukes met up with Michael Scott and hosted press conferences and 
speeches to tell his story to the British public.  A couple of days later, Beukes and Scott 
traveled to Oslo to thank the students who had supported him throughout his struggle.609 
The Norwegian Students Union had held protests against the South Africans ever since 
Beukes passport had been revoked.610  Beukes addressed a crowd of Norwegian students 
and according to one South African official he received a “hero’s welcome.” 611  The 
South African Charge d’Affairs in Stockholm wrote that while in Oslo Scott and Beukes 
“succeeded in the space of only a few days, in doing us an unprecedented amount of 
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harm in Norway.”612  The Norwegian newspaper Aktuell Beukes as “probably the most 
soft-spoken, the least aggressive agitator, who has ever escaped from the hands of the 
Secret Police in South Africa, excited by racial politics.  An unknown man with a golden 
coloured skin, who once secretly dreamed of taking a degree at a University:  This is 
what 23 year old Hans Beukes from South West Africa was like – until a few months ago 
. . . . Now things have suddenly changed for Hans.  These last weeks he has been 
headlines in the news over the whole world and is no preparing a report about his country 
for the United Nations . . . all on account of the colour of his skin combined with an 
unexpected bursary from the University of Oslo.”613 
 Beukes left Oslo on September 13 and headed to New York to address the United 
Nations.  In New York, Beukes addressed the Fourth Committee and told the story of his 
trials and tribulations.  Most of what he said reaffirmed what Kerina, Kozonguizi, and 
Scott had been saying with a new twist on how the Union wanted to prevent Africans 
from gaining access to education.  The apartheid state was wantonly harming the African 
population.   In reference to his passport being revoked Buekes told the UN “I was not 
disappointed for seeing my hopes smashed.  One does not feel disappointed when one is 
bitten by a dog.  I don’t think the nations here who recognize our claims to the rights of 
human beings in our home country, will be insensitive to the injustices done to us.”614  By 
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the time that he arrived in New York, Beukes fame had propelled him to be the 
representative of the Rehoboth community at the United Nations, regardless of the 
positions taken by the South African government.615 
After Beukes arrived in New York, Maud reassured the South Africans that the 
UK did not see a similar situation as Beukes arising and that the Federation would not be 
used as a conduit for South Africans and Namibians to leave the Union.616  British action 
with Beukes “was dictated by the virtual certainty of an outburst at the U.N. against 
ourselves (since Beukes went to Bechuanaland) and the Federation (who first stopped 
him at the border) if we held him up.  There were very strong reasons for avoiding this, 
particularly as it was known an attempt would probably be made to debate Nyasaland 
during the General Assembly, which was likely to succeed if we exacerbated U.N. feeling 
over Beukes.”617 
Hans Beukes’ journey to the United Nations was remarkable not just for his 
perseverance in traveling the length of Africa and Europe in order to arrive in New York, 
but because of the diplomatic maneuvering that helped facilitate his journey.  
Kozonguizi, had managed to escape Namibia and South Africa and go to the United 
Nations, but he did so through Ghana, which had emerged as an early champion of 
Africans opposing apartheid.  Beukes’ journey was illuminating because it demonstrated 
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how the United Nations could influence government policy.  Union officials viewed the 
British decision to allow Beukes to travel through the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland as a direct attack on South African sovereignty.  The British weighed the pros 
and cons of angering the Union or the United Nations and decided that UN support was 
more important than their relationship with South Africa.  The power of the Fourth 
Committee directly influenced British policy and even though many officials did not 
want to allow Beukes to pass through the Federation, it was not worth the consequences 
to prevent him from doing so.  The Americans were also in a bind.  Even if they had 
wanted to refuse Beukes a visa, as in the case of Scott a decade before or Kozonguizi, the 
State Department was required to grant a visa to anyone the UN requested to hear.  If 
someone was traveling to the United Nations passports and other travel documents were 
not necessary, and South Africa’s refusal to grant passports to Namibians or South 
Africans was no longer effective in preventing Africans from traveling to the United 
Nations.  The UN by the early 1970s would fully rectify this problem by granting 
Namibians passports, which allowed them to travel throughout the world, without 
permission from either the authorities in Windhoek or Pretoria. 
Following Beukes’ address at the United Nations, Louw argued that the Fourth 
Committee did not have the right to hear petitions, even if it was the heir to the League, 
because the mandates commission only heard petitions under extraordinary 
circumstances.  In front of the Fourth Committee, Louw criticized Scott, Kerina, 
Kozonguizi, and Beukes.  He said Scott was not a legitimate representative of the Herero 
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and if anyone had read his memoir then they would know that he was not a reliable 
source.  He also claimed that Kerina was an agitator who had not fled South West Africa 
but had been given a student passport which had been renewed several times, and his 
testimony was full of lies and exaggerations.618  The Windhoek Advertiser was also 
mildly obsessed with Kerina.  In one instance they wrote that “The typical half-truths 
accepted by some UNO committees from people like Getzen and Kozonguizi, even after 
the “Advertiser” exposure of the Gtezen lies, can lead in only one direction-S.W.A. will 
eventually start considering the whole United Nations Organization as a farce.  In many 
respects it already is.”619 Every time he spoke before the United Nations, the newspaper 
fact checked and attempted to discredit his testimony.  Louw also attacked Kozonguizi 
arguing that he had left the country on forged documents and did not represent anyone.  
Louw was either unaware or purposefully ignored the growing organization of Namibians 
within Namibia, that Kozonguizi was spearheading with Ja Toivo.   Louw saved Beukes 
for last arguing that he was a left wing radical whose passport was only revoked after it 
was found out that he was not traveling to study, but to attack South Africa at the UN.  
Louw claimed that Beukes did not represent the Rehoboth Community and that he should 
not be trusted.  The South Africans had become convinced that Michael Scott had 
organized an international conspiracy designed to discredit and isolate South Africa.  
Louw argued that Lowenstein and Beukes were clear evidence of the strength of this 
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conspiracy.620  While Scott had been working with people like Goerge House of the 
American Committee on Africa, Kerina, Kozonguizi, and others, Beukes’ situation arose 
organically out of opposition to Apartheid and Lowenstein’s presence gave him the 
option to flee South Africa.  When Lowenstein testified at the Fourth Committee about 
conditions within Namibia, Louw used this moment to reinforce his conspiracy theory 
about Scott.  He said Lowenstein had lied and acquired a fraudulent visa to South Africa 
and that it could embarrass the US.  Louw stated, “the South African Government had 
long suspected the existence of a network directed by the Reverend Michael Scott and 
certain organisations.  It now had irrefutable proof that such a network existed and that 
Mr. Lowenstein was one of its agents.”621 
Recognizing that attacking the petitioners was getting him nowhere Louw began 
to change tactics.  In a speech to the UN, he avoided discussing the interference of the 
UN in South African affairs, but instead welcomed the new African states.  He stated “I 
wish, as the representative of an African state, to convey to the newly independent 
African states the good wishes of the Union of South Africa for their progress and 
prosperity, and to assure them or our hearty co-operation in regard to matters of common 
concern.”  He also implied that the UN should recognize the efforts that the imperial 
powers made in opening up Africa to settlement and to “developing the natural resources 
. . . and raising the standard of living.”  Louw also highlighted the difference in 
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development between South Africa and the rest of the continent.  This speech showed a 
different side to Louw.  Rather than being belligerent and upset as in previous speeches 
he tried to demonstrate how South Africa had benefitted the African population of the 
region and that they were sincere in offering a helping hand to the rest of Africa.622 
Louw continued this tactic at the Fourth Committee’s meeting.  He regretted the 
failures of the Good Offices Committee in 1958 and while he was pleased that it was 
reconstituted in 1959, it was so limited that he did not believe they could work together.  
He also pushed for partition if the inhabitants of South West Africa agreed to it.  Louw 
also stated that as long as the issue was being discussed the Union would continue to rule 
in the spirit of the mandate as it had done since 1920.623 Louw’s conciliatory actions 
would not last.  The Fourth Committee, particularly the African nations, wanted to end 
South African rule in Namibia.  Beginning in October and lasting throughout November, 
Namibians began to petition the UN to stop the South African’s from forcibly relocating 
the African population from the Windhoek Township.  Since 1954 the South African 
administration had began a plan to relocate the Namibain population away from the white 
urban center of Windhoek.  They had begun building a township on the outskirts of 
Windhoek, which the Namibians in the Location named Katatura, which translates to “we 
have no dwelling place.”624  Kutako, Witbooi, and Nujoma representing the Herero, 
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Nama, and Ovambo sent many letters requesting that the UN step into stop the forced 
relocation of the Location.625626 
 Throughout November and December, the Namibian population began to 
organize within Windhoek in order to fight relocation.  SWANU and OPO began a 
boycott of the municipal buildings within the Location, including the beer hall.  
Namibians purchased their beer from women in the Location rather than from the 
government authorized beer hall. The Windhoek Advertiser reported that on December 4 
a SWANU protest almost erupted in violence when the South African police arrested four 
women.627  By early December, the government began cracking down on the illegal sale 
of beer in the location and hundreds of Namibian women began protest marches on 
December 8. Two days later a protest outside the beer hall erupted in violence.  When the 
smoked cleared 11 Namibians were dead and dozens injured.628  The shooting of 
Namibians in Windhoek caused global repercussions as each side blamed each other for 
the disturbance.  The Namibian population would refer to the night of December 10 as 
the Old Location Massacre and the South Africans referred to it as the Windhoek Riot. 
 Word of the massacre almost immediately reached the United Nations.  The 
Fourth Committee had almost completed their discussions for 1959, but held an 
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emergency session to hear Kozonguizi, Kerina, and Beukes discuss the attack.  On 
December 11, Kozonguizi told the Fourth Committee “the forces of the South African 
Government are butchering my people.”  He also said “This is the hour in which the 
United Nations has to take (sic) a decision.  Either the decision will have to be for us or 
for the Union Government.”  Kerina’s brother was one of those killed and he just thanked 
the Committee for being willing to hear them before they closed up for the year.  Beukes 
said similar things as Kerina.629  None of the Namibian petitioners knew exactly what 
was going on in Windhoek and was simply asking the UN for help to protect their people 
from the South African government.  The South African delegation walked out during 
Kozonguizi’s speech because they still did not recognize the rights of Namibians to 
petition. 630 
Louw took a different approach and claimed that the UN  
 
by discussing and taking evidence on the South West Africa issue had 
made itself directly responsible for the disturbances on night of 10th 
December.  News of riot had not surprised him; he had expected it.  He 
had recently warned United Nations that agitation and incitement in South 
West Africa would lead to unrest.  The incitement Mr. Louw said was 
done particularly by whites.  He mentioned the three Americans who gave 
evidence before United Nations and also Getzen and Beukes.631 
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Louw believed that the situation was the fault of the international community who 
consistently encouraged the Namibian population to work against South African rule and 
that no one could be surprised when this erupted in bloodshed. 
 The Windhoek Advertiser reported that the incident started because an 18 yr old 
Namibian attacked an old woman.  When he was arrested, things spilled over.  The police 
presence grew until the women started throwing stones at the police officers.  The police 
fled to the municipal building and the crowd lit three cars on fire.  Armored vehicles then 
arrived from the South African Defense Force.  The defense force opened fire into the 
crowd.  Kerina’s brother, Bernad Gusche died at the hospital as a result.  The end of the 
article is an attack on Kerina’s credibility.632  After speaking with people at home, 
Kozonguizi disagreed with this position. He reported that 50 police went into the 
Location to arrest those who were boycotting the Municipal Facilities including the beer 
hall and recreation hall.  Thousands arrived to see what the police were doing in the 
location.  Major Lombard ordered the people to disperse and Willy Kaukuetu told him 
that they were not doing anything wrong and did not have to leave.  Some began to leave 
as they heard police talking about getting out their sten-guns.  As the crowd dispersed, 
the police began to shoot randomly into the crowd.  After the police, opened fire the 
crowd began throwing rocks at the police.  The police fired for forty-five minutes and 
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fired over three hundred rounds, 11 were killed, and 32 seriously injured.  The location 
was also put under martial law.633 
 The South African position was that the police were called into protect municipal 
buildings and only fired upon the crowd in self-defense.  What exactly transpired will 
depend on which side one chooses to believe; however, the South Africans had been 
preparing for the possibility of violence for days.  As one Namibian witness said “They 
knew, but we did not.”634  The South African Police were able to arrive heavily armed 
and ready to fight in minutes against an unarmed populace.  The morning of December 
11 would show a radically changed Namibia.  What little trust that existed between the 
Namibian population and the South African government evaporated.635  The reactions of 
the United Nations and SWANU would also fracture the new nationalist movement in 
Namibia and end the hope many of the younger generation held in the United Nations. 
 African and Asian support for the Namibian people poured in. On December 17 
the delegates from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, 
and the United Arab Republic sent a letter to Hammarskjold stating that “The situation in 
South West Africa, therefore, cannot be but a matter of legitimate and urgent concern to 
the United Nations, especially as the territory of South West Africa has an international 
status.  Moreover, the Government of the Union of South Africa’s repeated violations of 
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its obligations under the Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights constitute a threat to peace and security in Africa.”636   
 The Committee on South West Africa met and demanded that “the Mandatory 
Power to desist from the use of force and not to enforce the removal of the residents of 
the Windhoek Location.,” but little else.637  The Soviet delegate A. Saboleve wrote to 
Hammerskjold that they supported the Committee for South West Africa’s decision of 21 
December to demand a ceasing of the “mass transfer of the African population” of 
Namibia.638  The Commonwealth Relations Office described the discussion of the Old 
Location Massacre a being “raised in an atmosphere of some excitement in the closing 
hours of the United Nations General Assembly and has subsequently been considered by 
the United Nations South West Africa Committee.”  Letters had been trickling into the 
UN since October protesting the force movement of the Location to Katatura.  After the 
massacre the African states on the Fourth Committee wanted to refer the matter to the 
Security Council or hold a special General Assembly session, but these were both 
defeated.  The British position was that the Union must provide more information over 
the territory in general and the Massacre in particular.  They also believed that while the 
massacre was not a direct result of the move to Katatura the move was a definite factor in 
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the escalation.639 The Soviet Union and other “hot heads” wanted to refer the Old 
Location Massacre to the Security Council, but this was also unsuccessful.640  The UN 
merely condemned the action and by the 1960, session had proven that they were 
ineffectual in stopping South African aggression in Namibia. 
 Within Namibia, the Massacre split SWANU’s alliance between the OPO and the 
Herero Chief’s Council and the latter two split off and created SWAPO in 1960.   
Historian Tony Emmett argued that the split might have been avoided if Kozonguizi was 
not in New York and the head of the OPO Sam Nujoma had not been exiled from the 
territory.  The leadership of SWANU within Namibia was unable to prevent the party 
from fracturing.641  The nationalist movement of the 1960s revolve around SWAPO and 
SWANU fighting for legitimacy in the eyes of the international community with SWAPO 
eventually emerging as they main nationalist movement in Namibia. 
 One of SWAPO’s first official communications to the UN called on the UN to 
immediately place South West africa under a trusteeship agreement.  They also detailed 
the events following the Old Location Massacre.  They claimed that the Union brought in 
armored cars and arms to intimidate people to move to Katatura.  After the UN passed a 
resolution prohibiting South Africa from removing people by force the Union turned to 
indirect methods to get Africans to relocate including:  not giving work permits to those 
                                                
639 Commonwealth Relations Office, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Africa, January 1960, The Union and the 
United Nations: South West Africa:  The Windhoek Distrubances,” 31 December 1959, DO 35/10615, 
National Archives of the United Kingdom. 
640 Letter from Fourie to Jooste, 5 January 1960, BTS 1/18/1, vol. 7, NASA. 
641 Emmett, 312.   
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not in Katatura, firing those who did not move, only giving passes to those willing to live 
in the new location and expelling those who refuse from the towns.  Africans who did not 
move were also threatened by those who worked with the government.  They also listed 
the poor educational opportunities, health care, police brutality and the extension of the 
pass laws.642   
 SWAPO’s official history To Be Born A Nation says that the ineffectiveness of 
the United Nations convinced the party that they could not rely solely on the UN to save 
Namibia.  By early 1960s, SWAPO began to send recruits from Namibia throughout 
Africa to begin military training in order to secure the freedom of Namibia.643  The 
failure of the UN also spurred Ethiopia and Liberia the two African members of the 
League of Nations to end South African occupation through the ICJ.  Between 1960 and 
1966, the ICJ discussed the legality of South African rule and eventually dismissed the 
case by arguing that neither Liberia nor Ethiopia had the right to bring the case to the 
court.  The armed struggle for Namibia began almost immediately. 
 The year 1960 was a transformative year in the struggle for Namibia.  Harold 
MacMillan’s “Winds of Change” speech before the South African Parliament in 
February, the creation of the South West African People’s Organization, the creation of 
the Republic of South Africa, and the case against South Africa filed by Ethiopia and 
Liberia at the ICJ transformed the nature of the debate and discussions.  The declaration 
                                                
642 Letter to Secretary General of the UN from SWAPO, 28 June 1960, Scott Papers, Box  3, Rhodes 
House, Oxford.  
643 176 
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by Macmillan that the age of empires was past and South Africa’s break with the British 
Empire, left South Africa virtually alone as it tried to hold on to its empire in Southern 
Africa.  The UN continued to hear petitioners and discuss Namibia, but was in a holding 
pattern until the ICJ ruled on the status of the mandate and South Africa’s occupation of 
the territory.  SWAPO and SWANU moved their struggle from the UN and began an 
intensive campaign against each other as well as South Africa for the political soul of 
Namibia.  The days of individuals such as Kutako, Scott, Kerina, and Beukes were over 
as truly national organizations began to speak for the people of Namibia.  The 
groundwork laid between 1945 and 1960 by Namibian activists allowed SWAPO and 
SWANU to create truly global networks and helped isolate South Africa from the 
international community. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The creation of the United Nations in 1945 created a forum where Namibians and 
other colonized people could confront their rulers, in spite of the imperial powers plans to 
use the UN to maintain the status quo.  Namibians and South Africans viewed the UN as 
an institution that could further their aims in Namibia.  Hosea Kutako, the Paramount 
Chief of the Herero, believed the UN could be a savior that would prevent South Africa 
from annexing Namibia and eventually guarantee independence.  Kutako’s campaigns, 
through the Anglican cleric Michael Scott, prevented the Union of South Africa from 
annexing Namibia and set the stage for future international activism.  Jan Smuts, the 
Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa until 1948, as the President of the General 
Assembly at the San Francisco Conference that created the UN believed that the UN, 
would strengthen older imperial ties and was unprepared for the backlash that met his 
proposal to incorporate Namibia.  Since Namibia had been a League of Nations Mandate, 
the UN claimed a stake in its future.  Namibia was the only mandate not to be placed 
under the authority of the Trusteeship Council and South Africa’s defiance of UN 
resolutions and the international community’s wishes isolated South Africa, long before 
apartheid became a global rallying cry.  Smuts and Kutako’s battles in the early 1940s set 
a precedent for Namibian nationalists to use the UN to challenge South African rule.   
“A Global Struggle” examines the initial period of Namibian and South African 
action at the UN.  The diplomatic struggle over Namibia can be broken into four periods.  
Between 1945 and 1960, Namibians created the channels they would use to reach and 
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work with the international community and the South Africans acted willing to negotiate 
with the UN in order to resolve the situation.  The year 1960 was a key turning point in 
the struggle as the situation within Namibia, South Africa, and the international 
community changed.  By 1960 two rival multiethnic nationalist organizations SWAPO 
and SWANU replaced Kutako’s and others ethnic based protests.  In 1960, South Africa 
broke formally broke away from the British Empire and declared itself a republic, 
alienating a key ally in the process.  Great Britain was the only nation that consistently 
supported the Union, but after 1960 this support quickly dried up and South Africa’s 
place as an international pariah was secure.  The fight for empire also changed drastically 
in 1960 as British Prime Minister Harold MacMillian gave his “Winds of Change” 
speech in Cape Town, which publically acknowledged that imperialism was over in 
Africa.  In the UN fifteen years of South African intransigence caused Ethiopia and 
Liberia to file suit against South Africa at the ICJ in hopes of declaring the South African 
occupation of Namibia illegal.  Between 1960 and 1966 South Africa refused to discuss 
the Namibian issue in the UN until the ICJ ruled one way or the other, effectively taking 
the negotiations out of the UN.   
The second period of the struggle over Namibia was between 1960 and 1974.  
Both South Africa and the Namibians used this period to consolidate their positions.  
South Africa increased their control of Namibia and both SWANU and SWAPO 
expanded their actions at the UN and sent representatives around the globe to gain 
support for their parties.  SWAPO and SWANU worked together at first, but eventually 
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turned against each other in order to gain support from foreign powers.  By 1968, 
SWAPO had won this battle and was declared by both the UN and Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) as the authentic voice of the Namibian people.  The creation of the 
OAU during this period also helped Namibians by creating a voting bloc in the UN to 
work against the South African occupation, as well as supply financial and military aid to 
Namibians.  The ICJ took six years to decide Ethiopia and Liberia’s suit and in 1966 
declared that they did not have the right to bring the case, effectively dismissing the suit.  
In response, the decision on August 26, 1966 SWAPO launched its armed struggle.  The 
UN also promptly passed a resolution declaring that the mandate had lapsed and the 
South African occupation of Namibia illegal and the ICJ confirmed this resolution in 
1971.  At the opening session of the 1974 UN session, the General Assembly refused to 
accept the South African’s credentials and effectively removed South Africa from the 
United Nations.  Between Namibian activism and apartheid, South Africa angered the 
UN enough to be the only state, and an important founding member, to be removed from 
the UN. 
From 1974-1978 the UN began to set up a Namibian administration in Zambia 
and the war between SWAPO and South Africa heated up as Cuban troops entered 
Angola and supported Namibian independence.  The UN issued passports to Namibians 
as they traveled the globe attending conferences, receiving military and civil training, 
attending colleges and working towards an independent Namibia. South Africa withdrew 
from the international community and focused on securing its borders by clamping down 
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on nationalism in both Namibia and South Africa.  The South Africans also continued to 
work behind the scenes with the US and Great Britain as both feared that the presence of 
Cuban troops in Southern Africa would tilt the region towards the Soviet Union.  
Globally the focus against South Africa had turned towards apartheid and Namibia’s 
struggle was often pushed into the background.  Namibian activists staged international 
conferences and workshops around the world to keep South Africa’s occupation of their 
country in the spotlight. 
Beginning in 1977, a Western Contact group consisting of the US, GB, and 
France tried to negotiate with the South Africans to resolve the situation.  The UN passed 
Resolution 435, which demanded that South Africa leave Namibia, however the UN was 
ignored and the future of negotiations would happen outside the UN.  SWAPO, with 
Cuban support, fought the South Africans until 1989 when a solution was finally 
negotiated.  The Cubans agreed to leave Angola if the South Africans left Namibia.  This 
deal was negotiated between Cuba, the US, and South Africa, but without the 
international support and the military campaign of the Namibians, the future of Namibia 
would not have been guaranteed.  When examining the Namibian case it is easy to argue 
as Saunders and Gleijeses do that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola coupled with 
the end of the Cold War, not Namibian activism forced South Africa out of Namibia.  
However, that is only part of the story.  
 In 1945, South Africa was a respected member of the international community.  
Smuts was not only the President of the General Assembly at the San Francisco 
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Conference; he was instrumental in writing the preamble to the UN Charter.  By 1950, 
South Africa was an international pariah.  The US and Great Britain even when they 
wanted to support South Africa could only do so covertly.  The attempt by the Union to 
incorporate Namibia, while denying the rights of non-whites in both the Union and 
Namibia isolated South Africa from the international community.  Over a decade before 
the UN or international activists became concerned with apartheid, the Namibian issue 
had turned the international community against South Africa.  Namibia became a rallying 
cry for the emerging Third World as well as a key issue in the early Cold War.  By the 
time South Africa was willing to come to the negotiating table in 1989, international 
support had completely dried up.  Both Reagan and Thatcher had covertly supported the 
South Africans in Angola, but because of the international condemnation, created by the 
Namibians, the British or Americans could not openly support the apartheid state.  
Namibians and their supporters were successful in not only eventually winning 
independence, but also in isolating South Africa from the global community.  Namibians 
persevered for forty-five years against overwhelming odds.  After rebellions against 
Germany and a few isolated rebellions against South Africans, Namibians knew that they 
could not militarily defeat South Africa, so they had to use another avenue.  International 
organizations and diplomacy were the keys that would unlock their jail.  Against all odds 
Namibians struggle to make their voices heard and were able to overcome South Africa’s 
military and political might and win the battle for public opinion.   
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